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SUMMARY 
This thesis reports on a case survey of 15 UK metalworking companies and their experience of 
implementing an integrating technology - CAD/CAM. The thesis places this process of 
implementation in the organisational context of these companies by examining the ways in which 
the engineering/manufacturing interface is coordinated. This interface is important, because it is 
also critical to the effective implementation of such techniques as total quality management and 
simultaneous engineering. 
In order to develop an incisive analysis of these companies, a contingency approach to 
organisational analysis is developed around the idea of flows of information and materials and 
their interaction with the structure of the organisation in a process of structuration. This analysis 
is placed in the strategic context of the organisations' relationships to their environment through 
the notion of a production strategy. Models of the process of implementation are then reviewed, 
and a recursive model of implementation as organisational changing is developed which 
emphasises the processes of organisational learning. 
The management of the engineering design process has been little examined, in comparison to the 
management of manufacturing, and research and development. This thesis develops an analysis 
of the management of the entire production process from the conception of the product right 
through to its delivery to the customer in these 15 firms. It then goes on to examine the recent 
organisational changes in the engineering and manufacturing functions before examining the 
implementation process in detail. Finally, the basis of organisational integration from both a 
technological and organisational perspective is analysed, which provides the basis for some more 
general propositions on the development of production management over the next decade. 
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FOREWORD 
Although presented as a doctoral thesis, this work is the culmination of over a decade of work 
on the process of technological change. It started in 1979 when I developed teaching materials 
around the BBC TV programme "Now the Chips are Down" for a Dockers' Day Release class at 
the University of Hull. It continued at Imperial College, working with Arthur Francis and Paul 
Willman on a Joint Committee funded project, and after an interregnum, developed fully on a 
project at Warwick Business School. Chris Voss was the grant holder of this Joint Committee 
funded project. This thesis reports on the larger part of this research, but also draws heavily on 
the earlier work. 
The work draws extensively on the mainstream tradition of organisational sociology, but deploys 
many concepts from the production/operations managment literature to bolster some of the 
conceptual weaknesses of that tradition. It therefore presents a reformulation of the both the 
organisational sociology tradition, and the behavioural side of the production/operations 
management literature in a form that will, it is hoped, allow the trenchant analysis of the rapidly 
changing organisational landscape of the 1990s. 
My thanks must go first and foremost to Chris Voss for his support and encouragement 
throughout the project both as principal investigator and doctoral supervisor. Gibson Burrell 
contributed enormously to the final shape of the thesis through his detailed and patient supervision 
of the writing of the text. Jon Clark and Peter Clark provided crucial support and encouragement 
as external assessors of the related SERC project. Thanks must go also to the innumerable people 
with whom I have discussed the ideas contained here - especially John Bessant, Dave Buchanan, 
Joanna Buckingham, Arthur Francis, Alan McKinlay, David Twigg, and Fiona Wilson. This work 
would have been impossible without the commitment and cooperation of the managers from the 
15 companies surveyed, and my thanks are heartfelt and profound to these people who are actually 
creating the new organisational forms discussed herein. Of course, none of those mentioned bear 
any responsibility for my interpretations of our discussions. 
INTRODUCTION 
0.1 THE PARADOX OF FLEXIBILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY 
"We are beginning to look at our industrial processes as complete, integrated systems, 
from the introduction of the raw material until the completion of the final 
product...One way of defining automation is to say that it is a means of organizing or 
controlling production processes to achieve optimum use of all production resources -
mechanical, material, and human .... Fundamentally, I think automation means an 
optimisation of our business and industrial activities". 
John Diebold (cited Bright 1958 appendix 1), speaking before a US Congress subcommittee 
in October 1955, thus posed the key issue facing production organisations in the middle 
decade of the century. As these organisations approach the end of the century, many would 
argue that integration remains the critical issue. Some have suggested that there has been a 
fundamental shift in the character of production organisation towards "flexible specialisation" 
(Piore and Sable 1984); or, in an echo of Daniel Bell, towards "post-industrial manufacturing" 
(Jaikumar 1986) since 1955, but there are also crucial continuities with earlier periods. Indeed, 
there is a sense in which Diebold was re-iterating the words of Andrew Ure (cited Clayre 1977 
P 69) who, writing 120 years earlier, saw the factory as: 
"a vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in 
uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them being 
subordinated to a self-regulated moving force." 
The notions of the "integration" and "system" in production operations are not new; what is 
new is the insistence that they should be managed flexibly. Bright, in his survey of the impact 
of mid fifties high technology identi fied one of the key issues in the management of automated 
production facilities as "lack of flexibility" (1958 p 212). Indeed, much of his book is a 
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discussion of how to mitigate the inevitable reduction in production flexibility that automation 
then entailed. Earlier in that decade, John Diebold (1952 p 140) had identified the cost of 
"taping", or, as we would now call it, programming, as the most important single factor in the 
development of automation. The advent of microelectronics has allowed "taping" costs to be 
dramatically reduced, thereby enabling the development ofpror ammable, flexible automation. 
In addition to the dynamic development of efficient resource utilisation and cost reduction 
through productivity growth, product markets are now increasingly transmitting demands for 
both higher quality, and better response to customer needs in tenns of both time and 
specificity. The emerging paradox of production management is that of managing for both 
productivity and flexibility. Traditionally, flexible production organisations, such as job shops, 
tended to be relatively "loosely coupled"; while their "tightly coupled" counterparts in the 
integrated mass and continuous process production sectors delivered the remarkable 
productivity gains that have been the foundation of post-war economic growth. The challenge 
now facing production management is, therefore, to deliver flexibility while at the same time, 
not sacrificing productivity growth - to give customers the cake of effective resource 
utilisation, while letting them choose the recipe, and the time they take their tea. 
This paradox has its roots in the division of labour. Adam Smith lucidly expounded the 
benefits of the division of labour for the development of productivity, and also noted that it 
was limited by the extent of the market. For the subsequent 200 years, the pursuit of 
competitive production largely focused on an ever more detailed division of labour through 
the development of mass markets. This posed the problem of co-ordinating the fragmented 
production process; indeed, James D. Mooney, then a vice-president of General Motors argued 
in 1933 that 
"[co-ordination] expresses the principles of organization in toto; nothing less. This 
docs not mean that there are no subordinated principles; it simply means that all the 
others arc contained in this one of co-ordination. The others are simply the principles 
through which co-ordination operates, and thus becomes effective" (cited Urwick 
1937). 
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One response to this problem was to establish bureaucratic procedures which regulated rather 
than reduced the fragmentation engendered by the division of labour. The most notable 
developments of this approach were those of scientific management and classical management 
theory. A second response was that epitomised by Ford which developed the assembly line 
in the years prior to World War 1, and the transfer line in the years subsequent to World War 
2. Both bureaucratic organisation and production line technology were notable for their lack 
of flexibility, and it was the latter which influenced the conceptions of integrated production 
developed by John Diebold, James Bright, and their contemporaries. Productivity was achieved 
at the cost of flexibility. 
A whole set of process innovations are now making the dynamic resolution of this paradox 
possible. The most important of these are total quality management (TQM) through which the 
whole production process is subject to continuous review and improvement against criteria of 
quality and service for the customer; simultaneous engineering in which the processes of 
product development and manufacture overlap with the objective of reducing "concept to 
customer" lead times and increasing product integrity; and advanced manufacturing 
technologies (AMT) which deploy a wide variety of programmable control and data base 
technologies in the office and on the shop floor aimed at reducing costs and improving control 
of the production process. 
What all three have in common is that they are forcing a radical re-appraisal of the interface 
between the engineering design process and the manufacturing process. Poorly designed 
producL~ cannot be manufactured weIll, and so TQM's continuous improvement feedback 
loops increasingly need to pass through engineering design to be fully effective. Greater 
communication, co-ordination, and trust between engineering and manufacturing. proficiently 
project managed, are the essence of simultaneous engineering which, as its name implies. 
1) ;, deta':l"" a~a~ys~s o!~3r!"d-:y p:oblems at onE' of the cases s~o .... £'d tnat the :argest sing"e 
source of fault s .. as ',~~CSl' dC's':'gned :'n: 0 t ~( product. 
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breaks down the traditional sequential linearity of the design process. The aim is to "fast track" 
critical decisions so that manufacturing can start work before the design process is completed. 
The data required for manufacturing a product are created during the engineering design 
process; the drawing and specification are manufacturing's key texts, without which no 
production can take place. Thus, the design data created by engineering is the key input into 
the production planning and control processes. 
Engineering design has been largely ignored in the innovation literature. Talk of manufacturing 
and R&D strategies is now common currency, but one rarely hears of an engineering strategy. 
The focus has tended to be on the research and development process leading to radically new 
technologies, rather than on the more mundane, but equally crucial process of combining 
existing technologies in new ways, spiced as appropriate with a radical innovation. Arguably, 
the engineering design process will become even more important source of competitive 
advantage in the future as product liability legislation and reducing product development lead 
times reduce the space for radical innovation. 2 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the engineering design process 
and the manufacturing process through the medium of one of these innovations - Computer-
Aided Design and Manufacture (CAD/CAM) technology. It has been chosen because of the 
broad role that it plays in the development of the new organisation of production. Firstly, it 
fonns, together with Computer-Aided Production Management (CAPM) systems, one of the 
main building blocks for Computer Integrated Manufacture (CIM). Secondly, it has posed for 
many companies in a stark way the nature of the interface between the engineering design and 
manufacturing processes. Thirdly, it is, as one informant put it, an "enabling technology" 
which facilitates the implementation of TQM and simultaneous engineering. Finally, it is 
relatively well diffused through industry and so finding compatible cases with a significant 
2) ~~'.Js, o~e of :~e cases, ~~ae:- :.:;e i:;!~~e-.ce 0: .:s Japa~ese pa:-tne" ..... as airing to shorten 
its rroduct CH'\l'lop.-c:;t ~ead t:-es by ;educi;8 the :;.,.::--:::er 0: u;tr:ed tecr-.:;.ogies in eacr-. ne ..... p:-oduc: 
iniLlative. 
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level of experience which allow detailed empirical work is not too difficult. 
The focus on the engineering/manufacturing interface implies that the emphasis of the thesis 
will be on the processes of organisational change associated with the implementation of 
CAD/CAM. In this way, the findings will not only be relevant to the analysis of the 
implementation of other AMTs such as CAPM and, as it develops, ClM, but also to the 
implementation of TQM and simultaneous engineering. It is suggested here, and will be 
reviewed in the conclusions, that the organisational issues associated with CAD/CAM 
implementation are not significantly different from those associated with the other two 
innovations in the management of production processes. 
0.2 PARADOX RESOLUTION AND ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Much of the literature that has tried to explore these and similar issues, particularly the 
literature on innovation, has tended to be what Gibson Burrell has called "Heathrow 
Organisation Theory" (HOT). This is the type of management literature, typically found in 
airport and station bookshops, which attempts to provide management guides "in search of 
excellence", or to present entrepreneurial role models capable of "making it happen". While 
at its best - such as Kanter's "The Change Masters" - this literature provides effective 
theoretical analysis combined with an accessible, anecdotal style, it very often reduces to a sct 
of nostrums which yicld little indication of how they might be applied. Given that many of 
thc insights providcd by this literature are sound, the problem would seem to be the lack of 
a sen.~c of contingency. Cascs are trcated as sources of best practice without any attempt to 
understand how and why that firm dcvcloped the practice. In the absence of a scnsc of 
contingcncy, no assessment can be made of the extent to which cited best practice is 
transferable to any other firm. 
A fully effectivc analysis of contingcnt relations within and between organisations requires a 
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clear conceptual framework for analysis, and a set of firms which are varied enough for 
interesting differences to emerge, but not so varied that comparison becomes either futile, or 
so general that the lessons of best practice are lost. For this reason, the first part of the thesis 
develops a conceptual framework through the traditional method of a critique of the existing 
literature. This, I believe, is an essential foundation for the building of the case analysis in the 
subsequent chapters. As Kurt Lewin (1947) said, "nothing is quite so practical as a good 
theory". This is also why a single industry, metalworking, was chosen for analysis which is 
the largest single user of CAD systems. 
The case studies are presented in a rigorous, rather than anecdotal, style. This is at some cost 
to the lucidity of the prose, but I believe that if the reader is to understand the dynamics of 
the processes at work, then it is important to present the evidence as a whole, rather than to 
pick highlights. It is this process of systematic presentation which allows the development of 
models of contingent relationships which will, it is hoped, allow readers to analyse other 
organisations with which they may be concerned either as managers, consultanll\, or 
researchers in relation to the cases analysed here. 
In developing the conceptual framework, the argument treats a number of themes in a 
distinctive way. Firstly, it views technological change as a special case of organisational 
change, rather than a phenomenon in its own right. It thereby develops a processual view of 
the implementation of new technologies as organisational changing through a recursive process 
of organisational learning. Secondly, it articulates the contingencies facing the organisation of 
production as being dependent upon the production mission on the one hand, and upon the 
nature of the information and material flows chosen to fulfil that mission on the other. These, 
it will be argued, provide more readily operationalisable measures, than those of environment 
and task/technology usually found in the contingency literature. In this way contingencies 
become elements of process in the organisations under study. 
~ 
I 
Flows of information and materials are amongst the most imponant actions, or processes, in 
any production organisation. Similarly, the development of the production strategy as pan of 
the overall business strategy is a dynamic process of enactment of the outer context of the 
organisation. These processes are in tum structured in relation to the organisation -
information flows between sections; materials flow from department to department; strategies 
are formulated to utilise existing capabilities. In tum, changes in the process of strategy 
formulation or the character of information and materials flows through the dynamic resolution 
of internal paradoxes and external competitive pressures stimulate changes in structure. This 
dynamic interplay between structure and process is what Giddens (1979: 1984) has called the 
process of "structuration" - the institutionalisation of process into structure and the dissolution 
of structure through process. 
Thirdly, the thesis offers a distinctive "case survey" methodology whereby 15 comparable 
cases are researched as case studies with a longitudinal dimension and then analysed cross-
sectionally. The aim is to combine the richness and depth of qualitative case studies, with the 
typicality and breadth of survey data. The collection of basic performance data on each case 
also means that the outcomes of effective organisation design can also be assessed. Examples 
from the cases allow the expansion of main points in the argument, while frequency counts 
across the cases allow the reader to assess how widespread the relevance of the point is. 
0.3 PLAT': OF THE THESIS 
The first chapter discusses the existing approaches to technological and organisational change 
and innovation. The "diffusion approach" to technological change is. perhaps, most commonly 
associated with economists concerned with the processes by which firms adopt innovations, 
rather than with how they get the innovations to work once they have chosen to adopt them. 
The "impact approach". more favoured by industrial sociologists, lends to examine the 
outcome of technological change in terms or the impact on work organisation or organisation 
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structure, without a concern for the decision processes leading up to that impact. The "social 
shaping approach" is very much concerned with such decision issues, but for the individual 
firm implementing technologies such as CAD/CAM, many of the issues of technological 
shaping have already been closed off. An "implementation approach" will then be proposed 
which emphasises the totality of technological change as a process. A review of the more 
general literature on organisational change will take Pettigrew's critique of the linearity of 
much of the literature and agree with his call for a contextualist, processual approach. It will 
finally be suggested that technological change is merely a special case of organisational 
change, and not a qualitatively different organisational phenomenon, despite the almost 
complete separation of the two literatures. 
The second chapter moves on to review the various ways in which the "technology" has been 
conceptualised and deployed in organisational analysis and thereby explores the "content of 
change". It advocates the utility of the distinction between the technology and its dimensions 
advocated by Clark and his colleagues. Drawing on Kaplinsky, it then goes on to discuss the 
distinctive character of CAD/CAM as an integrating technology which distinguishes it from 
many other advanced manufacturing technologies and shows they way in which it forms a 
crucial stepping stone on the road to computer integrated manufacture - CIM. Finally the 
chapter reviews the development and present state of the art of CAD/CAM, indicating the 
ways in which changes in computer hardware over the last 10 years have radically altered its 
potential. 
Moving on to the analysis of organisations which provides the "context of change", the third 
chapter rcviews thc organisation design literature, and proposes a distinctive way of analysing 
"contingencies" which draws upon the production/operations management literature to provide 
morc tractahle opcrationalisations 01 "tcchnology" and "environmcnt" than have been used 
beforc. In particular, the notion of jlOH'S of information and materials is developed as the key 
contingency facing organisations together with the market environment as enacted through the 
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mission of the organisation. This framework is then deployed to develop a model of the 
operational functions within manufacturing organisations which provides the basis for the case 
studies in subsequent chapters. 
On this basis, the current debate on the integration of organisations is addressed. Drawing on 
the work of Lawrence and Lorsch, the fourth chapter first analyses the sources of 
"differentiation" in manufacturing organisations which mean that "integration" is required. It 
then goes on to review the extent to which such integration can be achieved through 
information technology alone, before assessing the frameworks developed by Adler and 
Galbraith for appraising the process and structure of organisational integration. These 
frameworks are extensively used in the analysis of the case studies. 
Building on the earlier analyses, and a critique of existing linear models of the implementation 
of advanced manufacturing technologies, chapter five advocates a dynamic and recursive 
model of organisational changing and thereby explores the "process of change". The model 
presented it is argued, is simple, robust. and capable of handling variety across an number of 
different cases, without loosing grasp of the essentially political nature of organisational and 
technological change. Finally, the chapter emphasises the importance of "organisational lag" 
and "organisational learning" for the implementation process. 
The first five chapters are aimed at setting up a conceptual framework for understanding the 
processes of changing within production organisations as they attempt to resolve the paradox 
of productivity and flexibility. The sixth chapter moves on to review the existing empirical 
literature on the implementation of advanced manufacturing technologies. It is structured 
around the model developed in the previous chapters, and shows how few studies have 
examined the entire process of implementation from the decision to adopt at the evaluation 
stage through to the associated ()r~:tnisational changes in the consolidation stage. 
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Turning to the empirical findings, the seventh chapter reviews the established approaches to 
organisational research before going on to discuss the distinctive research methodology 
deployed in this research, the case survey. The research instrument is then presented before 
the 15 companies studied are reviewed to help the reader understand the character of the firms 
involved in the case survey. 
Chapter eight presents the context of innovation. Firstly, the outer context of the firms 
surveyed is examined before their relationship to this context as enacted in four distinctive 
types of relationship to the customer are identified. This is followed by a detailed review of 
their inner contexts in terms of the production processes as articulated in each case's 
information and materials flows. The relationship between the information and materials flows 
is then developed in terms of how the three distinctive types of information flow identified 
are related to the two main types of material flow. On the basis of this analysis, three generic 
production missions are identified - two established ones which are called engineering led and 
manufacturing led, and a third, emergent, production led mission. 
Developing from the analysis of context in the previous chapter, chapter nine analyses the 
variety of organisation designs found amongst the cases. Firstly, the overall design of the 
companies is reviewed, and the stability of traditional, functional, "line and staff' organisation 
shown. The evidence for the relative instability of deviations from this fonn such as matrix 
and product orientated organisation designs is then presented. The argument then moves on 
to suggest that this level of analysis is incomplete, and the discussion reviews the organisation 
designs of manufacturing and engineering separately. Here, a considerable dynamism is found, 
with major changes in organisation design being implemented in most cases within recent 
years. Matrix organisation within the engineering function is the predominant form. Within 
manufacturing, very different organisation designs are reported, with the manufacturing led 
companies favouring a vertical division of labour between planning and operational functions, 
while the engineering led companies favour attaching the manufacturing engineering 
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deparunent to the part of the factory which it serves. 
The process of evaluation of CAD/CAM in the 15 finns is covered in chapter ten. It starts 
with a more detailed review of the actual systems implemented and the stage of technological 
integration achieved by each company. It then goes on to show the importance of internal 
"implementation champions", and specialist task forces in the process. The chapter then 
discusses the extent to which the evidence shows that evaluation is an inherently political 
process, and benefits from organisational learning. 
Chapter eleven shows the way in which the approach to the evaluation process influences the 
later stages of implementation as the new technology is installed and commissioned. The firms 
are assessed on the extent to which they have achieved technically successful systems. 
Particular attention is paid to the large number of difficulties which firms had, and are still 
having, in achieving effective and reliable CAD/CAM links. Although some of the initial 
problems were patently technical in nature, it is also clear that the remaining problems are 
largely organisational. The importance of effective project management of the implementation 
process, and the noticeable lack of attention to human resource management issues are also 
discussed. 
These organisational problems are explored further in chapter twelve through an examination 
of how achievement of successful implementation, defined in tenns of business rather than 
technical criteria. was attained. This is cast as the process of consolidation. Then. one of the 
most immediate organisational changes associated with the consolidation of CAD/CAM is 
investigated - the arrangements for the management of the system. Finally, the overall 
experience of the 15 case firms with implementation is summarised. 
Chapter thirteen re\'iews the empirical evidence deployed in the pre\'ious four chapters to show 
the ways III which the case study companies have tried to achieve integration across the 
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engineering/manufacturing interface, while retaining flexibility and responsiveness to market 
demands. The integration mechanisms at the level of both organisational process and 
organisational structure are identified before they are brought. together with the data presented 
in chapter ten, into a typology of organisational and technical integration. In tum, this is 
related to the performance data presented in chapter eight to suggest that the more integrated 
companies in terms of the relationship between engineering and manufacturing are also the 
more successful. 
The following chapter summarises the evidence and argument while the concluding chapter 
focuses in on two areas of more general relevance: 
1) The current state of organisational analysis is briefly reviewed and an approach some 
way between the generalities of the Montreal school's configuration analysis. and the over-
detailed and cumbersome methodology propounded by Van de Ven in his organisational 
assessment analysis is proposed. 
2) A view of organisational change as the dynamic resolution of tensions and paradoxes 
generated within and without the organisation is advocated. and the implementation of new 
technologies and techniques is shown to be central to the overall process of organisational 
change. In this process. the role of organisation design as a method for resolving dynamically 
the paradox between productivity and flexibility is examined. 
13 
1 
APPROACHES TO TECHNOLOGICAL AND ORGANISATIO~AL 
CHANGE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The dynamic of technological change has been one of the most profound characteristics of the 
capitalist system since the industrial revolution. The sense of awe captured in Philip de 
Loutherbourg's painting of "Coalbrookdalc by Night" still reflects our frequently contradictory 
responses to the latest technological breakthroughs today. As the pace of technological change 
has quickened over the last few decades, increasing attention has been paid by commentators 
to the processes by which these changes occur. This chapter will briefly review the main 
approaches to analysing those processes within organisations with the intention of identifying 
an "implementation approach" which views technological change in a way which overcomes 
some of the weaknesses of more conventional approaches. The more general literature on 
organisational change will then be reviewed, and a methodology for identifying the point of 
entry into organisations when analysing technological change will be suggested. 
1.1 APPROACHES TO TECH!\OLOGICAL CHANGE 
One of the major concerns of analysts of technological change has been the research and 
development lR&D) process which yields inventions, and the ways in which inventions are 
turned into usable innovations. The agenda set hy Freeman (1974) and others has yielded a 
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substantial body of work, relating innovative activity to economic perfonnance. More recently, 
the concept of a "technology strategy" has been developed to help to analyse the ways in 
which organisations develop and sustain competitive advantage through innovation (see the 
review by PREST 1989). However, the focus of this literature has been almost entirely 
devoted to the analysis of product innovation, rather than innovations in production processes. 
While, of course a finn's process innovation was at one time their vendor's product 
innovation, it is to be expected that the nature of the two different types of innovation process 
will be different. Crucially, process innovations occur in the operational parts of the 
organisation, while product innovations usually take place in the more rarefied annosphere of 
the R&D function, relatively buffered from the daily tasks of managing production. 
Economists concerned with process innovations have tended to focus on the diffusion of 
process innovations measured by the rate at which the innovation moves from first commercial 
use to predominance. or "saturation". within the relevant industry. Attention then turns to the 
factors which explain differences in diffusion rates between industries, and between countries 
(Nabseth and Ray 1974; Ray 1989). While such an approach yields valuable data for the 
analysis of industrial and macroeconomic issues. it gives us linle insight into how individual 
finns come to make the decision to adopt an innovative process technology. 
Others, such as Rogers (1983), have taken a more processual approach, emphasising the 
process of "communication" of new ideas to examine the factors which encourage an 
organisation to take the decision to adopt a particular innovation. Here. the research is focused 
upon the social processes which innuence the rate of diffusion through the popUlation, 
including the characteristics of the innovation, adopters. and change agents. While this 
approach provides a sophisticated framework for understanding how organisations adopt, it 
gives little help in understanding what happens once the adoption decision has been made. 
\\'hile Rogers does recognise that there are problems with the implementation of innovations 
in organisations. the relevant part of the argument (1983 chap 10) is relatively underdeveloped. 
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The framework developed in this thesis is intended as a complement to Rogers' diffusion 
analysis. 
The general weakness with such diffusion approaches is that they make the assumption that 
once a finn has decided to adopt an innovation, then reaping the returns on the investment 
made is unproblematic (Voss 1988; Zaltman et alia 1973 chap 2). However, evidence that 
many adopted innovations simply do not work, or work far below their specified capability, 
is overwhelming. In Fleck's (1983) survey of UK robot applications, nearly half the cases 
experienced initial failure, and over one fifth abandoned robot applications completely. 
Jaikumar (1984) found that no US Aexible Manufacturing System (FMS) was actually being 
managed flexibly, as measured by the number of different components machined by the 
system, and that this was in distinct contrast to the Japanese who did use their new systems 
flexibly. New and Myers (1986 table 4.2) report that in their survey of British manufacturing 
plants, the benefits from AMT were typically perceived to be in the low to moderate range. 
Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP II) systems have proved particularly intractable - only 
28% of US finns surveyed by Duchessi and his colleagues (1989) could be rated as successful 
in implementing such systems. There are clearly major problems of implementation amongst 
firms who would be counted as successful adopters of new technologies. 
The main tradition in analysing the implications organisations that have adopted a new 
technology has been that of the impact approach in which the outcomes of technological 
change are assessed without a prior examination of the means by which those outcomes were 
anained. The outcomes, thereby, are presented as the inevitable consequence of a decision to 
adopt a particular technology. The approach is a venerable one. and has influenced much of 
the sociological work on technological change. Williams and Williams ( 1964)' in a pioneering 
study were concerned with the impact of the installation of NC machine tools on the 
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organisation of the manufacturing function. Whistler (1970) was more concerned with office 
automation, but both concluded that the main impact of automation was the centralisation of 
decision making, and this is a common theme amongst much of the early work on 
technological change in organisations. Other studies from the same period which focused more 
upon the work organisation implications - see the cases reviewed in Meissner (1969) -
similarly took the adoption of the new technology as given, and turned to the impact upon job 
content, payor whatever. 
Much of the work stimulated by the revival of interest in technological change and 
organisations since the "microelectronic revolution" has adopted a similar line. The large body 
of work within the labour process school which has built upon the agenda set by Braverman 
in "Labor and Monopoly Capital" tends to move straight from an asserted capitalist imperative 
to adopt AMT to an analysis of the inevitably deskilling consequences of that adoption. 
Valuable collections of papers on the debates around this theme can be found in Knights and 
Willmott (1987), and Wood (1989), while Attewell (1987) critically reviews the evidence to 
date for the deskilling hypothesis. Similarly, a review of the recent research by Jones (1988) 
concludes that no secular trend towards deskilling or reskilling can associated with 
developments in flexible automation, and that the outcomes depend on the circumstances. 
Perhaps one of the most sophisticated recent explorations of the implications of technological 
change is Zuboff's (1988) analysis of the "age of the smart machine". In particular, she offers 
a valuable contribution to the debate on the types of competencies most appropriate for 
working with information technologies with the development of the concept of "intellective", 
as opposed to "action-centred" skills. In many ways, her work is reminiscent of that of Blauner 
(1964) who also advocated automated continuous process plants as the model for the 
development of new forms of less alienated work. However, she moves on from the analysis 
01 automated work systems to those which offer a new transparency of the process. or are 
"informated". Some of the issuL's which this distinction rises will be explored in chapter 2. 
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while the point to be made here is that Zuboff has little sense of the process by which 
panicular work organisation outcomes are achieved. Her explorations of the impact on skills 
in the two main case studies of pulp mills and financial services are fascinating, but only 
cursory attention is paid to either the market environments in which these firms operate, or 
the actual work processes that are being automatedfmfonnated. 
The problems with the impact literature are at two linked levels - firstly, the lack of a sense 
of contingency, and, secondly, the failure to examine the process of choice around 
technological change. The detailed comparative work of Sorge and his colleagues (1983; see 
Nicholas 1983 for a summary) has shown the ways in which differences in the implementation 
of CNC machine tools in the FRG and UK is dependent upon a number of factors: the 
national social and economic context; the size of organisation; the market conditions it faces; 
and the complexity of the manufacturing process. Similarly, Finch and Cox's (1988) study of 
the design of production planning and control systems shows the importance of factors such 
as variability in production volume and mix, and differences in the production process and 
lead times. Rarely have these contingency factors been coherently analysed in the examination 
of the impact of AMT. 
In his critique of the contingency theory work of the sixties, Child (1972) argued that it was 
essentially determinist in its formulations, and failed to allow a role for a process of "strategic 
choice" by the members of the organisation's "dominant coalition". In other words, 
contingencies deriving from environment, task, or, size only provide bounds to the 
organisation design process, and do not determine it. Miller and his colleagues empirically 
investigated the proposition that the strategic decision making process by an organisation's 
most powerful actors, particularly the CEO, is the key intervening variable between the 
organisation design and the market environment. They conclude that "strategic content and 
process appear to playa central role in relating context to structure" (1988 p 565). 
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Bessant (1983) has developed these ideas specifically in the context of the implementation of 
AMT. He suggests that the "design space" around any particular technology allows room for 
manoeuvre and choice during the implementation process. The outcome of that process. he 
suggests, will be influenced by environmental factors, existing organisational factors, 
management objectives, employee objectives, and the mediation process between all these 
factors. Technological change is, therefore, a negotiated process, and perhaps, most crucially 
for the following argument, the actual character of the AMT itself is also open to varying 
levels of negotiation in terms of its "malleability". Empirical support for this position is 
provided by the cases reported in Wilkinson (1983) and Boddy and Buchanan (1983). 
Others have had more of a concern for the process of change. Those investigating the trade 
union response to technological change and the implications for collective bargaining have 
provided detailed case studies of implementation. Willman and Winch (1985) studied the 
dynamics of collective bargaining associated with the implementation of auto body framing 
and roboL~ at what is now Rover. Clark and his colleagues (1988) similarly provide 
considerable detail of the process of negotiation around the installation of new telephone 
exchanges for British Telecom. Batstone and his colleagues (1987) take a broader range of 
information technologies to explore the same issues. The more general issues in this area are 
reviewed by Willman (1986). 
A second group of more process orientated approaches are those deriving from social-
psychology. Blackler and Brown (1986) identify three strands. Perhaps the most important is 
that developed from socio-technical systems theory (STS) - Cherns (1976; 1987), and Taylor 
(1975) provide reviews. Wider in the scope of its concerns than the other approaches, it draws 
much of iL\;\ inspiration from the well established work of the TavislOck Institute. STS concerns 
itsell with thc "joint optimisation of the social and technical systems" (Trist 1981 p 37) at 
work through the involvcment of the user in the design of the manufacturing system. Perhaps 
the main weakness of STS is its championing of semi-autonomous workgroups despite its 
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purported contingency approach which one would expect to lead to a variety of outcomes 
(Hackman 1981), and problems in handling conflicts of interest over what the optimal work 
system might look like (Brown 1967). 
A second strand is ergonomics which concerns itself with the "human factors" in system 
design. Useful though it is, ergonomics is limited in its ability to address more general 
concerns around the implementation of new technology due to its inability to analyse the 
organisational context of work activity (Perrow 1983). The third is "participative" system 
design which advocates the involvement of users in the design of information systems. Here, 
the relationship between operatives and management is cast in an co-operative rather than the 
inherently conflictual perspective of industrial relations. For this reason, participative 
techniques have been accused of being manipulative and managerialist. Mumford and Henshall 
(1979) describe such a process during the implementation of a management information 
system at Rolls Royce, and also indicate the limitations of such an approach which tum 
around the low aspirations of the users involved and the limitation of the user participation 
to the customisation of the basic system already selected by management 
Very much within the spirit of this literature, and that on social shaping summarised below, 
is the work on "human-centred systems", which develops a more thorough-going critique of 
the tendencies within the development of AMT. (Rosenbrock 1990). Corbett (1989) has 
distinguished between conventional AMT which automates the production process, and 
"hybrid" systems which "innervate" by leaving key production decisions in the hands of skilled 
operatives. The essence of the argument is that it is impossible to remove all variance from 
production systems, and that it is more efficient to locate decisions which cope with that 
variance at the operator level. rather than in the production planning function which programs 
the system. \\'hile of considerable interest, this work is still at an experimental stage. and has 
yet to start to di ffuse out to operational environments, although the lessons from the 
implementation of participative techniques associated with TQM such as quality circles may 
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well be relevant. 
There is much of value in these approaches, but they all share a common weakness - their 
almost total concern for job design issues and associated questions such as payments systems. 
While such a focus may have been adequate for the earlier generations of AMT such as CNC 
and FMS, the development of integrating technologies such as CAD/CAM and CAPM starts 
to expose serious shortcomings. The concept of an integrating technology will be elaborated 
in chapter 2, but the point to be made here is that they pose questions of organisation design 
as well as job design. The level of intervention of these approaches is within individual 
functions, while the key issues of the implementation of integrating technologies occur 
between functions. They are also, with the exception of the "human-centred systems" approach, 
essentially reactive in that the fail to articulate clearly the extent of the "design space" around 
new technologies. A broader perspective is required. 
This is provided by the social shaping approach. Its basic contention is that technological 
development is not an autonomous process driven by the disinterested pursuit of science, but 
a process fundamentally shaped by the society in which it takes place (Williams and Edge 
1990). Thus the development of integrated circuits was, to a critical extent, driven by the 
concerns of the US military - in particular, the desire to catch up with the Russians in the 
"space race" (Braun and MacDonald 1978). Similarly, Noble (1986 part 2) charts the way in 
which the development of NC was dominated by the theoretical concerns of academic 
researchers at MIT with mathematical modelling, in alliance with the US Air Force which 
desired to control quality in the production of complex aircraft components. As a result the 
needs of managers responsible for managing machine shops for simpler point-to-point and 
record/playback technologies was marginalised and even actively suppressed. It is di fficult to 
think of any major element of AMT which has not had the financial support of the US 
military at some key stage of its development. It is perhaps notable that it is the developments 
21 
in production management which do not depend on information technology, such as kanban 
and total quality management which are of Japanese provenance. 
However, while the evidence for the social shaping of AMT is strong, this does not mean that 
at the level of the individual firm, a full range of technological options exists. Firms which 
commission the development of major advances in AMT are rare; the extent of technological 
choice at the level of the firm is, therefore, limited to what the vendors have to offer, or are 
prepared to customise. The amount of customisation, or reconfiguration, that is either possible 
or necessary varies from technology to technology, but in the case of most types of AMT is 
highly constrained. Thus the most crucial parts of the social shaping process have taken place 
before the individual firm is able to have any influence - all that is left is customising as part 
of the negotiations which form the implementation process. The process of customisation will 
be explored conceptually in chapter 2 and empirically in later chapters, where it will be seen 
that it is part of the process of organisational change associated with implementation. 
So far, product and process innovations have been distinguished, and the limitations of 
research which is restricted to the diffusion of process innovations for an understanding of the 
processes within adopting organisations as they struggle to get the new technology into a 
usefully productive state were identified. The research on the impact of new technologies 
within organisations was then criticised for its lack of concern for process, while researchers 
who have concerned themselves with processes of negotiation around the new technology's 
design space were criticised for a concentrating on job design issues without taking into 
account the broader organisation design issues associated with integrating technologies. 
Voss (1988) has proposed that three linked fields of study are requi red for a full understanding 
of technological change in manufacturing: the development of process innovations; the 
diffusion of process innovations; and the implementation of process innovations. The first two 
areas of study are well establ ishcd, and have been complemented, in the main, by impact 
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studies within organisations on job design, payments systems, organisation design and similar 
issues. Without a concern for the dynamic of strategic choice around the design space inherent 
in the implementation process as the AMT is configured, there is a risk of what might be 
called an adoption/impact short circuit in the understanding of the process of technological 
change in organisations. The focus on implementation chosen for this thesis aims to indicate 
how such a risk can be avoided. 
1.2 APPROACHES TO ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
The discussion has reviewed various approaches to technological change within organisations, 
but, as Buchanan (1983 p 78) argues, "technical changes are usually organisational changes". 
The traditions of analysis which take organisational change itself as the focus of interest are 
also of relevance to the our understanding of implementation. Closer to the issues of 
technological change is the analysis of organisational innovation. Traditionally, research in this 
area has focused on the appropriate organisation design and human resource management 
policies for the nurturing of innovative activity. A considerable body of empirical literature 
has now built up (Daft 1978; Hull 1988; Moch and Morse 1977; Sapolsky 1967; Zaltman et 
alia 1973 chap 3), which is remarkable in its unanimity arguing that what Bums and Stalker 
(1961) called "organic" organisation design is more capable than "mechanistic" design of 
stimulating innovation. 
The argument is, perhaps, best summarised by Kanter (1985) who, along very similar lines to 
Bums and Stalker, identi fled "integrative" companies which facilitate innovation and 
"segmentalist" companies which stine it. Integrative organisations have organisation designs 
in which 
"job charters are broad: assignments are ambiguous. non-routine and change directed; 
job territories are intersecting. so that others are both affected by action and rcquircd 
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for it; and local autonomy is strong enough that actors can go ahead with large chunks 
of action without waiting for higher-level suppon" (ibid p 143). 
Segmentalist companies, on the other hand, have a structure 
"finnly divided into depanments and levels, each with a tall fence around it and 
communication in and out restricted - indeed, carefully guarded. Infonnation is a 
secret rather than a circulating commodity. Hierarchy rather than team mechanisms 
is the glue holding the segments together, and so venical relationship chains dominate 
interaction. Each segment only speaks to the one above and one below, in constrained 
rather than open exchanges. The one above provides the work plan, the one below the 
output. Pre-existing routines set the terms for action and interaction, and measurement 
systems are used to guard against deviations." (ibid p 75). 
However, many commentators have noted, including Kanter herself (ibid chap 6), the paradox 
that organisations that are good at innovation are not necessarily good at implementation - the 
flexibility required for the fonner undennines the integration required for the latter. Zaltman 
and his colleagues (1973 chap 3) identify "high complexity", and "low formalisation and 
centralisation" as favouring the initiation of innovations, while "low complexity", and "high 
fonnalisation and centralisation" favour implementation. The innovation literature has mainly 
concentrated on exploring ways of creating greater flexibility within organisations so that ideas 
flow, rather than on the problems of implementing those ideas once they have been managed 
into good currency and adopted. 
The organisation development (00) literature is concerned with how members of the dominant 
coalition and their advisors can redesign the organisation to meet the tasks they have set for 
it. In a sense it explores the means by which "structure follows strategy" (Chandler 1963 p 
314) as powerful actors implement their strategic choices for the business. It is this focus on 
implementation that is panicularly anractive here, but the approach still has limitations for 
those concerned with the implementation of AMT. Beckhard and Harris (1987) is a widely 
accepted mode] of planned change. which lays great stress on "defining the future state" as 
an essential prerequisite for embarking on a change management programme. This, however. 
assumes that decision-makers have the capability to articulate a vision of that future Slate in 
something more than general tenns, and does not allow for the redefinition of strategy as the 
lessons from the implementation of the new structure are absorbed. 
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This weakness is particularly unfortunate for those concerned with the implementation of new 
technologies. The explosive dynamic of innovation in AMT, particularly over the last decade 
or so, means that it is virtually impossible to clearly specify a future state over a reasonable 
time horizon. The dimensions of the problem are indicated by the vast variety of available 
definitions of the term elM - Boaden and Dale counted 10 (1986) in their review. Too little 
is known, by individual adopting organisations, about the full potential of the systems they 
have just installed, never mind the promise of the generation of systems just announced, for 
the coherent articulation of realisable future states. Organisations need to learn how to review 
simultaneously where they are, and where they are going on a continuing basis, modifying 
their targets in the light of their experience of technological change. This dynamic will be 
explored further in chapter 5. 
The OD literature has been extensively reviewed by Pettigrew (1985 chap 1). He criticises its 
tendency towards a linear and rationalist view of the process of organisational change, and 
notes how "research on change continues to focus on change episodes, and more likely, a 
change episode, rather on the processual dynamics of changing" (ibid p 10). In particular, he 
argues that little of the 00 work has taken into account the organisational context of the 
change process, which is a serious weakness because "change processes can only be identified 
and studied against a background of structure or relative constancy. Figure needs ground" (ibid 
p 36). From this critique he develops a "contextualist approach" to processes of organisational 
change resulting from the implementation of strategic decisions. 
The approach can be most usefully summarised in figure 1.1, which is developed from 
Pettigrew (1987). He identifies the three crucial elements in the analysis of any form of 
organisational change - the "context", the "content", and the "process". Echoing the distinction 
of Zaltman and his colleagues between the "internal environment" and the "external 
environment" (1973 P 114). he then distinguishes between the "inner context" and the "outer 
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context", as two distinct levels of analysis of the context of change. Pettigrew has rightly 
identified one of the major problems in this type of research to be the specification of the 
interactions between the various possible levels of analysis of the context both within the 
organisation under study and also the environment within which the organisation is located 
- what he calls the vertical form of analysis. However, his approach reveals few clues as to 
how to specify the relevant levels of analysis for any particular change. 
The model of strategy implementation developed by Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984) offers one 
way of attempting to define the relevant levels of analysis of the inner context for the 
implementation of AMT. Their framework firstly asserts that decision-makers in organisations 
are intendedly rational in that they face bounded rationality, but at least attempt to act 
rationally. Secondly, it asserts that the two basic activities in implementing strategy are 
planning, and organisational design. The key processes are those of setting objectives, and 
then designing structures and processes that allow those objectives to be met. This process 
is conceptualised as a cascade down the organisation of ever more detailed decisions in the 
context of the primary strategic aims. 
Three main points can be made about this framework: 
1) Strategy implementation is deltaic as well as a cascadal. As Hayes and Wheelwright 
(1984, chap 2) point out, strategic decisions at the corporate level are passed onto the various 
business levels within the corporation. In tum, these business strategies form the context for 
decisions on the functional strategies relating to marketing, manufacturing, and so on. For 
instance, manufacturing strategy can be conceived as a third order functional strategy within 
a framework set by the business strategy and the over-arching corporate strategy. 
2) Like much organisational literature, the model conflates job design, and 
organisational design. It also conceptualises "incentives and controls" as elements of the 
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process of planning rather than organisational design. It seems more plausible to suggest that 
the plan should specify a level of perfonnance, and that the incentive and control system 
should be designed to generate that level of perfonnance. Figure 1.2 presents an amended 
version of Hrebiniak and Joyce's strategy implementation model. 
3) It assumes implementation is unproblematic in the sense that opposition from 
managerial interest groups and workers' organisations will not be encountered. Any full 
model of strategy implementation should include the processes of the garnering of commitment 
and the resolution of conflict. 
Bearing these reservations in mind, the amended Hrebiniak and Joyce model presented here 
is a useful heuristic for establishing the di fferent levels of the analysis of organisational change 
in general and the implementation of AMT in particular within a contextualist approach. 
Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984 chap 8) propose that the analysis of the strategy implementation 
process should commence by examining one of the "triads" formed within the model. The 
choice of triad for the start of the analysis is dependent upon the content of the change being 
implemented. Analysis then proceeds by examining the consistency within the chosen triad 
before looking at its relation with the other elements of the model. It is proposed to adopt this 
methodology for identifying the point of entry into the vertical fonn of analysis for the 
implementation of AMT. 
1.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has laid out the issues deriving from the existing research on processes of 
technological and organisational change. Focusing on organisations as users of innovations 
rather than creators of innovations (Kimberly 1986), it identi fled an implementation approach 
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which complements the diJfusiotf approach. Rejecting the impact approach due to its lack of 
concern for the negotiation processes inherent in implementation, it also identified the 
limitations of existing process orientated research which focuses solely on job design issues. 
While such issues are very important, the parameters within jobs are designed can only be 
understood within the broader context of the organisation and changes in its structure. The 
research on organisational change was reviewed so as to help in the understanding of such 
broader processes and a the development of a methodology for identifying the point of entry 
into the organisation was proposed. 
The following chapters will explore this implementation approach conceptually and 
empirically. Firstly, an analytical framework building upon Pettigrew's distinction between the 
context, content, and process of change will be developed, which will then be used to structure 
the presentation of the empirical data from the 15 cases. The emphasis will be on the dynamic 
interplay between the processes of organisational and technological change in the context of 
the market environment facing the finn. Thereby, as Child proposes, "the argument is that 
advanced technology and organizational structure should both be constituted so as to facilitate 
the co-ordinated and controlled pursuit of strategic objectives" (1987 p 106). 
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2 
THE CONTENT OF CHANGE 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The revue of the literature in chapter 1 provides the basis for the development of a conceptual 
framework for understanding the implementation of AMT. This chapter will explore the 
content of implementation - the advanced manufacturing technology itself. It will start by 
briefly discussing the ways in which "technology" has been conceptualised in organisational 
analysis, and distinguish between a technology and its "dimensioning" in a particular 
implementation. It will then provide a typology which allows the identification of the those 
AMTs which may be considered to be "integrating technologies", and hence of wider 
significance for the organisation of the nineteen nineties than other new technologies. Finally, 
the process of social shaping of CAD/CAM will be explored and some of its possibilities and 
limitations identified. 
2.1 TECHNOLOGY IN ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The use of "technology" as a variable in organisational analysis has a long and venerable 
history. Some of the earlier work, particularly the US industrial sociology of the fifties, is 
reviewed in Meissner (1969). The traditions dcriving from the work of Woodward and the 
Tavistock Institute which shapcd the organisational sociology of the sixties and seventies are 
reviewed in Fry (1982). Gerwin (1981), and Mintzbcrg (1979 chap 14). The later work laid 
great strcss on technology as an independcnt variable. or contingency. in the structuring of 
organisations. The debate on the precisely what effects technology has on organisations has 
raged cver since. but the overwhclming evidence is that there arc major causal relationships 
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(Fry 1982). Mintzberg uses his five part model, or "logo" of organisational structuring to 
identify the varying effects of the "technical system" (1979 fig 16.1) - the "prime effect" is 
at the level of the "operating system", while it only has a "selective effect" on the higher 
levels of the organisation. 
In much of this work, the notion of "technology" was often vaguely and broadly specified, 
with considerable inconsistency between authors - Fry counts 6 different operationalisations 
(1982 table 1). What they all have in common, however, is that they are attempts to capture 
an overall measure of the technology an organisation deploys in its business. This means the 
measures are too crude to catch changes in the actual machinery which makes up the 
production process. Collins and his colleagues (1988) provide an interesting attempt to assess 
changes in levels of "automaticity" over eight years, but they can tell us little about how these 
changes were achieved - whether, for instance, robots or CNC machine tools were involved. 
The definition of "technology" needs much greater precision if it is to be a useful concept for 
the study of the implementation of AMT. 
Clark and his colleagues (1988), drawing on their study of the implementation of computerised 
telephone exchanges, have argued strongly that "technology" is a crucial variable in 
organisational analysis. They have also been very careful to define "technology" in a clear way 
as an "engineering system" (ibid p 13). The engineering system consists of an "architecture" 
consisting of the system principles and configuration, a "technology" of "hardware" and 
"software". These primary elements are then "dimensioned" for a particular organisational 
setting, and have a panicular "appearance". The stress on architecture suggests that this 
formulation is strongly influenced by the computerised information technologies. One problcm 
with the concept of an "engineering system" is its lack of obvious application to \I.'hat might 
be called non-engineered technologies. For instance, the paper drawing is a well developed and 
robust infonnation technology which can be used in a number of ways, yet it is straining the 
language to describe it in tem1S of systems principles or software. The tenn also tends to 
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imply analogies with concepts such as "manufacturing system" which is not the intention. 
Secondly, the model is very detailed. and unwieldy in practice - Clark and his colleagues do 
not deploy it themselves in full array. 
Perhaps the crucial distinction they make is between the primary elements which are largely 
fixed so far as the individual implementing organisation is concerned, and the secondary 
elements which can be altered by that organisation. It is, therefore, proposed to define the 
primary elements of the engineering system as the technology, and the secondary elements as 
the technology's configuration in the organisation under study. This two part definition allows 
us to distinguish two distinct processes of social shaping. The primary elements are the 
responsibility of the vendor organisation. and largely controlled by that organisation, and the 
more general processes of social shaping identified in section 1.1 apply. The secondary 
elements, on the other hand. are under the control of. and therefore can be shaped by. the 
implementing organisation during the implementation process. This is the process which Rice 
and Rogers (1980) have called "re-invention" within the innovation process. 
One strength of this definition is that it reminds us that an individual production process may 
be composed of more than one technology. For instance. a typical secretary may use a 
telephone. a word processor. and a photo-copier daily. Each is a distinctive and sophisticated 
technology. with its own history of social shaping and implications for work organisation. but 
rarely will anyone be determining in the formation of the secretarial task. Thus production 
processes can be conceived as arrays of technologies which are configured to form a co-
ordinated whole according to the needs of the organisation deploying them. The technology 
is conceived as an independent variable at the level of the adopting organisation. while its 
co~figuration is bounded by the hardware and software specification. and shaped by the 
negotiations within the implementation process. 
This distinction between a (echnolugy and iL'I configuration allows the equipment adopted. and 
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the use to which it is put through configuration to be distinguished. In making a similar 
distinction between technology and task, Cooper (1972) argued that the same technology, for 
instance an oil refinery can be run on a single or multiple shift system, that decision 
depending on the organisation's goals as articulated in the manufacturing strategy, rather than 
the technology itself. Thus, while in practice capital intensive plant tends to be utilised on a 
multiple shift basis, that is a result of decisions regarding market demand and overhead 
recovery rates, not the characteristics of the technology of oil refining itself. 
One corollary of this approach is that it is incumbent upon the researcher to understand what 
the technology actually does so that its influence on the task can be traced. The point has 
been made most recently by Rose et. alia (1986), who stress the importance of understanding 
the technological differences between telephone exchange systems for the analysis of work 
organisation options. This insight is, however, central to the "socio-technical systems" 
approach and is responsible for the incision and continued relevance of Trist and Bamforth's 
study of coal-getting (1951). However, few studies of technological change have given much 
detail of how the technology actually works. The latter part of this chapter examines the nature 
of CAD/CAM technology more closely, while later chapters explore some of the ways in 
which CAD/CAM technology is configured within metalworking organisations, and then 
indicate the ways in which those configured systems influence organisational structures and 
processes. 
2.2 A TYPOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY 
A number of writers on organisational and technological change have distinguished between 
"routine" or "incremental" innovations, and "radical" innovations. Thus, Zaltman and his 
colleagues (1973 chap 1) distinguish between "routine" and "radical" innovations in terms of 
their novelty to the organisation in question. and also in tenns of the solutions adopted by the 
organisation for the implementation. In their definition. "solution radicalness is defined as the 
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extent to which an implemented [adopted] innovation implies changes in the various 
subsystems of the organization or in the behavioral patterns of il~ members" (ibid p 23). In 
tenns of novelty, AMT is by definition a radical innovation, and so the issue to be addressed 
is the radicalness or routiness of the solution. Similarly, Hage (1980 p 191) defines a radical 
innovation as "a change of input, process and output that represents a significant departure 
from existing technologies". He goes on to state that "radical innovation causes a 
disequilibrium ...... (it) usually involves some transformation of the organizational form. 
Therefore it is a process that leads to change of the system and not just change in the system" 
(ibid p 207). 
Writing specifically about AMT, both Gerwin (1984) and Ettlie (1984) draw on Hage and 
deploy the same basic distinction. The dichotomy is intuitively attractive for analysts of AMT 
implementation; unfortunately, it is also tautological if the concern is with the organisational 
change which accompanies innovation. Both Zaltman and his colleagues, and Hage effectively 
define radicalness in terms of its impact on the organisation. This is explicit in the former's 
discussion of "solution radicalness", and in the Hage definition, the only way of measuring 
the "significance" of an innovation is in terms of its impact. The dichotomy is, therefore, of 
no use as a variable in the analysis of the implementation process. The problem appears to be 
that both Hage, and Zaltman and his colleagues tried to develop a general theory of innovation 
which takes no account of the intrinsic characteristics of the technology in terms of its 
functions and performance. Even the novelty dimension which both identify does not make 
any attempt to understand what the innovation actually does. Such an understanding is crucial 
to the analysis of the implementation process. 
Kaplinsky (1984 chap 2) has attempted to categorise AMT in a way that comprehends the 
functions of the technology. He first identifies three spheres applicable to any production 
process - design: co-ordination: and manufacturing. \\'ithin each sphere, the production process 
is di\'ided into a number of acti\'ities. He goes on to identify three types of A~1T - those 
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which automate a single activity, or intra-activity automation; those which automate linked 
activities, or intra-sphere automation; and those which involve co-ordination between different 
spheres of production, or inter-sphere automation. This evolution is shown in figure 2.1. The 
fifties were noticeable for the diffusion of a form of intra-sphere co-ordination - the transfer 
line. During the sixties, other forms of intra-sphere co-ordination, such as computers for 
accounting functions and process plant, took the imagination of researchers. During the 
seventies, attention tended to focus more on a form of flexible intra-activity automation - the 
NC/CNC (numerically controlled/computer numerically controlled) machine tool. Recent work 
on the implementation of AMT has often concentrated on another form of intra-sphere 
automation - the FMS (flexible manufacturing system). 
The same issue has also been tackled by Tyre (1988). She studied 48 innovations in 8 plants 
of one multinational corporation in Italy, West Germany. and the United States. A factor 
analysis produced a two dimensional typology which is illustrated in figure 2.2. Essentially, 
innovations can vary on the systemic dimension in terms of their breadth of implication for 
the production process, and on the complexity dimension in terms of their depth of 
implication. When a change is high on both the systemic and complexity dimensions, then it 
can truly be described as radical (ibid p. 15). Examples of each type of technology have been 
added to indicate the range of technologies which can be categorised using the model. 
Tyre's work supplies a dimension missing from that of Kaplinsky. His typology has only a 
single, systemic, dimension, and does not comprehend the possible implications of varying 
levels of technical complexity of the innovation. Tyre's typology also has the attraction of 
being derived inductively from a study of actual innovations, rather than from a swift review 
of the very general literature on levels of automation. However, Kaplinsky's review can be 
used to give a point of inflection to her systemic dimension. The brief historical review 
suggested that the key shift at the moment is from "intra-sphere" to "inter-sphere" automation. 
\Vithin this framework. systemic technologies for inter-sphere automation can perhaps be 
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described as integrating technologies, which may be more or less complex, depending on the 
particular application. This more spectacular end of AMT naturally attracts the attention of 
commentators, but, the cumulative effect of low complexity non-systemic change should not 
be underestimated. Abernathy, in his research on the car industry (1978), has shown the ways 
in which productivity gains come as much through the detailed fine tuning - what might be 
called the re-configuration - of process technology as through large step changes. The extent 
to which CAD/CAM can be considered to be an integrating technology will be explored in 
the next section. 
2.3 CAD/CAM TECHNOLOGY 
The arrays of technologies which makes up contemporary CAD/CAM systems have three main 
elements. The first array is the alpha-numeric systems which process the vast amounts of data 
required for engineering design calculations which began to develop during the fifties. These 
relied upon conventional main frame computers, while the software was often written by the 
users themselves. Perhaps the most characteristic application is stress analysis. Diffusion then 
took place as the more successful packages were marketed by the users themselves, or licensed 
to software companies. This area of application is often known as Computer Aided 
Engineering (CAE). Although a number of standard packages are available, the idiosyncratic 
nature of many applications means that this is stilI an area where individual developer/users 
and small software houses can thrive. CAE received a major boost with the development of 
minicomputers such as the PDP 11 series which allowed engineering depanments to run their 
own computer facilities completely independently of other applications within the business. 
The second element is CAM which developed from the requirements of the part programming 
of NC machine tools. A number of fairly standard alpha numeric systems were developed, one 
of the most widely diffused of which is APT. Noble (1986 section 3) charts the development 
of these systems during the fifties. and notes their o\'er-complcxit) which severely inhibited 
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their diffusion in the early years. The diffusion of CAM systems is essentially a function of 
the diffusion of NC and, more recently, CNC machine tools, and so CAM systems diffused 
widely during the seventies. Again, they were usually run on either the business mainframe 
systems, or on dedicated mini-computers. 
The third element is the development of interactive graphics for engineering drawing work _ 
usually known as computer aided draughting (CAD). The history is reviewed by Arnold 
(1983) who states that the original impetus for such systems came at an MIT meeting in 1959 
when the idea of extending the work on NC programming upstream to the drawing office. 
This research was funded by the same US Air Force group which funded the NC work, and 
by 1963, a working "man-machine communication system" called SKETCHPAD had been 
developed. By 1965, all the main US aircraft manufacturers were experimenting with 
interactive graphics systems using mainframe computers and refresh screens. 
The sixties generation of CAD was much too expensIve for diffusion outside the state 
subsidised sectors - mainly defence. Around 1970, though, four key developments took place -
cheap minicomputers; storage tube terminals; structured programming; and virtual memory. 
These innovations allowed by the mid seventies the development of "tum-key" systems which 
could be sold to engineering companies without internal computer expertise. A number of 
specialist companies set up to serve this new market - often as spin-offs from the large US 
aerospace companies - and began to actively sell such systems in the UK. Most of the 15 
companies in this case survey bought this type of system for their initial investment. These 
systems were usually mounted on dedicated mini-computers - usually different mini-computers 
to the ones supporting CAE and CAM applications. 
The development of interactive graphics capabilities is the key breakthrough which allows the 
emergence of CAD/CAt-.l systems. The link between the design process and manufacturing 
process has always been the engineering drawing. supported by text such as specifications and 
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parts lists. The engineering drawing is the means by which the conceptual design is fully 
resolved into a working component, and then communicated to manufacturing. Thus the alpha 
numeric outputs and inputs of the old CAE and CAM systems always had to be translated to 
and from the graphical form manually. Now, the whole process could, potentially, be 
perfonned on the computer, with the graphics system at its heart. 
As these CAD systems developed, interactive graphic part programming systems also began 
to replace the old alpha-numeric systems, and the systems could also be used for tool design. 
Similarly, the tremendous advantage of perfonning routines such as stress analysis and 
kinematic simulation graphically, where the engineer can look at a visual presentation of the 
perfonnance of the component at the design stage began to be appreciated. However, many 
of the early CAD systems, such as CADAM, were developed solely for draughting as a way 
of increasing productivity in the drawing office - there was little or no concern for the 
interfaces with the developing graphics systems for CAE and CAM. Crucially, both require 
3-D images, while the early draughting systems were content to emulate the 2-D manual 
drawing. The diffusion of such draughting systems was then driven by justifications based 
upon drawing office productivity. 
By the mid eighties, the microelectronics revolution was having a profound effect on 
CAD/CAM systems. The main developments were the workstation, which, unlike the tenninal, 
has its own computing power, and local area networks (LAN) such as Ethernet which allow 
workstations to communicate with each other. The results were that, firstly, much more 
powerful and responsive processing power was available to the individual user. Secondly, 
individual users could communicate much more easily with other, remote, users. Thirdly. much 
more powerful programs were available which could effectively manipulate images on a 
number of dimensions. In particular. software that could model surfaces or solids in 3-D began 
to di ffusc ,"'idel),. Integrated CAD/CAf\ 1 systems sharing a single engineering data base 
became. for the first time. a reality rather than a rhetoric. Figure 2.3 illustrates the differences 
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in configuration between the earlier tenninal/minicomputer based systems and the modern 
workstation based systems. The switch to workstations has been rapid - Bessant (1991 p 166) 
cites figures to show that in 1985, over 80% of European sales were for minicomputer based 
systems, while by 1987, 85% of sales were for workstation based systems. 
As Marx noted in a rather different context, "men make their own history, but they do not 
make it just as they please: they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, 
but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (1968 p 
97). The main problem facing the development of integrated CAD/CAM systems is that the 
two ends of the systems, alpha numeric processing for engineering calculations and part 
programming, developed independently for nearly twenty years before the crucial linkage - the 
ability to create engineering drawings - became available in the mid seventies. By that time, 
sunk costs in the two earlier technologies made moves towards integration difficult. These 
sunk costs are as much in human capital in tenns of learnt expertise and incremental re-
configuration on the old systems, as in fixed capital in tenns of hardware and software. It is 
as if two builders set out to build an arch without having any idea what the keystone looked 
like. Having built the individual columns, they find that one is Ionic and the other Corinthian; 
each expects the other to knock his down and start again, but they cannot even agree on the 
specification for the keystone. The character of some of these arguments will be illustrated in 
chapter 10. 
Undaunted by such problems, the rhetoric is now that of Computer Integrated Manufacture 
(CIM) - BessanL (1991) describes the development of both the elements and the overall 
concept. The objective can, perhaps, be most easily described in tenns of Kaplinsky's spheres 
which were presented in figure 2.1. CAD is at the heart of computerisation in the design 
sphere. and has already linked across to the co-ordination sphere with CAM. The main 
element of computerisation in the co-ordination sphere is the suite of systems. generically 
called Computer Aided Production Management (CAPM). of which the most widely diffused 
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are MRP and MRP II. Thcse systems are responsible for planning the production process in 
terms of capacity and matcrial requirements, and then controlling against that plan to ensure 
manufacturing objectives are mel. In the manufacturing sphere CNC controlled machine tools 
such as robots, machining centres, and FMS are being combined through networks such as 
MAP into automated, integrated manufacturing systems. It is the combination of intra-sphere 
computerisation and automation from the design, manufacture, and co-ordination spheres into 
a single inter-sphere system so that the product data base generated on the CAD system can 
be accessed freely both to plan and to control the manufacturing process which can be 
considered true CIM. This evolution is illustrated in figure 2.4. 
Until recently, computer dcvclopments within cach sphere proceeded autonomously, with little 
thought for interfaces. The data analysis basis of CAD/CAM; the data processing basis of 
CAPM; and the control, or "mechatronic" (Bradley et alia 1991) basis of automated 
manufacturing systems all havc distinctive histories and process of social shaping, and the task 
of integrating them into single CIM systems poses major technical problems. There are 
significant differcnces in the basic computing techniques between each group of applications, 
and they have, historically, been the responsibility of different departments within the business 
organisation. The archcs are coming together to form a temple, but some builders have been 
working on Doric columns, while the remainder have adopted Roman styles, and nobody is 
yet quite sure about the roof details. 
Zuboff has attcmptcd to capture thc organisational implications of such dcvelopments in her 
concept of technologies that potcntially "informatc" as well as "automate". Thcy are systems 
which render transparent processes which were previously opaque by generating a quantity and 
quality of information prcviously unavailablc. In this way, informating technology "supersedcs 
the traditional lo~ic of automation" (1988 p 10). Earlier conceptualisations of "automation", 
such as thosc of Amber and Ambcr (1962): Bcll (1972): and Bright (1958 chapter 4) ha\'e 
taken thc main critcrion for thc lncl of automation as the degrcc of removal of thc operati\'c 
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from the control cycle of the machine. The latest developments in manufacturing systems 
engineering do indeed move beyond this stage to the type of informating that Zuboff 
describes, and her contention holds. However, computer developments in the other two spheres 
have not led to significant automation in the sense identified above. For instance, except in 
a vary few cases of "variant design", design decisions are still taken by engineers and drawing 
staff, yet CAD systems can be fairly said to "informate". A technOlogy, then can "informate" 
without automating, and can automate without "informating". 
Venkatraman (1991) has argued that on his typology of "IT induced reconfiguration" of 
organisations, CAD/CAM only features at the "evolutionary" rather than "revolutionary" levels 
of "degree of business transformation". From an overall business perspective, this may well 
be true, but within the production information flow and the associated activities of engineering 
and manufacturing, the implications of CAD/CAM are revolutionary. As one car industry 
executive put it: 
"The creation of a fuUy integrated master data base holding all the engineering 
information on a product, and used by everyone involved in that product's design, 
development and manufacture, is the single most important development in our 
industry since the first continuously moving assembly track" (cited Whipp and Oark 
1986 p 105). 
The distinctive nature of CAD/CAM, then, is the way it informates across the two spheres of 
design and manufacture. While CAD and CAM on their own might be considered intra-sphere 
computerisation, and CAE might even be considered intra-activity computerisation, the 
emergence of integrated systems is producing inter-sphere computerisation. This inter-sphere 
characteristic means that the appropriate level for the analysis of its implementation in terms 
of figure 1.2 is the organisation design triad of operating strategy/operating structure/task, 
rather than the job design, or incentive system triads on the one hand, or the business strategy 
triad on the other. 
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2.4 SUMMARY 
The concept of "technology" has often been vaguely and misleadingly specified in 
organisational analysis, yet a clear conception is vital for understanding the implementation 
of AMT. The distinction between the basic technology, and its dimensions in a particular 
implementation was introduced, and the sense of production processes consisting of arrays of 
mutually configured technologies was suggested. An examination of the distinctive 
characteristics of CAD/CAM technology allowed the identification of a central feature - that 
of being an integrating technology - which distinguishes it from many other AMTs which have 
been the focus of implementation research. The social shaping of CAD/CAM was than briefly 
described, and located within the more ambitious framework of CIM. Finally the way in which 
CAD/CAM informates, but does not automate was discussed, and the appropriate level of 
entry into the organisation for studying the process of implementation was identified. 
CAD/CAM, then. is one of the central manufacturing technologies of the 1990s. It forms one 
of the three main building blocks of CIM. and is already posing many of organisational issues 
that the implementation of CIM will face due to its integrating nature. Probably the only other 
innovation in manufacturing that is presently posing the same range of issues is TQM. For this 
reason, a focus on organisation design, rather than on the job design issues more commonly 
explored in the research on AMT implementation. is appropriate. The implementation of such 
a technology and the attend process of dimensioning poses a number of critical organisational 
issues. For this reason. the argument will now tum from the content of change to the context 
of the implementing organisation. 
47 
3 
THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The organisation provides the context of change within which implementation occurs. The 
"greenfield" site is very much a special case in the diffusion of AMT; the vast majority of 
implementations occur within existing organisations. It is, therefore, helpful to have a 
conceptual framework for understanding those organisations in terms of their structures and 
processes. This, of coursc, has been the central focus of organisation theory, particularly those 
elements derived from sociology. However, in line with the criticisms made in the last chapter 
about the over-general conception of "technology" typically deployed, this chapter will try to 
specify in more detail than is usual a model for understanding the organisational contexts of 
imp1cmentation. 
Firslly, the way in which the organisation relates to its outer context through the process of 
strategy formulation will be reviewed. As the concern is for the operational elements of the 
organisation, concepts derived from the manufacturing strategy literature will be deployed to 
aid understanding of how organisations enact their environments. Then, the main elements of 
internal process in organisations - flows of information and materials - will be analysed to 
show the ways in which they, too, shape the inner context. These two contingencies will then 
be brought together in an heuristic model of the organisation of manufacturing operations to 
form the basis for the devclopment of specific measures of contingency deployed in the case 
anal vses which follow. 
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3.1 PRODUCfION STRATEGY 
Strategy formulation is the way in which the organisation relates itself to the economic. social 
and political environment in which it lives. The outcomes of this process can be formal plans. 
articulated positions, shared perspectives, patterns of action, or even deliberate ploys. However 
formulated, strategic intentions will differ from what is realised in practice (Mintzberg 1987) -
the strategy process is dynamic. Strategies can be formulated at the corporate level. the level 
of the individual business, or at the main functional levels within the business (Hayes and 
Wheelwright 1984 chapter 2), but their essence is the coherent and proactive articulation of 
the relationship between the organisation and its environment. Strategy formulation is. 
therefore, one of the main processes in the structuration of organisations. 
As discussed in chapter 2. our concern with an integrating technology means that the 
operational levels of the organisation - particularly the engineering and manufacturing 
functions - are the prime foci for analysis. In terms of the strategy process, therefore, the 
emphasis is on functional-level strategies. The concept of a "manufacturing strategy" has been 
one of the major developments in production management of the last few years. Following on 
the work of Skinner (1974), writers such as Hill (1985), and Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) 
have elaborated the contribution that manufacturing can make to the overall success of the 
business. and the ways in which manufacturing strategy formulation can be incorporated into 
the business strategy development process. 
The first stage in the development of manufacturing strategy as part of the overall business 
strategy is to identi fy the particular product market(s) which the plant is intended to serve. 
then to analyse the requirements for success in that product market. and finally to dcsign the 
organisation of the manufacturin~ oJXration to meet those requirements. Throughout, the 
compatibility of this strategy with the o\'crall business and corporate strategies should be 
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maintained; in particular, close links with the marketing strategy are important (Hill 1985 chap 
2). From the manufacturing strategy flow decisions regarding the choice of production process 
and, as shown in figure 1.2, the appropriate operating structure, work organisation, and 
incentive and control systems. 
The focus on production means that the concern here is for the business - either as an 
independent company, or as a strategic business unit of a larger corporation. While 
manufacturing management do make an input into the development of the overall corporate 
strategy, corporate strategy and structure can be taken as environmental factors for the 
development of manufacturing strategy. Strategic choices as to which markets to be in, and 
whether to divisionalisc by product, process, or geography are given in the development of 
manufacturing strategy. Thus corporate strategy can usually be treated as part of the outer 
context for the process of change at plant level. 
The key environmental factor in the analysis is the chosen product market. Hill formulates 
his analysis in terms of the criteria which win orders for products. These criteria can either 
be "qualifying", in that the product is not viable in the market unless it meets them, or "order 
winning", which are the criteria by which products are chosen for purchase by customers 
(1985, p 49). However, as will be discussed in section 8.4, Hill's model fails to relate 
empirically order winning criteria and process choice. A more helpful way of looking at the 
issue might be the nature of the contract with the customer. In particular, the main variable 
could be whether the customer selects from a defined product range, or commissions the 
product individually. This possibility will be explored further in chapter 8. 
The two environmental contingencies most frequently discussed in the manufacturing policy 
literature are corporate strategy and structure, and the product market, yet there are a number 
of other environmental factors which also need to be taken into account as part of the outer 
context for a full understanding of the development of manufacturing strategy. The muterials 
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market can be an important factor in both choice of technology and location. For instance, 
transport costs of the main raw materials playa role in Iocational decisions in the steel and 
heavy building materials industries (Estall and Buchanan 1966), and relative energy costs may 
playa role in process choice in energy intensive industries. 
For the independent firm, the capital market may well playa role in manufacturing strategy 
by supporting invesunent in one type of production technology rather than an alternative. In 
particular, capital markets can strongly influence the setting of "hurdle rates" for investment 
appraisal. The labour market, especially in terms of the level of skills available in the local 
area may also influence choice of technology. For instance, in my previous research on 
process innovation, a number of managers interviewed stated that they had chosen to adopt 
NC machine tools because they felt that they could not obtain the level of skills required for 
conventional machining in the local labour market. This, of course, begs the question of why 
they are not prepared to train people in these skills, but, where firms are unwilling or unable 
to train, this too can be an important factor in the development of strategy. 
Finally, there is the whole range of contextual factors against which the markets themselves 
operate, which may be called the regulatory system. Product markets are regulated through 
British and International technical standards, and also the more specific regulations in high 
technology areas such as aerospace and pharmaceuticals. Production processes are regulated 
by both pollution and worker welfare legislation. The latter, for instance has encouraged the 
adoption of robotics and telechirics in noxious environments. The industrial relations system 
for the industry concerned can also influence manufacturing strategy decisions (Kochan et alia 
1984). 
A notable feature or the manufacturing strategy literature, however, is the almost complete 
lack of concern for the strategic aspects of the engineering design process. With notable 
exceptions, such as the work at Harvard (Clark and Fujimoto 1991: Hayes et alia 1988 chaps 
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10 and 11), and SPRU (eg Rothwell and Gardiner 1984). the strategic role of the interface 
between R&D and marketing on the one hand. and manufacturing on the other - engineering 
design - has received linle attention (Kotler and Rath 1984). In metalworking production. new 
products are mainly development of existing technologies. While there may be major 
innovations with particular components, most of the new product consists of proven elements 
in new configurations. For this reason, the ability to create "families" of technologically 
similar products is a major source of competitive advantage (Rothwell and Gardiner 1983). 
The interdependent relationship between manufacturing strategy and engineering strategy 
strongly suggests that their development might best be seen as a joint activity. There is little 
point in planning to manufacture products without knowing what they look like; similarly. the 
problems of trying to design products without taking into account how they will be 
manufactured are now well known. Perhaps the most useful way of thinking is in terms of the 
production strategy as a complement to the business' financial, marketing and R&D strategies. 
The manufacturing and engineering strategies can then be conceived as symbiotic elements of 
the production strategy and their relationship will be explored empirically in chapter 8. 
3.2 TECHNOLOGY AND TASK 
The previous section showed how the development of the production strategy is the means 
by which the activities of the firm are focused to accommodate the environmental 
contingencies that it faces. It is the process by which the outer context is articulated within 
the organisation to create an inner context. In order to carry out those activities. the factory 
requires a specific operating structure and process. By operating structure is meant the 
organisational and departmental structure of the manufacturing unit under review; by operating 
process is meant the flows of activity through those structures which enable production to take 
place. The operating structure and process are contingent upon the actual combination of 
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capital and labour chosen for the production process. This is what Van de Ven and Ferry call 
the "production function problem" (1980 chap 4). or the question of "process choice". Hill 
identifies five generic processes - project. jobbing. batch, line. and continuous process3 (1985 
chap 3). 
This choice sets the parameters for the further decisions regarding production technology and 
organisation design. The technologies which make up the production process are not fixed in 
the sense that no development takes place. However, there is a high level of fixity once 
technologies have been implemented - capital is sunk. and incremental improvement takes 
place within the relatively narrow bounds of the re-configuration of the technology. Only when 
the investment has been amortised. and the option of scrapping is. therefore. open. can the 
choice of technology adopted be re-evaluated in a fundamental sense. The operation of the 
process technology in the manner required to meet the objectives of the production strategy 
defines the production task. 
Lynch (1974) has usefully distinguished between the "system" and "individual" levels of task 
measurement. At the system level. task is assumed to be a contingency whose effects permeate 
the entire organisation. while at the individual level, its effects are presumed to be restricted 
to the immediate work group or department. The earlier work of people such as Woodward. 
Blau. and the Aston group tended to operationalise a system-level definition, while more 
recent work drawing on Perrow's (1967) formulation such as that of Yan de Yen has taken 
a more individual-level definition. These two levels are both relevant to the analysis here. The 
system-level definition is analogous to the formulation of the "manufacturing task" or 
"manufacturing mission". while the weight of contemporary organisational sociology tends to 
favour the individual-level definition (Withey et. alia. 1983). In order to retain clarity of 
analysis and exposition. the argument presented here will reserve the term task for the 
3) T~ese art', o! c:-.;~s(', veery s~-:,a: :c' '\·,'oa'~,,:-a's (l9l'tl origi~a~ :ypo~ogy ".t~ ::r.e ,"air, 
addi: . C'~: o~ "r:"o ;cct" ~'rO:-l'sses. 
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individual level, and deploy the term mission for the system or plant level task. 
3.3 MISSION AND TASK 
How, then, is the production mission translated into the tasks which influence the design of 
jobs and departments? Clearly, there is a range of tasks within a single production mission, 
and the organisation may be unfocused and have more than one mission. Product design is a 
different task from production control; the foundry's task is different from that of final 
assembly. Within a single mission, there is a level of differentiation which will vary 
contingently, and for a given mission, there is a level of requisite integration which will also 
vary contingently. Within this conceptual framework, adapted from Lawrence and Lorsch's 
study (1967) of the relationship between organisation and environment, the work of Van de 
Ven and Ferry (1980) helps us to draw out the linkages. 
There is a variety of operationalisations of task available in the literature, but in the opinion 
of Withey et. alia. (1983), Van de Ven and Ferry's is one of the better ones in terms of 
"discriminant" and "convergent" validity. For our purposes, their operationalisation has the 
overwhelming advantage of being part of a suite of organisational assessment methods. They 
analyse task (1980 chap 5) in terms of "difficulty", broken down into "predictability" and 
"analysability", and "variability", and show that these contingency factors are correlated with 
measures of departmental structure and process. Departments are defined though a "linking 
pin" analysis. They then analyse relationships between departments in terms of work and 
information flows (1980 chap 7). These flows vary along the dimensions of "direction", 
"intensity", and "variability". So, 
"for the organization as a whole. the direction of work and infonnation flows between 
organizational units and levcIs identi fies the network or cluster of relationships within 
a complex organization. The amounts of work and information flows indicate the 
intensity of the intraorganizational network. that is. the strength of the 
task-instrumental and maintenance activities in the network. The variability or 
standardisation of work and information flows indicates the routinization of network 
relationships" (p 247: emphasis in the original). 
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The production mission can, therefore, be conceived as consisting of work and information 
flows differentiated into a series of tasks, which require a particular level of integration - the 
requisite level of integration - in order to function effectively. Structurally, this differentiation 
takes the form of departmentation, and integration takes the form of organisational linkages 
(c.f. Galbraith 1977). Processually, differentiation takes the form of interdependence and 
conflict, and integration takes the form of co-ordination and control. This conception will be 
explored further in chapter 4 in terms of the differentiation between the engineering and 
manufacturing functions. 
While the analysis of tasks and departmental structure and process proposed here may be well 
established and widely acceptable, the analysis of relations between departments in terms of 
flows is a useful innovation which requires further development. The main issues would seem 
to be these: 
1) The nature of the flows needs to be carefully specified. Economists distinguish 
between stocks and flows. Yan de Yen and Ferry seem to confuse the two in their 
organisational analysis. 
2) Information flows are conceived only as control flows, yet, I would suggest that 
there are many types of information flow in organisations. 
Yan de Yen and Ferry define work flows as the "materials, objects, or clients and customers 
that are transacted between units". They are a subset of the resource flows which include 
"money, physical equipment, staff, support services and work". If, however, we take the 
comparison with the economists' view of stocks and flows we can see that much of these 
supposedly flow elements are pan of the assets of the manufacturing operation. Work is 
processed through and by the physical equipment and staff of the manufacturing unit. It is 
the raw materials of production which flow through the manufacturing operation. A linked 
issue is that the flow of inrormation also imolvcs work in the intuiti\'c sense; indeed, a large 
and growing number of people are employed solely to process information in organisations, 
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It seems useful, therefore, to call the work flow the materials flow, at least in the operating 
core of businesses engaged in the production of goods. 
In terms of the content of the information flow, Yan de Yen and Ferry restrict its scope to the 
co-ordination and control of the work flow. While the control system which the finance 
function imposes on the operating functions of the organisation does represent a major 
information flow. it can be usefully distinguished from the other information flows within the 
organisation. Firstly. the sales and marketing flow required for positioning and developing 
the firm's product in the market is a major and distinctive information flow. There are also 
other environmental monitoring information flows. Secondly. and of more immediate relevance 
here, there is the production information flow. This comprises the entire flow of information 
from the conception of the product to its execution, and it both instigates and controls the 
materials flow. 
Thus the organisation can be seen as a set of structured flows - the precise character of which 
varies with both the organisation's mission, and the function of the flow within it. Within a 
business, the accounting flows will consist of cash and control information. the marketing 
flows will be of customers and market intel1igence, while the personnel flow will be of staff 
and the associated information. Thus what appear as the assets (or stocks) of the 
manufacturing operation - fixed assets (machines) and the workforce - appear as flows of 
financial and human resources in other pans of the business. 
3.4 THE PRODUCTION INFORMATION FLOW 
The contention is, therefore, that the production information flow is a vital element of process 
in organisations on a par with the flow of materials that forms the production process. Van 
de Yen and Ferry argue that a focus on work and information flows is useful because 
"they (1) appear to be the basic elements of process in organizations. (2) behaviorally 
indicate the task-instrumental and pattern-maintenance functions necessary for any 
or~ani/ation to survive. (3) provide a way to operationalize sociotechnical theory. and 
(4) provide ways to link thc micro- and macro-)c\(')s of organizational analysis" (1980 
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P 358). 
The following chapters will show the ways in which the same claims can be made for the 
material and infonnation flows identified above. 
The concept of the materials flow is a well developed one, at least amongst industrial 
engineers, and may be specified at varying levels of detail from the generic to the product, or 
even component, specific. The most detailed level of description is provided by method study 
techniques which can be used to develop "flow process charts" (see Lockyer 1983 chap 15). 
In the context of the model being developed here, method study is most appropriate for 
analysing tasks within departments. At the more aggregate level of the production mission, 
"process flow diagrams" (Marshall et. alia. 1975 chap 1) can be used to identify the 
relationship between departments. Wield (1985) gives an example of such a diagram for 
boiler-making. 
The technology with which this thesis is concerned is CAD/CAM. As is clear from the 
discussions in chapter 2, it does not. of itself, affect the other spheres of the business. The 
following discussion will, therefore. concentrate on the production infonnation flow. Figure 
3.1 shows the main elements of the production infonnation flow - the concept was first 
presented in Winch (1983). This is submitted as a process model in that it is meant to 
encapsulate real activity. The core of the model is the main data flow. It can be divided into 
four distinct stages in which the characteristics of the product are specified at cumulatively 
greater levels of detail: 
1) Design - the overall conception of the product has to be outlined and clari fied. 
and then put into a communicable fonn. 
2) Draughting - the detailed characteristics of the product must be specified and 
documented in order to e1iminate ambiguity once material processing starts. 
3) PLaflnin~ - the sequence of material processing must be specified. and costings 
calculated. The 3\'ailahilily of raw materials. labour and plant must also be 
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established. 
4) Control - once material processing is under way, its progress must be 
monitored against the criteria laid down in the previous three stages. 
It is through this process that the "information assets" (Clark and Fujimoto 1991 chap 2) of 
the production organisation are generated. Within this overall framework, the precise range 
of tasks within stages will vary contingently with the production mission. 
Transient data were identified by Wix and McLelland (1986). They are the data sets which 
are manipulated entirely within a stage, and from which only the output enters the main data 
flow. For example, the use of finite element analysis routines within the design stage, or the 
stock control system in the stores are examples of transient data flows. The importance of 
transient data flows comes from the historical tendency for them to be the first areas to be 
computerised within the production information flow, in what, to paraphrase Bright (1958 P 
99), might be called "islands of computerisation". Wix and McLelJand also identified fixed 
data as an additional data flow providing the standards by which the production process is 
undertaken. These can include elements of the regulatory system such as British Standards, 
and the scientific properties of the materials to be processed. These data are relatively 
unchanging both over time and between companies. They have not been included in the 
model for ease of exposition. 
Feedback data are perhaps the most overlooked element of the production information flow. 
Two of the most important flows are identified in the model, but there are others. The first 
is the loop from planning to design. This might be called the value loop by which production 
data is fed back into the design stage to enhance the manufacturability or buildability of the 
design. The second is the control loop by which the materials flow is controlled against both 
the criteria laid down at the design stage (the specification), and the planning stage (the 
production schedule). It is arguable that the effective management of these two loops is the 
most signifil'ant source of competitive ad\antage that the production operations can offer the 
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business. 
Van de Ven and Ferry suggest a number of dimensions along which the materials and 
infonnation flows can vary (see 1980, fig 7.1). Perhaps these can be summarised as direction 
and intensity. Direction clearly affects the ordering of tasks, and hence depanments, along 
the main data flow, while intensity refers to the frequency and variability of transactions along 
the flows. In their analysis of job design within departments, Van de Ven and Ferry draw 
on Thompson's (1967) three part typology in tenns of "pooled", "sequential" and "reciprocal" 
interdependence. They then go on to add a fourth type - "team" interdependence in which 
transactions are both reciprocal and iterative. This analysis is equally apposite to analysing 
flows of information and materials between departments, and will be developed in the next 
chapter. Thus, the manner in which flows of information are interdependent, or the coupling. 
through pooling, sequence, reciprocity or teams wi11 also have a major impact on the ordering 
of tasks. 
These flows of information and materials form series of transactions in the sense developed 
by Williamson (1975). In Williamson's definition, "a transaction occurs whenever a good or 
service is transferred across a technologically separable interface" (1981 p 552). Just as 
technological insepcrabilities segment the materials flow, the production information flow can 
be conceived as being broadly segmented by these four stages. They can, therefore, be subject 
to a variety of transaction governance regimes (Williamson 1985 chap 3). These can be 
predominantly "hierarchical", as in the 15 metalworking cases studied here, or predominantly 
"trilateral" as in the case of project processes such as construction4 (cf Winch 1989). Thus it 
is the governance of transactions within the flows of information and materials which defines 
the boundaries of the organisation as a "nexus of treaties" (Aoki at alia 1990). However, 
within the transaction cost approach, the analysis of internal, or hierarchical, governance 
~) Pure ~ar,,'L gover~a~ce is unl~,ely a~e to t~e h!a~ ievels of uncertainty lnherert 1n t~e 
19n t'!o,-ess. Cr.~y ",,'''ere cor:ciiti.::r,s ~avc~~ :r.e c~rC,~dse o! :~,e cO-:-C'.eted c!"oduct as a "o:ac", box" des_:;-
ma:Ke: gove~n,~r:-(' ::cao~:'na~e. 
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regimes is underdeveloped, an issue which will be explored further in chapter 4. 
Differences in transactions between the materials flow and the production information flow 
between firms are contingent upon the production mission. The dimensions of this variation 
can be sketched out in the manner shown in figure 3.2, which shows the relationship to the 
production information flow of each of the materials flows indicated in the circles5• As we 
move along the abscissa away from the origin, the level of intensity decreases, to the point 
where, at the process plant end, there may have been no information transaction between the 
plant designers and the manufacturing management running it since the day the plant was 
commissioned. In the production information flow, direction will remain broadly constant, 
as by definition, conception is prior to execution. Coupling will vary according to the level 
of requisite integration between the production information flow and the materials flow. It 
may be suggested that the level of coupling between these two flows will tend to increase as 
we move away from the origin along the ordinate. Thus jobbing production represents a highly 
intensive reciprocally coupled mission, while car production tends to be a low intensity 
sequentially coupled mission. 
The interaction of the production information flow with the sales and marketing flow is also 
a source of contingent variation. The point at which the external transaction with the customer 
interacts with the internal transactions along the information and materials flows is of key 
relevance to the design of the organisation. In project and jobbing production, the transaction 
usually occurs at the beginning of the production information flow. In firms selling a portfolio 
of standard designs it will come at stage two as a design configuration, and in make-to-order 
production it will come at stage three. In production for stock it will come after stage four. 
This point of interaction will again have implications for intensity and coupling, and possibly 
even direction. Its profound implications for the production mission will be explored 
5) As .. ill be explored in chapter 8, tn~s is not the same as the re~ationshlp bet"'c~en tr,e 
lincering and mdr'.utacturlng f.Jrctions. As chapter 9 ... ;; sho,",. man'! of ::h(' "tl ~-l1ne" !lrTl'S have 
iiberately decoupled much of rr,anufactt;: i,ng plann:nq from t~c materials flo ... 
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empirically in chapter 8. 
3.5 THE PRODUCTION MODEL 
A summary and fonnalisation of the preceding argument is given in figure 3.3. This model 
is an heuristic of the contingent choices regarding internal transaction governance that are 
made in designing the operational, or production orientated elements of an organisation 
engaged in the manufacture of goods. It is only an heuristic because it is not claimed that 
organisations are designed by following the sequence through as if it were a decision tree. In 
practice the choices are made both simultaneously and iteratively, and often by default. 
However, it does indicate the set of contingent choices that characterise the process of 
organisation and job design, and the main direction of dependency between them, and provides 
a framework for the analysis of each of the organisations included in the case survey. 
Contingencies, are indicated by shaded boxes, while the dimensions along which they vary are 
indicated by plain boxes. The outcomes of strategic choices become contingencies when they 
influence the next level of the organisation. The model could be read from top left to bottom 
left, but a linear reading cannot be sustained. This is most obvious with the relationship 
between organisation structure and departmental structure. In practice, it is simply not possible 
to say which comes first, whether organisation structure depends on departmental structure or 
departmental structure depends on organisation structure. Therefore, a sense of moving from 
the general to the particular. or an increasing sense of detail, has been the guiding criterion 
in drawing up the heuristic. 
The environmental elements have been discussed in some detail already. While the first two 
are clearly the most significant, the other four may be influential in particular cases, and their 
role is an empirical question. The outcome of strategic choices with reference to the 
environment is the production Slrarcgy. There is then a choice of process to meet the 
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requirements of that strategy. The ways in which the array of technologies which make up 
the production process are configured - whether, for instance, they are managed for flexibility, 
worked on a three shift basis, or deskill existing jobs - will be contingent upon both the 
technical nature of the process, and the production strategy. It is these two elements of strategy 
and an array of technologies configured into a production process which are the main 
contingencies affecting the character of the materials flow and production information flow 
in the organisation. The notion of the production mission describes the relationship between 
the production strategy and the associated flows - it binds together strategy and flow6. In 
chapter 8, three generic production missions will be identified. 
Distinctive flows of materials through the production technology, and distinctive flows of 
information from the conception of the product to its despatch are associated with each type 
of production mission. The character of these information flows and the relationship between 
them form the prime contingency for the design of the organisation. These flows are 
differentiated into series of transactions, the character of which varies in terms of intensity, 
direction, and coupling. The character of the flows constrains the choices that can be made 
about the most appropriate design of organisation structure and process. Within this chosen 
organisational form, the individual structure and process of the various departments within the 
organisation is the result of choices contingent upon the variability and diffiCUlty of the task( s) 
that the department in question is expected to perform. Linked with the design of jobs is the 
design of the payments system to motivate satisfactory achievement of the planned 
performance. In order to ensure that holders of jobs have the resources to meet that planned 
performance. they are recruited with certain levels of skills, and given further training. The 
level of requisite expertise of job holders is also an important factor in departmental 
organisation design. Chapter 9 will explore the implications of the three generic production 
missions for organisation structure and processes. 
6) Thus the mlssic": .. s s('.,~ as tne outcor,e of the production s:rategy and the process choice. 
s Is a slightly dlf~erc' t sense .!ro~ ~ha: in :he ma~ufacturing stratc~y literature where the mission IS 
outcome o! :he strategy di:ect.y, ~ra p!~ress chOlce follows. 
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3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined a contingency theory of organisation design which combines both 
environmental and technological factors. and has thereby elaborated a conceptual framework 
for the analysis of the inner and outer context of the implementation process. The precise 
weight of each in any particular organisation is seen as an empirical question. The 
environment, or outer context, is conceptualised as being enacted through the production 
strategy which, combined with the choice of production process. yields a production mission. 
It is this mission which is most influential in determining the character, or inner context. of 
production organisation. Associated with the mission are distinctive flows of information and 
materials, and it was suggested that it is these flows which are the main contingency for the 
design of the operational elements of the organisation through the transaction governance 
regimes developed for their co-ordination and control. Within the overall design, the 
organisation is seen as being differentiated into departments. or functions. whose internal 
structure and process is contingent upon its task within the overall organisational flows. In 
tum, the design of jobs within the department is contingent upon the factors identified by Yan 
de Yen and Ferry. 
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4 
DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION IN METALWORKING 
PRODUCTION 
Perhaps the major Issue to emerge from the preliminary investigations into the role of 
engineering discussed in section 3.1 is the importance of the mode of transaction governance 
between the engineering and manufacturing functions and the quality of relations across the 
engineering/manufacturing interface. Traditionally, transactions have been sequentially coupled; 
now the pressure for improved product development perfonnance is generating pressures 
towards more interactive coupling in what Hayes and his colleagues call a new paradigm of 
product development management where 
"development is characterised by extensive overlap, with continual two-way 
interchange of infonnation at low levels. Different phases of the project are integrated 
through a shared understanding of the primary purpose of the product or process. Fast, 
effective problem solving and early conflict resolution are the rule" (1988 p 331). 
This chapter will use the heuristic presented in section 3.5 to explore this interface as an 
example of its analytic power. In so doing, it will embrace a theme within organisation design 
which has recently become a major focus of debate - that of "organisational integration" (see 
Whiston 1989 for a review). This literature tends to assume that integration is, by assertion, 
a good thing. It does not, therefore, provide any mechanisms for assessing the requisite level 
of integration in any particular situation, an analysis which can only be carried out in the light 
of an understanding of the sources of differentiation which gave arise to the need for 
integration in the first place. In developing such an understanding, a conceptual framework 
will be developed for the governance of internal transactions between functions. While some 
of the framework will be specific to the engineering/manufacturing interface, other elements 
will be of morc general application to internal organisational governance. 
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4.1 DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION 
Perhaps the first question to be addressed is the necessity to identify separate design and 
manufacturing functions. Lawrence and Lorsch have argued that "differentiation is defined as 
the state of segmentation of the organizational system into subsystems, each of which tends 
to develop particular attributes in relation to the requirements posed by its external 
environment" (1967b p 3). In the context of metalworking production, the design, or 
engineering, function can be considered as differentiated from the manufacturing function due 
to the different environmental contexts that each faces. 
Lawrence and Lorsch go on to state that "integration is defined as the process of achieving 
unity of effort among the various subsystems in the accomplishment of the organization's 
task" (ibid p 4). The point is that the requisite co-ordination between engineering and 
manufacturing cannot necessarily be achieved simply by merging the two functions, because 
this may reduce their individual abilities to cope effectively with their particular environments. 
This suggests that it may be more effective to retain the benefits of differentiation for the 
functional level, and achieve co-ordination at the organisational level through integration. 
Thus, as Lawrence and Lorsch indicate, and Rueschemeyer emphasises, "differentiation" and 
"integration" are not the poles of a single spectrum, but two heterogeneous spectra (1986 p 
143), as indicated in figure 4.1. Crucially, integration may be achieved either through further 
differentiation in the shape of specialist co-ordinating functions, or through the merging of 
functions in a process of "de-differentiation". 
For a long time, manufacturing finns have only had the choice between these two options. 
Over the last decade or so, a third option has begun to emerge with the development of 
integrating information technologies. Unity of effort can be facilitated, and perhaps even 
achieved. through ensuring that all functions within the organisation are working off the same 
information. This can be achieved by establishing a centralised or distributed data base of 
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infonnation which is shared between functions. In the manufacturing context, this is the goal 
of Computer Integrated Manufacture (CIM), which was described in section 2.3, where all the 
functions which playa pan in the production infonnation flow access a single data base - the 
product data base. 
This discussion poses a number of questions for the nature of interactions at the 
engineering/manufacturing interface: 
1) what are the sources of differentiation between design and manufacturing? 
2) to what extent is dedifferentiation a viable option in contemporary manufacturing 
firms? 
3) how much can data base technologies contribute to integration on their own 
account? 
4) what are the appropriate ways of governing the internal transactions across the 
engineering/manufacturing interface? 
These will oc discussed in tum. 
4.2 THE SOURCES OF DIFFERENTIATION 
The investigation of the first question is hampered by the almost complete lack of comparative 
empirical work on the differences between the contingencies facing the design and 
manufacturing functions. Most of the work on organisation and environment, and organisation 
and technology has treated the organisation as a homogeneous unit. Indeed, this has been one 
of the major criticisms of contingency theories of organisation. Lawrence and Lorsch 
themselves do not offer much guidance for two reasons. Firstly. despite the explicit ro]e that 
the environment7 p]ays in their framework. they present on]y proxies for differentiated 
7 In :.~eir ~.ocie~, :;,e te:- "e:vi!o ..... ~,ent" incl~des t!"',e :asl<. or tec;.no~ ... 'qy of t~~ !,..;~ct~or, "Jnder 
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environments. In particular, they deploy formalisation of organisation structure, and the 
orientations of staff in terms of others, time and goals (1967 chap 1). Degree of integration 
is then measured in terms of the reported amount of inter-departmental conflict. This approach 
is unsatisfactory because it effectively infers the cause of differentiation from the observed 
effects; it attempts to measure the independent variable by examining the dependent variables. 
Secondly, Lawrence and Lorsch were examining companies in three process industries with 
very different production information and materials flows from the norm in metalworking 
production. In particular, science-based research and development plays a much more 
important role than engineering design. 
The differentiation between engineering and manufacturing has its source in both of the main 
contingencies discussed in chapter 3, and has led to the development of a professional form 
of organisation in engineering and a bureaucratic one in manufacturing. Firstly, engineering 
processes only flows of information, while manufacturing processes flows of both information 
and materials. In fulfilling their roles within the production mission, they perform distinctive 
tasks. Secondly, they have distinctive relationships to the external environment through 
differences in the tasks deriving from the engineering and manufacturing elements of the 
production mission. The task of engineering is to articulate the customer's requirements in the 
design. This articulation, made either in conjunction with a marketing department or directly 
with the customer, encourages a product orientated organisation design. Manufacturing, on the 
other hand is relatively "buffered" (Thompson 1967 chap 2) from the environment, either by 
a marketing function or by engineering directly, and tends to seek effective resource utilisation 
through a functionally orientated organisation design (Winch 1983). 
The two main contingencies at the task level are, as discussed in section 3.5, difficulty, in 
terms of the extent of the search process required to perform the task, and the degree to which 
its outputs can be fully specified in advance; and variability, in terms of the number of 
exceptions encountered In performing the task. Engineering design work IS inherentl ~ 
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innovative - if the outcome of the task were fully known, then there would be no need for a 
design process. Outcomes, cannot, therefore be completely specified in advance, much to the 
chagrin of many customers. The task of manufacturing, on the other hand, can be fully 
specified in advance, thanks, mainly, to the work of engineering, and is, therefore, relatively 
predictable. The design process is also inherently conceptual, and, therefore, relatively difficult 
to analyse. In manufacturing, the conceptual element is largely restricted to the planning stage, 
and most materials processing is relatively easy to analyse. 
Engineering also faces greater variability than manufacturing because each design project is 
a one-off by definition. There is little point in designing the same product more than once, but 
in manufacturing the production run may be in the thousands, and is rarely one-off. Even in 
heavy engineering, many components are manufactured in pairs on a two-off basis. Between 
firms, there will be considerable variations in the levels of variability and difficulty with which 
they have to cope, depending on the nature of the production mission. For instance, the diesel 
pump maker customising a product through "variant design" is likely to have lower levels of 
task difficulty and variability in its engineering function than the builder of submarines has 
its manufacturing function. However, issue being addressed here is the differentiation between 
engineering and manufacturing within a single business, not between businesses. 
These differences in task contingencies lead to profound differences in the organisation 
structure and processes of the two functions (cf Van de Ven and Ferry fig 5.2). Firstly, there 
are important differences in the expertise deployed by the majority of workers in each 
function. In Zuboff's tenns (1988 chaps 2 & 3), materials processing traditionally involves 
"action-centred" skills which are characterised by "acting-on" physical materials, while 
information processing in design work involves "intellecti\'c skills" which are characterised 
by "acting-with" abstract ideas. The greater difficulty in engineering tends to favour the 
recruitmcnt of more highly skilled workers \vho are deployed in job designs allowing greater 
discretion. Lc\'c Is of interdependence also tend to be higher between groups in engineering. 
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and co-ordination processes more reciprocal. 
Secondly, the lower difficulty and variability in manufacturing has favoured greater 
specialisation and standardisation of work. Littler (1982) has argued that the development of 
scientific management in manufacturing was essentially a process of increasing bureaucracy. 
In comparison to engineering, the emphasis has been on rules, programmes, and procedures. 
This contention is supported by evidence from Whalley's case study of a pressing plant where 
on a measure of "organisational constraint", the drawing office was found to have the lowest 
organisational constraint, while the production engineers were found to have the highest after 
the production managers themselves (1986 fig 4.1). Similarly, Smith (1991) in a comparison 
of the work and ideology of design engineers at British Aerospace and manufacturing 
engineers at Cadbury compared the "craftism" of the designers and the "Taylorism" of the 
manufacturing systems developers. 
Thirdly, the greater standardisation and specialisation has favoured the development of 
automation, and so one of the major differences between the two functions is capital intensity. 
Manufacturing deploys a whole range of technologies which are simply not relevant to the 
engineering. In manufacturing. the largest elements of costs are fixed capital and materials. 
while in engineering. the largest single element of costs remains labour. despite the advent of 
CAD. This means that the perfonnance criteria laid down in each function are likely to be 
different - while the focus of management control on the shop floor is turning increasingly to 
machining times and material control, in the design office concern still focuses directly on the 
perfonnance of workers. 
Fourth] y. the two draw on different types of labour market. Design engineers are now highly 
professionaliscd. Even if they do not meet the full criteria of a liberal profession or enjoy the 
autonomy of their counterparts in the construction industry. they arc now supported by such 
institutions as the Engineering Council and espouse many of the tencL,\ of the professional 
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ethos (see Francis and Winstanley 1988). In contrast, organisations of managers in 
manufacturing are pale imitations, and are more along the lines of specialist interest groups 
within bureaucratic structures. So far as manual workers are concerned, the changes 
symbolised by the decline in apprenticeships means that craft labour markets have now largely 
disappeared. While this choice of a professional fonn of work organisation may well be a 
response to the distinctive task of design engineering, it is now so embedded through the 
process of structuration that it must now be considered an independent variable in the 
organisation of the design function. 
Deploying the Schein (1984) model, Adler (1988) has reviewed some of the outcomes of these 
differing contingencies for the cultures of engineering and manufacturing in the American 
context. He identifies three main areas of difference, even in organisations where the two 
functions are on the same site. At the level of "artefacts and creations", rewards such as pay 
and fringe benefits tend to di ffer between the two, with engineering usually more favoured. 
At the level of "values", the implicit hierarchy of status and influence within the organisation 
runs from conceptual design, through detail design and down to manufacturing engineering. 
At the level of "basic assumptions", the root of creativity is seen as individual expertise, rather 
than a sense of collective responsibility for a successful product. 
Of course, the "bureaucratic" model of manufacturing organisation has long been under attack. 
McGregor (1960) contrasted the "theory X" view of management deriving fonn scientific 
management with the "theory Y" view of a more open, participative style. Writers as varied 
as Piore and Sabel, and Peters and Waterman have advocated a move towards more organic 
forms of organisation. More recently Walton (1985) has reported shi fts in the management of 
human resources away from attempts at "control" of the workforce towards generating 
"commitment" from the workforce at a number of factories. These changes have been 
accompanied by a shi ft towards more "organic" organisational forms such as those charted hy 
Haves and his colleagues (1988). Jaikumar (19S6). and !\emetz and Fry (1988) amongst 
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others. However. the evidence from these cases is that there is still a long way to go. and the 
contingencies outlined above will not go away. Indeed. they are in many cases increasing in 
their strength. 
The differentiation between design and manufacturing. therefore. has deep roots and a sturdy 
trunk. It may well be possible to train some of the branches towards a less differentiated state. 
but the survival of the whole will continue to depend upon this differentiation. Only in very 
small organisations, or highly focused factories in stable markets is a merger between design 
and manufacturing likely to be viable in tenns of competitive advantage. These conditions are 
not widely met. as is indicated by the fact that in only one of our case study companies are 
the manufacturing and design operations under a common (manufacturing) director. Even this 
organisation retains a separation between the chief designer. the manufacturing engineering 
manager. and the manufacturing manager at the next level of the hierarchy, and uses 
organisational linkage mechanisms between them. 
4.3 INTEGRATION BY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
The notion of technical, or systems integration is central to the literature on the 
implementation of AMT. As discussed in section 2.3, the contemporary literature abounds with 
the notion of CIM. and. indeed. the further interface of the product data base with other data 
bases within the business such as those in finance and marketing to create what is sometimes 
known as the Computer Integrated Business. However. as Ingersoll Engineers (1985 p 13) 
point out. elM is not the same as "Integrated Manufacture". They argue that it needs to be 
supported by organisational developments to tum a technical integration into a business 
intc!.!ration. For instance. Bertodo (1988) shows the way in which relying on an "engineering 
data base" for design team communication meant that decisions tended to be made sequentially 
rather than being overlapped. and reducing product development lead times through 
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overlapping the various elements of the design process required organisational linkages. 
For a number of reasons, integrating technologies do not offer a "technical fix" - a way of 
achieving technical and organisational integration on their own. Firstly, the elements of the 
system must be compatible. While the compatibility problem may well be fairly simply solved 
through greater senior management control of the evaluation process, the second reason is 
more intractable. Essentially, the problem is that of determining the content of the product 
data base, and the protocols for its use. This is not a question of coming to a single agreement 
which can then be implemented by each function separately, but a continuing negotiation 
which requires close and balanced co-ordination between all panies who generate or access 
the product data base. 
This issue, in tum, raises the question of the responsibility for the product data base. In its 
paper form - drawings, pans lists, and specifications - the design has traditionally been the 
responsibility of engineering. However, the increasingly demanding requirements of the NC 
programming process, panicularly with the advent of 3 and 5 axis machining centres, means 
that manufacturing engineering depanments are increasingly manipulating, rather than merely 
interpreting, the design. In some cases, this can lead to manufacturing engineering, rather than 
the drawing office, generating the 3D models required for NC programming, which can 
generate issues around the "ownership" of the product data base. If engineering develop the 
three-dimensional models that manufacturing require, this increases their costs for little 
perceived return to the function, but if manufacturing generate them, then engineering lose 
control over the design. 
CAD/CAM systems, as presently available, suffer from a number of limitations as integrating 
technologies for handling the production information flow. Firstly, CAD/CAM systems are 
most effective at generating, storing, and transmitting data in graphical form. Much of the 
design infomulion transmitted to manufacturing - panicularly specifications and scheduks -
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is textual in form, describing attributes of the components, and CAD/CAM systems tend to 
be poor at handling such data. Secondly, another very important way of transmitting design 
information is in physical representations in the form of prototypes, models, and mock-ups. 
At the present state of the an, it is difficult to use CAD/CAM systems for textual and physical 
data. While, developments are presently taking place which will overcome these limitations, 
such as bill of material capabilities, and various visualisation techniques such as solid 
modelling, holograms, and stereolithography, these are only just beginning to be implemented. 
and are seen as next generation tools by users. 
Thirdly, as discussed in section 2.3, CAD/CAM systems only automate the design process in 
a very few cases of "variant" design. when tailoring a generic product to meet the 
requirements of a particular customer. For the vast bulk of design work, design decisions are 
still made mentally, and it is the content of those decisions which is critical. Iterative debate 
within the design team is a crucial part of the process. and one which is unlikely to be 
computerised in the foreseeable future. Organisational integration remains, therefore. vital for 
the release of the potential of the business potential of technically integrated CAD/CAM 
systems. and it is to this issue that the argument will now tum. 
4.4 ORGANISATIONAL INTEGRATION 
The earlier sections of this chapter have shown the way in which the engineering and 
manufacturing functions are di rferentiated, and the limitations of information technology alone 
in providing the requisite level of integration between them. This section will discuss some 
of the conceplual issues associated with organisational integration between engineering and 
manufacturing. which will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 13. It will be remembered 
from section 3.5 that the key variables by which transactions within the production infom13tion 
flow \'ary are direction. coupling. and intensity. The direction of the main data now is 
unprohlematic in this case - it is from engineering to manufacturing. 
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A useful basis for analysing the type of coupling between differentiated functions is 
Thompson's typology of interdependence (1967 chap 5), which can be summarised in tenns 
of infonnation flows as follows. Organisations are characterised by "pooled" interdependence 
when functions merely share overheads, and little or no information flows between them on 
a routine basis; by "sequential" interdependence when information flows in a linear fashion 
from one function to another; and by "reciprocal" interdependence, where there are feedback 
loops in the information flows. To this basic typology, Van de Ven and his colleagues (Van 
de Ven et alia 1976; Van de Ven and Ferry 1980) have added that of "team" interdependence 
where there is simultaneous exchange ofinfonnation between groups. The term "team" is more 
descriptive of the organisational means by which such a simultaneous information flow is 
achieved, and so the term iterative to describe interdependence in such an infonnation flow 
is preferred here. 
However, as Adler (1989) argues, this typology ignores the temporal dimension in the 
engineering/manufacturing interface. The character of interdependence varies, depending on 
whether the design project is being planned, or at the "pre-project" phase; is in the design or 
"project" phase; or is in the manufacturing or "post-project" phase. This typology gives one 
way of measuring intensity appropriate to this particular transaction. Adler has related these 
two dimensions of the production infonnation flow in a typology of co-ordination procedures. 
He defined coupling in terms of the "communication pattern" across the design/manufacturing 
interface, which varied according to whether it was "one-way", "stilted two-way" or "(WO-
way". These appear to be synonymous with the categories developed above, and so the latter 
will be preferred. 
The discussion has. so far. concentrated on the procedures, or processes. of 
engineering/manufacturing co-ordination. However, just as processes within organisation 
structures are their life-blood, those processes have to be embedded in structures in order to 
define their now in the dynamic of the structuration of the organisation. In other words. \l, hat 
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types of organisation design can best facilitate the kinds of co-ordination procedure identified 
above? Galbraith (1977) has extensively reviewed organisational linkage mechanisms, and his 
typology can be applied to linkages across the engineering/manufacturing interface. 
Galbraith starts from the premise that organisations are designed so as to cope with 
uncertainty, defined as the "difference between the amount of information required to perform 
the task, and the amount of information already possessed by the organisation" (1977 p 36). 
He then reviews the variety of ways that organisations have coped, suggesting that they 
essentially fall into two cate1!ories - reducin1! the level of uncertainty. and hence the amount 
. ~...... . . 
of information required to be processed, or increasing information processing capacity. In the 
former category, he includes environmental management, or buffering; the deployment of slack 
resources, thereby reducing organisational performance; and creating self-contained tasks. 
He then suggests four strategies for increasing information processing capability. The first is 
the introduction of what Weber called bureaucracy (1947 S 3.2) - taking the form of hierarchy, 
rules, programmes and standards. The second is professionalism,8 where workers with known 
performance capabilities are given local autonomy to solve problems. As discussed in section 
4.2, these have been the classical solutions adopted in manufacturing and engineering 
respectively. However, both professionalism and bureaucracy suffer from strictly limited 
information processing capacities as hierarchical lines of communication become overloaded, 
rules and programmes need to be continually updated, and professionals need to be 
co-ordinated. Committees can be considered as the most distinctive co-ordination mechanism 
of bureaucratic and professional organisation designs in that they meet to set rules and decide 
on programmes. 
The third strategy is the introduction of computerised management information systems. \\'hi1c 
these do indeed increase the organisation's information processing capabilities, the: can only 
f') Parso:;s, "~ ,~~s :'r.~,OQ~C~20:-:0 ;·;coer's :ex:, a~c S:inc'1co:roe (:i959) ~ave coth a,q~eQ tnat ... eoer's 
~lat1on o! o-.;rea_;::ra:!c n:.C ~·c~css:c··,,: :::,,;a:.:sa::::::~ :s a ~.is:a,e. : cC'c_r ~_th :"'ls cr:tiq.1e. 
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handle quantitative infonnation and all suffer the types of limitations identified in section 4.3. 
The fourth strategy is the implementation of lateral, as opposed to hierarchical, relations. All 
the strategies identified for increasing capacity incur costs; but, Galbraith argues (1977 p 55), 
if they are not chosen, slack resources are the default option. He goes on (1977 chap 8) to 
propose a hierarchy of lateral relations with the aim of reducing the need for infonnation 
processing vertically within the organisation, and enhancing the capacity to process it at lower 
levels. He identifies six distinct mechanisms: direct contact; liaison roles; task forces; teams; 
integrator roles; and matrix organisation. 
The structures proposed by Galbraith and the processes proposed by Adler can be considered 
as the ways through which the structuration of internal transaction governance along the 
infonnation and materials flows takes place. Pressures from the environment, particularly 
through the shortening product life cycles, the reduction of product development lead times, 
and demands for the implementation of JIT-type production systems are all placing increasing 
pressures on internal transaction governance. Slack resource is no longer a viable default 
option, and bureaucratic and professional solutions are no longer capable of the speed and 
quantity of infOlmation processing required. Infonnation technology cannot do the job on its 
own, and so increasing attention is being paid to organisational integration. Organisations are 
moving from simpler transaction governance methods towards iterative coupling and matrix-
type structures. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has explored in more detail the heuristic developed in chapter 3 by focusing on 
the engineering/manufacturing interface and the sources of differentiation between the 
engineering and manufacturing functions in organisations engaged in metalworking production. 
It demonstrated that the sources of di fferentiation are contingent upon the outer context. and 
the associated process choices. The option of "dedi fferentiation", or the merger of functions 
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IS, therefore, limited to a very few special cases, and is not widely available. While 
information technologies can help with the problem of integration in differentiated 
organisations through increasing their information processing capabilities, such a 
"technological fix" on its own is inadequate - information systems need to be managed. While 
integrating technologies such as CAD/CAM can provide useful elements of integration by 
making it easier for everybody to be working off the same timely information in the product 
data base, it is still necessary to develop organisational co-ordination procedures for managing 
transactions across this interface within the production information flow. 
Attention, therefore, turned to the organisational means of governing transactions between 
departments. Typologies of process and structure, derived from the work of Adler and 
Galbraith respectively, were presented. These two typologies fonn the basis for an 
understanding of the structuration of transaction governance across the 
engineering/manufacturing interface and can, therefore, be considered to be complementary 
to Williamson's typology of governance forms for external transactions within the outer 
context. The requisite level of integration in an organisation is a combination of, on the one 
hand, the extent of differentiation which remains once dedifferentiation, or merger, options 
have been exhausted, and, on the other, the type of transaction governance that the information 
or materials flow requires. The level of organisational integration can be measured by the 
extent of use of these structural and processual governance modes, and will be explored 
empirically in chapter 13. 
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5 
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
The process of technological change, or implementation, within the organisation is the main 
issue addressed by this thesis. However, influenced by the development of Pettigrew's model 
presented in section 1.2, it was necessary to present the content of change in terms of the 
characteristics of the technology being implemented in chapter 2, and the context of change 
in terms of the organisation within which implementation takes place in chapters 3 and 4. The 
argument will now return to the main theme by developing a robust, recursive model of the 
process of change. It will then examine the types of structures adopted by organisations to 
enable this process to happen, and discuss their different properties in terms of the capacity 
to generate "organisational learning". 
5.1 STAGE MODELS OF CHANGE 
The literature on the di ffusion and implementation of innovations has tended to specify the 
process in terms of stages. As a result, Zaltman et alia (1973, chap 2), writing in the early 
seventies, could specify seven different stage models in their review of the literature before 
adding their own. Time has only added to this cornucopia of models - see Partridge (1987) 
for a review. Before attempting: to derive a generic stage model which can be applied across 
the 15 cases investigated here, it is worth trying to specify the criteria which a stage model 
should meet. Zaltman et alia. commenting on the stage models of diffusion and 
implementation prevalent in the sixties. argued that they all tended to be inductively generated 
from limited case study data (1973 chap 2). Little has changed in more recent work on this 
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topic. Hage (1980 p 207), however, argues that any model proposed should be theoretically 
justifiable. This is surely right - the continued generation of slightly differing models from 
non-comparable case studies is not going to advance knowledge very much. 
The work of Gardiner and Rothwell (1985) on the criteria for "good" engineering design 
stresses the importance of "robust" as opposed to "lean" design. Robust designs are ones that 
can be both consolidated and stretched, while lean designs are unadaptable. Such a criterion 
would seem to be appropriate for the assessment of both methodologies and models in 
organisational research. In particular, any model of change proposed should be capable of 
adaptation and re-adaptation to the case under study without loosing its conceptual integrity. 
This suggests that the generic model itsel f should not be over-refined, but clear in its 
specification and plausible in its application. 
Any stage model is an analytic device to segment a flow of activity through time. The point 
of transition, or inflection between stages, therefore, ought to be meaningfully specifiable. 
Many stage models attempt to describe the content of each stage, but do not specify the 
outcomes of the activities within each stage. The inflection points, therefore. tend to be 
arbitrary. A simple, but related point. is that the nomenclature of the stages ought to be 
intuitively meaningful as well. There are, therefore, three basic criteria by which to assess 
stage models - they should be theoretically justifiable, robust. and specify clearly both the 
content and inflection points of each individual stage. The fo]Jowing discussion will focus on 
implementation models; diffusion models will not be addressed because, as discussed in 
section 1.1. they tend to assume that implementation is unproblematic. 
Hage (1980 chap 7) proposes a four stage modeL which he justifies on the groundS that each 
stage corresponds to one of the four prohlems of the Parsonian social system. "Evaluation", 
is the pattern maintenance funLtional prohlem - how the organisation perceives a performance 
gap and the selection of the option oj ch~mge. "Initiation" is the adaptive functional problem 
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of how the search for resources is carried out. "Implementation" is the goal achievement 
functional problem, its objective being the reduction of the perfonnance gap. Finally, 
"routinization" is the integration functional problem and the process through which the change 
is accepted or rejected by the organisation. This model of implementation is largely based on 
research in hospitals and other service sector organisations such as schools. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that the implementation of AMT might be different. The key difference 
lies in the fact that in manufacturing organisations, capital budgeting procedures mean that it 
is not very meaningful to distinguish between the evaluation process, or the choice of 
technology, and the initiation process or the garnering of funds to pay for it. Keeping with 
Hage's tenninology, it is suggested here that the justification procedure simultaneously 
"evaluates" and "initiates" the innovation. 
Lewin (1952 chap 9), writing from a social psychological perspective, identified three stages 
of change in group standards - "unfreezing", "moving" , and "freezing". This model has been 
developed by Schein (1964) who gave a rich content to each of the stages. White (1980) has 
usefully applied this model to the implementation of MRP systems, and, as Melin (1987), has 
pointed out, this metaphor is a hclpful onc for analysing change in organisations. However, 
the emphasis upon the reactions of individuals to the change, and, in particular the implied 
problematic of "resistance to change", means that organisational and technical problems 
associated with implementation, such as those suggested by Beatty and Gordon (1988) tend 
to be overlooked. While striving for a holistic approach, it does not give any guidance as to 
where to look for the forces acting in the field upon the organisation under study. 
Voss (1988a) has proposed a three stage model of implementation, moving through 
"pre-installation", "installation and commissioning", and "post-commissioning". The outcome 
of the first stage is the "go/no go" decision. The problem with this terminology is that it tends 
to impl y that the most im ponant stage is the "installation and comm issioning phase". when 
the importance of the different st~1ges may well \'ary between implementation projects. 
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Secondly, it only suggests a point of inflection for the end of the evaluation stage. However, 
elsewhere, Voss (1988b) has distinguished between "technical success" and "business success" 
as outcomes of the implementation process. Technical success occurs when the system is fully 
de-bugged and working reliably. Business success, on the other hand, is only reached when 
the original benefits that were sought have been realised. 
Drawing mainly on these three models, the following generic model for the implementation 
of AMT is proposed - it is summarised in figure 5.1. The first stage is the evaluation of the 
new technology both technically and financially following upon the recognition by the 
organisation of what Zaltman et alia (1973 p 55) call a "performance gap". This evaluation 
process has the effect of unfreezing the perceptions of at least the key decision makers. Its 
most characteristic procedure is the "justification" by which the bidding for funds takes place. 
The outcome is the adoption decision on whether to proceed with the implementation. This 
stage is, in effect, a combination of Hage's first two stages, and it lays down the criteria by 
which the success, or otherwise, of the implementation will be assessed. 
Walton (1989) has identified a number of organisational process that occur principally at this 
stage. The first is what he calls "creating a strategic vision" through which the technology is 
evaluated both in the context of the existing production strategy, and in terms of external 
opportunities and threats posed by the technology. The second is the promotion of 
"commitment and competence" amongst those that will use the system. Thirdly, "broad and 
informed political support" is generated. The extent of this activity varies depending on 
whether other members of the "critical mass" required for implementation are required to "let 
it happen", "help it happen", or "make it happen" (Beckhard and Harris 1987). The evaluation 
stage, then, is a quintessentially political process through which the objectives of the 
implementation are detenn ined. 
In tenns of the typology presented in section 2.2, this stage is likely to vary with the content 
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of change so far as the level of technical complexity and systemic change of the technology. 
The more complex the technology, and the more systemic the technology, the more likely is 
the evaluation process to be extended and far ranging. Similarly, the context of change will 
also have an impact, particularly in terms of how the technology affects the existing 
production mission, and how the capital budgeting procedures as part of the organisation's 
resource flows are organised. Thus, in some organisations, as implied in the comments on 
Hage's model above, it may be useful to identify the mode of search for resources as a 
dimension along which this stage can vary. 
The second stage is the installation and commissioning of the new technology. During this 
stage, the commitmcnt of those immediatcly involvcd with the system is usually gained, and 
workers are trained to operatc the system. Thc first stage of the configuration of the systems 
takes place during this stage, and may bc organised on a participative basis (Walton 1989 part 
II). Relationships with the vendors of the technology will also be at their most important. The 
intended outcome is technical success in the sense that the performance of the technology as 
laid down in the specification at the evaluation stage is met or surpassed. This is the same as 
Hagc's "implementation" stage. 
The contingencies by which this stage varies are likely to be largely technical, particularly the 
level of complexity. The objective is to get the new technology working by mobilising the 
requircd resources internally and externally, mainly through configuring it to the meet the 
specifications laid down earlier. High technical complexity will involve the intensive 
mobilisation of a depth of ski1ls, while systemic features will imply the deployment of a 
broader range of skil1s. The physical characteristics of the technology will also be important. 
A basic CAD system can be installed in a existin~ office merely by plugging it in; a new press 
line requires a major construction project. perhaps lasting over a year. The more complex the 
technology. the longer commissioning is likely to take. 
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The third and final stage is consolidation, or what Hage calls "routinization". During this 
stage, the organisation makes the adaptations in its internal structure and process so that the 
perfonnance of the system can be improved. If necessary, a system management section is 
established to ensure its routine operation. There may also be a further configuration of the 
technology so that it complements the organisational context. During this stage. the freezing 
of the implementation into the organisation takes place. The intended outcome is business 
success in that the objectives laid down at the evaluation stage are either met or surpassed, or 
that sufficient unforeseen benefits are reaped to counter-balance the disappointments with the 
original aims. 
Technical complexity is not likely to have much of an influence on this stage, but systemic 
technologies will tend to imply that major organisational changes will be required, particularly 
in tenns of increased organisational integration between the departments affected. The amount 
of change required will also be contingent upon the existing extent of differentiation and 
integration within the organisation. For instance, the implementation of CAD/CAM into an 
organisation which is already highly integrated will require less consolidation than in one 
where integration across the engineering/manufacturing interface is underdeveloped. 
Using this generic model, analysis can be focused on how it varies contingently between 
different implementing organisations. The key question for research on implementation is how 
and why each of the stages changes in tenns of its content and its relationship with its 
adjoining stages. For instance, Enlie (1980) in a survey of 34 innovations shows that, in terms 
of a version of Rogers' diffusion model amended to include an "implementation" stage, the 
stage that most often varied in terms of its absence or presence was the "trial" stage. The 
problem is that some technologies are quite simply not amenable to trial. Rather than specify 
this as a separate stage, it seems more sensible to characterise "trialability" as one of the 
dimensions by which the (,valuation stage can vary. 
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All three stages of the model can be considered to comprise the implementation process. It is 
submitted as a process model, because, as will be demonstrated in chapters 10, 11, and 12, 
implementations can be seen to pass through these stages. The model is theoretically justified 
on the basis of Hage's analysis, robust in terms of its ability to handle contingent variation 
within stages, and has clearly specifiable content and inflection points between stages. 
However, this is precisely the sort of model that Pettigrew has criticised on the grounds of 
excessive linearity and rationality (1985 p 16). Although not totally averse to stage models 
himself (see 1985 p 473), Pettigrew is right to reject a reliance on such crude formulations. 
They can only serve a useful role as parts of more dynamic and recursive models; the next 
section will develop such a mode1. 
5.2 A RECURSIVE MODEL 
Leonard-Barton presents a model of implementation as a process of "mutual adaptation". She 
argues that most of the literature on process innovations "focuses on either what can be done 
to the technology to adjust it to its environment or what is done to the organization by the 
technology". She proposes that the process is more fruitfully conceived as one of mutual 
adaptation between the technology and the organisation as a process of the "re-invention of 
the technology and the simultaneous adaptation of the organisation" (1988 p 253). This process 
of mutual adaptation proceeds through a series of long and short cycles of adaptation. "Long 
cycles" are major evaluations and redirections of the implementation process. while "small 
cycles" are minor adjustments to the flow. 
There are two main points that can be made about this model. Firstly. Leonard-Barton is 
clearly influenced by socio-technical systems theory. and conceives the end process of mutual 
adaptation to be an equilibrium between the social and technical systems. In particular. she 
stresses the simultaneity of the adaptation process. Ettlie has similarly proposed a model of 
"svnchronous inno\,:ltion" (198R chap 1) in which the inscallarion and commissioning and 
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consolidation stages overlap. Damanpour and Evan (1984), however, have noted that 
organisational adaptations tend to lag behind technical ones due to "organizational lag" . This 
is because, as Leonard-Barton herself points out in a later work (1990 fig 9.2), organisational 
issues have a much slower learning curve than technical issues. We have then three possible 
routes for the "alignment" AMT with the organisation: the enabling organisational conditions 
already exist; the adaptation occurs simultaneously; and the technology is implemented and 
then the organisation adapts, with the last being the most common (McKersie and Walton 
1991). 
A second issue is how to distinguish between the large and small cycles. Leonard-Barton gives 
examples, but does not give more general guidelines. So far as technical adaptation is 
concerned, the distinction between the primary elements of the technology identified earlier 
in section 2.1, and its configuration is the key. Small cycles can be defined as those which 
affect the configuration, while large cycles are those which take the implementor back to either 
scrapping the technology and choosing another, or changing the primary elemenLIi of the 
technology. So far as organisational adaptations are concemed, Leonard-Barton appears to 
equate small cycles with job redesign, and large cycles with organisational redesign (see 1988 
figure 3). 
The Leonard-Barton model meets many of the requiremenLIi for a dynamic and recursIve 
conception of the implementation process, but is limited by its assumptions of simultaneity 
and equilibrium. Like Ettlie's model of "synchronous innovation", it is more a picture of an 
ideal, than a model for understanding actual change processes. The greater the consolidlltion 
required, the less likely is synchronous implementation to be achieved. The process of mutual 
adaptation means that implementation does not occur in a linear fashion, but recursively 
through time. At each stage the organisation iterates around strategic choices within the design 
space. Ttle lag within the process means that each stage is interactive with the others. The 
achievement of technical or business success can mean that a new performance gap is 
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perceived; it may reach such a level that a completely new evaluation of CAD/CAM is 
required, and so the cycle starts again. Indeed. the achievement of success, in both technical 
and business terms is likely to encourage re-evaluation as awareness of the potential of the 
technology is heightened. The dynamic of the development of the technology itself. as 
articulated by vendors' marketing, also ensures that perceptions of the performance gap are 
constantly changing. 
A recursive model of implementation is presented in figure 5.2; it was first presented in Winch 
and Twigg (1992). The main feature is the avoidance of a position of equilibrium, and the 
emphasis on continuous changing. It retains the three stages identified in section 5.1. but 
places them in interactive and recursive relationships to each other. and shows the way in 
which the successful completion of one phase of implementation generates pressures for re-
evaluation and a new phase of implementation to begin. If each phase can be considered as 
a large cycle of implementation, then the small cycles can be seen as the incremental changes 
within each phase. The process does not revolve around a fixed point. but displays a 
development through time as re-evaluations build on the experience of installation and 
commissioning, and consolidation with the earlier system. This is indicated by the large arrows 
at the end of each cycle. The overall dynamic can be considered to be one of "organisational 
learning" in which "feedback from previous experience is used to choose amongst present 
alternatives". and can be seen as a complement to "rational calculation, by which expectations 
about future consequences are used to choose amongst current alternatives" (March and Olsen 
1988 P 336). 
One of the more useful frameworks for understanding organisational learning is that of Argyris 
and Schon (1978 chap I). They distinguish between "single loop" learning in which the 
organisation adapts to the external and internal pressures acting upon it so as to achieve ib 
pre-establ ished objectives. and "double loop" learning in which there is a process of the re-
evaluation of norms in U1e light oj the process of adaptation. Double-loop learning. they 
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Figure 5.2 The Implementation Process 
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suggest, is particularly important where the organisation faces conflicting demands, or, what 
more recent commentators have called paradoxes (e.g. Quinn and Cameron 1988). Thev also 
identify the importance of organisational contexts that facilitate "learning to learn" in achieving 
high quality organisational learning. 
Daft and Huber (1987 fig 1) have suggested that the amount of organisational learning 
required in a given situation is dependent upon the "equivocality of infonnation" which poses 
problems of interpretation of the data received, and the "amount of infonnation" which poses 
logistical problems of processing the quantity of data received. The higher the organisation is 
on these two dimensions, the greater the "infonnation load" it has to bear. This framework can 
be related back to the typology of technology developed in section 2.2, for it can be suggested 
that the greater the compLexity of the new technology, the greater the equivocality of the data 
regarding the criteria for successful implementation, and the more systemic it is, the greater 
the quantity and range of data requiring to be processed for successful implementation. 
This argument implies that integrating technoLogies, which are both complex and systemic, 
will pose considerable infonnation loads on the organisation. The organisations best suited to 
colX with learning under such high infonnation loads, argue Daft and Huber (1987 fig 2), are 
those that are capable of adaptive learning though incremental trial and error decision 
processes using "rich media" such as interpersonal contact through meetings and teamwork -
in other words, those organisations capable of double loop learning. It can, therefore. be 
suggested that double loop learning is more appropriate for integrating technologies, while 
single loop learning is more appropriate for the implementation of incremental technologies 
characterised by both low complexity and a non-systemic nature. How, then, can 
implementation be organised to facilitate the appropriate kind of learning? 
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5.3 ORGANISATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
One of the earliest decisions taken during the evaluation stage is the choice of organisation 
structure, or implementation project, to carry the process through to a successful conclusion. 
This project may be explicitly conceived as such within the organisation, or it may be a rather 
grand title for a series of implementation decisions taken on an informal basis by functional 
managers. While the project organisation may well evolve through the life-cycle of the 
implementation, the decisions taken on how the evaluation is to be conducted are likely to 
have a lasting inn uence upon later activities. 
Blackler and Brown (19g6) identify three different forms which such implementation projects 
can take. Firstly, they identify "model 0" implementation projects which are characterised by 
short-term thinking, limited appreciation of organisational issues, and a general sense of 
muddling through the change. "Model I" change is characterised by a focus on the technology 
and the tasks immediately associated with making it work. While they may be strongly project 
managed, and achieve technical success, such projects tend to show limited awareness of 
broader organisational issues. It may be called the technocratic project organisation. Finally, 
they identify a "model 2" approach which focuses upon organisational concerns from the 
initial evaluation stage, and tends to adopt a more participative style of project management, 
involving end users in the articulation of the design space around the new technology. This 
is exactly the kind of approach to implementation advocated by those concerned with "human-
centred" systems discussed in section 1.2, and is elaborated by Walton (1989). It may be 
called the parricljJatirc approach. 
Perhaps the main feature which distinguishes the technocratic and participative approaches to 
implementation projCl't organisation is the stronger role of organisational learning in the latter. 
The emphasis is upon the Il'\,iew of existing practices, and the development of projcct 
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objectives as implementation proceeds. Participative management is used to involve those 
affected by the technology in its dimensioning, and a slow project speed may be chosen to 
allow the incremental approach which helps these processes to occur. In tenns of the typology 
of implementation project organisation identified in the previous section, perhaps model 0 
implementation can be seen as that where little or no organisational learning takes place, the 
technocratic approach can be thought of as an example of single loop learning, while under 
the participative approach, the project organisation becomes a vehicle for double loop learning. 
This implies that an important criterion for the choice of implementation project organisation 
is the information load it faces. There are, however, a number of other important factors. The 
existing inner context will shape the project organisation, particularly the extent of 
di fferentiation within the existing structure, the existing level of integration, and the 
relationship of the new technology to the production strategy. The size of the project in 
financial tenns relative to the size of the business overall and other changes taking place will 
be a factor. In certain situations where the project involves large relative expenditures, there 
may be a threat to the business' viability should implementation fail. Resource scarcity in 
tenns of the availability of skills and capital within the organisation will have a strong 
influence upon the extent to which the project organisation includes outsiders. Finally, the 
speed with which the implementation is to go ahead - whether it is a "crash programme" or 
a steady development - will also have an influence. 
The relationships between these factors is interactive. For instance, a differentiated internal 
context. and high speed are likely to increase the infonnation load through raising the amount 
and range of data to be processed. Similarly, previous organisational learning will reduce the 
learning requirements for the present project - returns to experience are signi ficant in the 
implementation of AMT through learning curve effects. Here, the ability of the organisation 
to diffuse organisational leaming may be crucial (Leonard-Barton 1990) - learning to learn is 
part of the dynamic. The ar~ument is summarised in figure 5.3, and is presented an heuristic 
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of implementation project organisational choice. 
5.4 SUMMARY 
The core of the process of implementation has now been elaborated. Firstly, a linear model 
of implementation stages was derived from the existing literature, and then developed into a 
dynamic and recursive model of the process of changing inherent in implemention. This model 
rejected an equilibrium analysis and suggested that implementation is a process of continual 
changing and learning. The basic features of implementation project organisation were 
identified and their relative capabilities for organisational learning discussed. As was identified 
in chapter 2, CAD/CAM is an integrating technology, and so it may be concluded from the 
above analysis that the achievement of business success in implementation is most likely to 
be achieved through double loop learning facilitated by a participative implementation project 
organisation. It is through these requirements for double-loop learning that "CAD/CAM's 
challenge goes to the core of our conception of the firm" (Adler 1990 p 214) 
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6 
IMPLEMENTING ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES 
6.0 INTRODUCfION 
The argument so far has developed a conceptual framework which sees the process of 
implementation of new technologies as one of both organisational and technological change. 
The argument will now become morc focused and review the recent experience of the 
implementation of integrating technologies before presenting the findings of the research 
project. It thereby forms the "bridge" between the conceptual framework and the empirical 
investigation upon which it is deployed. This chapter will follow broadly the structure of the 
implementation process model elaborate in section 5.], but it will first review what is presently 
known about the diffusion of CAD/CAM. 
6.1 THE DIFFUSION OF CAD/CAM 
In a survey conducted in ]985, New and Myers (1986) found that 66% of "engineering" 
(including electronics) companies were using CAD or CAM systems, and Bessant (1991 p 
168) reports similar figures for 1987. A more recent survey9 found that 58% of "mechanical 
engineering" companies were using CAD (Pawar et alia 1991). In a recent survey of 24 
mechanical engineering companies who possessed CAD systems9, Black and Shaw (1991) 
found that all companies were using the systems for "detail draughting", and around 9 out of 
1 0 were using them for" asscm bl y draughting" (92 CIc) and 2D layouts (880/c). and onc third had 
achieved a level of automation through "parametric pan generation" (330C). On the other hand. 
only around one third were using CAD for design analysis applications such as kinematics and 
9) ;'rl_s,~a:i:"lg:\, thl!se iL'::'G~S co ,0:' prov:ClP d cn:e :O! :>-pir sur';cys \or, s:ra"cl£'ly, does 
P".'c!H'S :ea~ r('Po!"~ ar\ f.irCl~r(:S :,-" \, :'dr: prO,,:n--~~q. 
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finite element analysis (29%). These figures are broadly supponed by Pawar and his 
colleagues, and in data reponed by Bessam. Only 58% of the sample "directlv re-use CAD 
for their manufacturing activities", despite that fact that the sample was restricted to those 
involved in both design and manufacture. Thus, in terms of the production information flow 
presented in figure 3.2, the predominant use of CAD is at the draughting stage, and only one 
third apply it at the design stage, and less than two thirds have a link across to the planning 
stage. 
The main benefits achieved from CAD were, in order of response frequency, the ability to re-
use design information (92% of responses), reduced design lead times (88%), bener 
productivity (58%), and improved product image (50%). The claim for reduced manufacturing 
lead time by 46% of companies is impressive in the light of the relatively limited use of direct 
CAM links, and the 29% claiming better analysis and simulation is a very high proponion of 
those using CAD at the design stage. 33% of companies were also using the system to create 
3D layouts, although it is not clear whether these are wire frame or solid modelling 
applications (Black and Shaw 1991). Again, Pawar and his colleagues, and Bessant report 
similar results. 
6.2 EVALUATION 
The issue of the benefits, or returns of CAD/CAM to the company is the central issue at the 
evaluation stage, and is strongly shaped by the existing inner context. Under the capital 
budgeting regimes this issue revolves around the "justification" of CAD/CAM - 929c of 
companies in Black and Shaw's survey prepared financial justifications for their systems. 
Woods and his colleagues (19H5) report that a total of 490/( of their sample of 47 CAD/CA\1 
users applied formal techniques. and they note the practice amongst some firms of shortening 
the pay-back period or raisin~ the discount rale to reduce the perceivcd risk associated with 
implementing A~1T. Other finns. however. dropped formal techniques when evaluating A\1T 
99 
due to the uncertainties involved. Hayes and Garvin (1982) argue that the misapplication of 
formal techniques which discount the future can effectively lead to a gradual spiral of 
disinvestment in capital stocks. For these reasons, Gerwin argues that it is the financial 
uncertainty associated with the potential benefits of AMT "which is at the heart of the 
technology selection problem" (1988 p 91). 
A number of researchers have criticised the use of such simplistic justification techniques 
because they do not take into account many of the non-quantifiable benefits of CAD/CAM 
such as those identified in the previous section. Such justifications as are produced tend to 
yield more to the demand for corporate rationality than reality (Blumberg and Gerwin 1984 
P 117). Senker (1984) found in his survey of 24 systems that many of the justifications 
prepared by the firms in their survey were wildly inaccurate, while laikumar (1984) reports 
that some managers had completely abandoned using accounting information. Others, such as 
Primrose and his colleagues (1985) and Kaplan (1986), have tried to develop alternative 
quantitative methods, but these have yet to diffuse into evaluating firms. 
Currie (1989) has explored these issues in some depth. In a set of case studies of the decision 
to adopt CAD in 20 engineering companies, she reports that only 2 were not obliged to 
prepare fonnal justifications, and in both these cases, senior managers were know to be 
relatively technolo£!ically aware. In 11 of the remaining cases. informants expressed 
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reservations about the "soundness" of the infonnation that they themselves had given to those 
responsible for authorising the decision to adopt. Only 6 of the 20 companies surveyed - all 
large (> 1 k employees) - had justi fled CAD on the basis of "strategic" company-wide benefits; 
the remainder had deployed "operational" arguments such as productivity savings. She 
suggests that the predominance or formal justifications are a product of the "accounting 
culture" that pervades the British engineering industry. 
A number of commentators have explored this issue on both sides of the Atlantic. Hayes and 
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Abernathy (1980) identify the "new management orthodoxy" of financial control, corporate 
portfolio management, and market-driven behaviour which generates a "pseudo-professional" 
managerial caste divorced from the realities of innovation and production. As a result, the 
holding of financial and legal skills, as opposed to technical skills, is, increasingly, the route 
to the top in the American corporation. The range of issues is too broad to be explored here, 
for the problems are deeply rooted in the distinctive development of capitalism in the UK and 
USA. Perhaps the most penetrating analysis of the more immediate issues as they face 
champions of AMT is that of Johnson and Kaplan (1987) who chart the ways in which the 
physical measures developed by engineers to control production during the nineteenth century 
were replaced by financial measures designed to serve the needs of the corporate staffs of the 
emerging multi-divisional corporations and the external reporting requirements of publicly 
quoted companies. 
The result, they suggest, has been a serious distortion in the information received by 
production managers who focus their attention on the reduction of production COSL~ as 
expressed in direct labour cost 10 rather than on tackling the "hidden factory" (Mi11er and 
Vo]]mann 1985) of burgeoning transaction costs which disappear into overhead. 
"By using direct labor to allocate overhead costs to products, cost center managers 
have their cost-reduction attention solely directed to direct labor savings. With 
overhead burden rates of 400 to 1000 percent, small savings in di rect labor time have 
large impacts on cost distributions and product costs" (Johnson and Kaplan 1987 p 
188). 
So far as CAD/CAM and the other integrating technologies are concerned, these distortions 
are major barriers to adoption, because it is precisely in their ability to save on transaction 
costs through integrated data base capabilities that many of their benefits lie. 
Duchessi and his colleagues (1989), in their survey of 272 MRP/MRP II implementations, 
report that lack of top management support hampered thc achie\,cment of busincss success. 
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Others agree. The traditional "bottom up" strategy for the development of manufacturing 
technology is no longer adequate for integrating technologies (Carrie and Banerjee 1984). 
Senker (1984) gives an example of the problems of system incompatibility due to engineering 
and manufacturing making independent purchase decisions for CAD and CAM respectively. 
Currie (1989b table 7.1) found that the decision to adopt tended to be taken at higher levels 
of management if the firm was large (> 1 k employees), and if the CAD investment was large 
(£1 m+), which suggests that project size is a factor. These cases also tended to be those that 
used "strategic" criteria. 
The role of "champions" in the product innovation process is weI1 established (Chakrabani 
1974; Langrish et alia 1972). Winch (1983), Beatty and Gordon (1988), and Gerwin (1984) 
have noted the importance of innovation champions for successful implementation, and that 
the organisational position of such champions is crucial. To be effective such champions - who 
may be dubbed implementation champions - must be above the level of engineering and 
manufacturing individually. Shaw and Macbeth (1986 p 342) found that the innovation 
champions in their cases were young, relatively inexperienced graduate engineers who reported 
directly to the technical director or managing director. In both cases they rapidly acquired 
eXJXrt status. 
The discussion in Chapter 3 laid stress on the importance of the production strategy for the 
development of the organisation of production operations. Senker and Beesley found that firms 
that had a c1ear idea of how the production planning and control systems they were 
implementing related to the company's goals tended to be more successful (1985 p.9). 
Duchessi and his colleagues (1989) report similarly. On the other hand, Rosenthal and \\'ard 
report that in "our study of three companies with major integration programmes under WJ) 
indicates a general lack of clearly articulated strategy. communication difficulty among the 
technical domains responsible for integration and lack of common rurpose" (1986 P 16). 
\\'aJton (1989 rig 3.4) presents a model of the potential for strategil mismatch between !'.1RP 
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II system design and corporate decentralisation objectives at Kodak. 
Adler (1989b; 1990) provides an overview of some of the issues at this stage derived from his 
investigation of CAD/CAM implementation in four cases of hydraulic tubing design and nine 
cases of printed circuit board design. He argues, as do Simmonds and Senker (1989 chap 4). 
that one of the main problems in developing a successful CAD/CAM strategy appeared to be 
the lack of familiarity with the technology at senior management levels, and a lack of strategic 
management capability at middle management levels. Adler characterises the learning process 
associated with implementation as an "S-Curve"11 with CAD/CAM presently on the early, 
flat part of the curve, and argues that "longer-term competitiveness depends upon the 
organization's ability to shorten the flat parts at both the bottom end and the top end of the 
S-curve" (1990 P 213). 
6.3 INSTALLATION AND COMMISSIONING 
Comparing one company's two earlier attempts to implement a CAPM system, with its present 
successful attempt, Shaw and Macbeth found that for the successful implementation the 
company had appointed a full-time project leader equipped with micro based project 
management software. They go on to argue that 
"the work is now being tackled within a coherent strategy for both computing and 
AMT; user needs have been clearly identified; detailed planning of the implementation 
has been carried out; users are being educated and trained and are much more 
involved in the process than previously; a significant amount of effort has been put 
into tidying up existing procedures and systems and ensuring data accuracy and a 
close link has been set up with systems suppliers" (1986 p 341). 
The project management of the installation and commissioning stage is a vital part of the 
process, and its organisation is likely to be shaped by the inner context. Duchessi and his 
colleagues (1989) report that nearly two thirds of companies surveyed established a project 
team. While this made no significant difference to success, stability of team membership did. 
103 
A survey by Graham and Rosenthal (1986) of FMS implementations found that all eight finns 
surveyed used some form of team approach and most had specific project managers. However, 
they felt that the project managers' level of expertise in both manufacturing management and 
technology was often low in comparison to the requirements of the technology. The teams 
ranged from 3 to 15 people in size, and those which involved part-time members tended to 
be less effective. The range of functions covered by the teams was often limited, and only 3 
of them included the personnel function. The continuity of membership of the team was an 
important factor in its success. Overall, the teams tended to be hardware dominated and 
narrowly technical in their approach. 
Rader (n.d.) similarly found the use of specialist teams for CAD implementation: and 
Hildebrandt (1988) found that in most cases of CAPM implementation he surveyed, project 
teams were formed. The members of such teams tended to be both advocates of their 
departmental interests within the team, and advocates of team decisions within the 
departments. Tyre (1988) found that the use of project teams was associated with the 
implementation of systemic technologies, but not complex ones. It appears that the project type 
organisation analysed by Cleland and King (1968) for the management of complex defence 
contracts has become the established mode of organisation for implementation, at least in the 
case of integrating technologies. The main questions would appear to be on the conditions for 
effectiveness of the implementation project teams, and these tum around the many of the 
issues identified in section 5.3. 
Resource scarcity is important in many cases. In a survey of suppliers and users of AMT, the 
respondents rated the quality of the relationship between the user and vendor as the most 
important factor influencing implementation outcome (Enlie 1986; Duchessi et alia 1989). A 
survey of users of microcomputers for production control in 200 small firms found that half 
the users had set up a team which included ouL,ide consultants and/or representatives of the 
vendor for implementation, and that only half of the firms rates vendor support as good 
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(Muhlemann et alia 1984). The evidence from a survey of small firms may, however, be 
misleading, because they are the least likely to have access to internal resources of skilled 
personnel. These internal human resources are a function of both IT system skills, and 
in-house experience in the use of integrative and analytic techniques such as value engineering 
and group technology. 
The level of resources devoted to the project will clearly have an impact on the success of the 
project (Duchessi et alia 1989). As Ettlie points out (1984), any innovating organisation 
requires slack resources in terms of cash and people. The role of in-house experience as an 
element in human resources means that capital and labour are not fully interchangeable in this 
context. In other words - an organisation rich in cash cannot simply buy in human skills, even 
if these are freely available in the labour market, which is unlikely to be the case. Not only 
must the organisation have at least some of the skills in house, but it must have enough to 
allow them to be released from other duties. This factor is likely to interact with the speed 
of implementation - resource scarcity encouraging slow implementation, and fast 
implementation consuming a high level of resources. 
Leonard-Barton (1990), in a comparative study of 3 MRP II systems and 3 purchasing 
systems, found that while all implementations achieved business success, there were major 
differences in the cost and elapsed time of implementation. This was despite the similar nature 
of the plants involved and the common systems being installed. The main problems that she 
identifies in the less successful plants are the failure to facilitate organisational learning to 
cope with the information load~ resource scarcity due to inadequate allocations by senior 
management; and high speed without a full understanding by senior management of the scale 
of the implementation project. 
Webster (1991) provides three interesting cases of failed MRP implementation - none achieved 
business success, and it is doubtful from the evidence presented that even technical success 
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was achieved. While she presents these failures as a seemingly inevitable consequence of the 
confrontation between dreams and reality in CAPM implementation, a close reading of the 
cases reveals a number of more mundane problems. Most notably, all three cases adopted what 
at best can be described as model 0 project organisations, and were unable to cope with the 
information load inherent in adopting integrating technologies. The scale of the problem in 
one plant is indicated by the fact that the project manager is described as a "former machinist 
from the shop floor". Evidence of crippling resource scarcity is also apparent in all three, 
particularly with respect to computing skills. 
While there has been considerable debate over the topic of industrial relations and 
technological change, and a frequent assertion that trade unions, or at least their members, are 
in some sense, resistant to change, there is little evidence that this is the case. Willman (1986) 
provides some evidence that strikes over technological change have been largely restricted to 
three industries - docks; print (especially Fleet Street); and vehicles. Even in vehicles, it is 
probable that the experience over technological change is more a result of the super-heated 
industrial relations environment in that industry, rather than a product of rooted resistance to 
technological change itself. The experience of British Leyland with new body a~sembly 
technology for the Metro was one of ready acceptance of change against a background of 
widespread industrial conflict on other issues (Willman and Winch 1985). 
Recent survey and case study data support the contention that trade union involvement in 
implementation is limited. A survey reported by Daniel (1987) found few problems relating 
industrial relations and technological change issues, and case studies by Batstone and his 
colleagues (1986; 1987) give similar results. Simmonds and Senker (1989 chap 8) report a 
decline in trade union activity around CAD during the eighties, matching the general decline 
in workplace trade union activity" They identify the main issues that did lead to negotiations 
as the introduction of shi ft work, and selcction for training. BaldI)' and Connelly (1986) and 
McLoughlin (1989) both found limited c\"idcncc of union involvement in negotiations over 
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technological change, while a survey by Lintner and his colleagues (1987) found that the 
presence of trade unions had made little difference to the diffusion of AMT in mechanical 
engineering. 
Training associated with AMT implementation has two main aspects - awareness and technical 
training for managers, and operator training for users (Stark 1988 chap 10). Simmonds and 
Senker (1989 chap 5) report widely varying levels of senior management support for training, 
and that less than a third of companies in their survey of 16 CAD users had provided 
awareness training, and less than two thirds had provided training for immediate supervisors. 
Generally, they report a reluctance of senior managers to invest time in appreciating the 
potential of CAD. On the other hand all had trained users, and had found that, generally, it 
took 2 to 3 weeks, of formal instruction and on the job training, developed through 4 to 6 
months experience to develop proficiency in 2D draughting (ibid chap 7). 3D proficiency and 
other skills can take a lot longer to develop. 
6.4 CONSOLIDATION 
Usually, one of the most immediate effects of implementation on the organisation structure 
is the establishment of a section for managing the system. This task, especially as networked 
systems are implemented and software applications become more sophisticated, is becoming 
increasingly demanding. Earl (1989) describes various ways of organising the systems 
function. Simmonds and Senker (1989 chap 6) have noted the tendency for system 
responsibility to move from design managers to specialist CAD or systems managers during 
the eighties, and for the numbers of support staff to grow. Such managers take on the 
responsibility for the continuing management and development of the system, and effectively 
becoming the repository of technical expertise on CAD/CAM within their organisations. 
Usually. they are also responsible for the provision of training once the vendors' 
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responsibilities have been exhausted. 
At the broader level, the emerging shape of organisations in the last part of the century is 
largely a product of the market forces acting upon them, as articulated through the strategy 
process. The implementation of integrating technologies such as CAD/CAM, itself a product 
of those market forces, is only one part of the story. It is, therefore, impossible to identify 
those organisational changes which are solely the result of implementation. It is, however, 
possible to identify those changes which complement integrating technologies such as 
CAD/CAM, and, as discussed in chapter 4, to identify those features of organisation design 
which facilitate the effective use of such technologies. Much of the research that has been 
done in this area suffers the problems of the "impact approach" that were discussed in section 
1.1, and is of limited help because it does not place the outcome of change in the context of 
the process of change. 
Rockart and Short (1991) argue that the dynamic of growing global competition and the 
increasing capabilities of IT are encouraging the emergence of "networked organisations" in 
which the "management of interdependence" becomes the key task and IT has a vital 
"enabling" role. While Galbraith (1977) saw MIS as improving vertical co-ordination through 
increased information processing capability, in the "networked organisation" IT performs a 
crucial lateral co-ordination role. The effects are "collapsing the value chain" through inter-
functional integration~ increased intra-functional integration~ the emergence of "groupware" 
which facilitates IT supported team working; the development of decision support systems for 
senior executives: and a new role for the IT systems management function itself. However. 
as Rockart and Short themselves note, "no company has yet accomplished the fully networked. 
large scale integration of functions and systems required to fully manage the product delivery 
process" (1991 p 208). Moreover. they do not give more than a general indication of how the 
management of interdependence is actually to be achieved. It seems rea~onable to asscn that 
the requisite amount and method of such management is likely to vary between companies. 
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and that, in practice, there is a wide variety of methods to choose from. 
Some of these were discussed in chapter 4. In addition to the enabling effect of IT itself, two 
basic types of structural change were identified - de-differentiation and integration. The most 
common fonn of de-differentiation is role convergence, where jobs are redesigned to cover 
a wider range of tasks. Voss reports a case where "a single group of designers perfonn all 
tasks from design, drafting or CAD, NC programming and liaison with manufacturing" (1985 
p 322). Similarly, Rader (n.d.) found that Gennan mechanical engineering designers were 
increasingly doing detail draughting work in addition to design. Buchanan and Boddy (1983 
chap 9) found that work roles in an architectural practice blended as both partners and 
associates, and technicians, started to produce drawings, a job previously carried out by the 
main grade architects. However, this option is likely to be sensitive to organisation size - Voss 
describes his case as "smallish", and the architectural practice was also small. The smaller the 
unit in terms of numbers employed, the more likely is the strategy of de-differentiation 
discussed in section 4.1 likely to be viable. 
If de-differentiation of the organisation structure through the merger of roles and functions is 
not possible, the alternative is to generate organisational linkage mechanisms. Winch (1983) 
found that matrix type structures complemented CAD/CAM technology best in organisations 
where the product market environment encouraged the project orientated organisation of 
engineering, while capital intensity encouraged the functional organisation of manufacturing. 
Ettlie and Reifeis (1986) identify a variety of organisational linkage mechanism associated 
with the technology. Taylor and his colleagues (1986) report the successful establishment of 
product orientated work groups combining engineering, layout design, and support functions 
for component design at Zilog Inc. Lee (1988) reports the formation of cells combining two 
previously separate groups of workers in both flexible and enriched jobs. Cells are important 
because they provide a delineated context in which dedifferentiation can take place. In 
Galbraith's terms. they handle uncertainty by providing an autonomous unit. 
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Adler (1988) found that it is the highly differentiated organisations which have the greatest 
problems in adapting to CAD/CAM. Those with the worst problems organised engineering 
along strong product/project lines under "myopic" project managers. and manufacturing along 
functionally organised lines with a strong "fiefdom" mentality. In many businesses. such a 
configuration had led to a stalemate (ibid p 46). Such organisational lag may be caused by 
a number of factors. but in particular. the existence of opposition to the required organisational 
innovations may occur. Leonard-Barton (1984) cites the example of an organisation retaining 
physical data transmission alongside a new electronic transfer (ET) system because of quality 
control concerns and because designers wanted to retain control over the design process. She 
concluded that "the perceived need to adhere to old performance and control measures nullifies 
the relative advantage ET has over current procedures". 
Both Willman and Winch (1985), and Jones and Scott (1987) have noted the phenomenon of 
organisational innovations being made to accommodate the implementation of AMT. and the 
subsequent abandonment of those innovations. In both cases, particular forms of work 
organisation and associated payment system were established by the managers and workers 
associated with the new technology, but then abandoned under pressure from the central 
personnel function - the new arrangements were perceived as a threat to the integrity of the 
existing workplace industrial relations system. In the terms of the model of implementation, 
the organisational changes were not "frozen" into the organisation, and other pressures within 
the business as a whole, but outside the particular implementing unit, led to their 
abandonment. 
The implications for work organisation and skills of AMT have been the subject of intensive' 
research, with NC/CNC becoming the generic case (Adler and Borys 1989), The overall issues 
of automation and job design in manufacturing are reviewed by Majchrlak (1988), The 
discussion here will concentrate on those changes associated more immedi atel ~ with 
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integrating technologies. Baldry and Connelly, in a study of 8 CAD implementations, found 
that the systems were being used solely as automatic drawing boards, and that they were 
"almost classic cases of deskilling" (1986 p 65). However, their work is methodologicall) 
weak. and few other researchers agree with them. A review by Ebel and Ulrich (1987) 
concludes that there has been little impact on skills and employment, while research by Adler 
(1989) identifies the increasing employment of graduates in design and manufacturing 
engineering. 
In their study of CPICS, a CAPM system, Senker and Beesley (1985) identify the 
disappearance of the less skilled functions and the upgrading of the more skilled functions. As 
McLouglin argues (1989), while the manual drawing skills are irrevocably changed with CAD, 
the design skills required remain unaltered. Ebel and Ulrich (1987) note that it is only the jobs 
of detail drawing staff and tracers which are affected. Even, here this may not be a result of 
CAD - Smith (1987 chap 4) notes that tracers had largely disappeared from the aerospace 
factory he studied over the last 20 years due to changes in drawing and reprographic 
techniques. There is an important issue here of the disappearance of jobs from engineering 
predominantly held by women, but it is not one of deskilling in the remaining jobs. 
As Osterman (1991) and Adler (1988b) argue, the general picture seems to be one of a net 
effect of the upgrading of skills along the lines of a shift towards the "intellective skills" 
identified by Zuboff (1988). Whether this leaves society in the situation that "taking the 
second industrial revolution as accomplished, the average human being of mediocre 
attainments or less has nothing to sel1 that is worth anyone's money to buy" so gloomily 
predicted by Wiener (1948 p 37) and so trenchantly satirised by Kurt Vonnegut in his novel 
"Player Piano" is an issue that can only be resolved at the level of national policy. 
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6.5 SUMMARY 
Four main themes then, emerge from the existing literature on the implementation of 
integrating technologies. Diffusion, while widespread, is far from saturation. A large number 
of smaller metalworking firms do not possess any form of CAD system, and a large proportion 
of those that do simply use it as a form of drawing automation to improve productivity. The 
number of users who are pushing the technology to its limits is relatively few, but they are 
the large firms in the key competitive sectors of the economy. 
The political process around justification is the main issue at the evaluation stage. This 
dynamic revolves around the procedures to be followed for justification and the inclusion or 
otherwise of those who will be affected by the change. At the installation and commissioning 
stage, the project organisation and the level of resources devoted to it emerged as predominant. 
During consolidation, the management of interdependence moves to the fore, which in the case 
of CAD/CAM means the co-ordination of the engineering/manufacturing interface. Intra-
functional issues associated with job design appear to be relatively less important to the 
successful implementation of integrating technologies. As Ebel and Ulrich argue, "CAD 
confined to the design office does not rock the boat. However, the linking of CAD and CAM 
may well ..... prove the crux of the matter" (1987 p 362). It is on this crux that the research 
that will be presented in the second half of this thesis is focused. 
112 
7 
RESEARCHING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
7.0 INTRODUCfION 
The preceding chapters have laid out a conceptual framework for the analysis of the 
implementation of AMT - specifically, the implementation of CAD/CAM systems in the 
metalworking industries. The argument will now tum to developing the methodology by which 
it is proposed to deploy the conceptual framework in the case survey organisations. After some 
general comments on social science research methodology and organisational analysis, the 
chapter will discuss the rationale for the selection of the case companies and then present the 
research instrument used during fieldwork. Finally, a brief review of the cases will be given. 
7.1 SOCIOLOGICAL THEOR Y AND ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS 
In developing a methodology for research into organisations, there are two basic decisions to 
be made. Firstly, there is the question of the level of analysis - is the concern, for instance, 
with issues at the level of the national economy, industrial sector, corporation, business unit, 
depanment, work group, or individual? The second follows from the first, and is the method 
of analysis and research methodology to be deployed. Winch (1990) discusses the first issue 
and outlines the di ffering relevances of the various social science disciplines for organisational 
analysis. The arhTlJment is summarised in figure 7.1: it is not intended as a strict delineation 
of discipline boundaries, but as a way of showing their relative strengths. Moving towards the 
origin on the ordinate. there is an increasing sense of focus from the industry as a whole. to 
the behaviour 01 indh'iduah. Reciprocally. there is an increasing sense of context as each 
clement of the organisation is related to the others around it. Moving towards the origin on 
('f) 
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the abscissa, the perspective changes from a range of issues, to a general sense of orientation 
in terms of whether the object of study is internal relations within the organisation, often 
summarised as "organisational behaviour", or external relationships between organisations, 
often described as "strategic management", and on to the five discipline bases. 
The present study is concerned with the management of change at the level of the business 
unit, and so it would seem most appropriate to take a sociologically orientated approach to the 
issues. Such an approach can produce important insights into management, and, as John 
Harvey-Jones points out "one disregards the work of sociologists at one's peril" (1989 P 90). 
However, it is inadequate on its own. Social scientific research on management topics needs 
to interact with the relevant contributions from the management disciplines which are not 
social science based such as law, accountancy, and operational research. In particular, the topic 
of the implementation of AMT at the organisational level needs to combine the approaches 
of sociology and operations management12• As Voss (1984) argues, "production/operations 
management" has emerged as a distinctive discipline over the past 15 years which can be 
clearly distinguished from operational research on the one hand, and production and 
information systems engineering on the other. Many of the concepts deployed in the 
framework developed over the last few chapters are derived from the operations management 
literature as the sociological literature has consistently failed to gain precision in its 
formulations of concepts such as environment and technology. 
The second choice has long been the subject of intense debate within sociology, and has two 
dimensions (Burrel1 and Morgan 1979). The first is that of "assumptions about the nature of 
society". It is conventional in sociological analysis to distinguish between those approaches 
which see society as the embodiment of human activity, and those which present society as 
a coercive and socialising force beyond human control (Berger and Pullberg 1965). Thus, "one 
12) At the 1e\',' of the .. -:>r, ,::,'~~' ·Ye' ~~dividual. more anthropolog,,'l~.\' and psycno;cG~.:, .. ', 
~ntated met ~,)llS may .. ,,' _ Oe mOl e : ".evant. 
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views action as the derivative of system; whilst the other views system as the derivative of 
action" (Dawe 1970 p 217). As Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue, this distinction is central 
to the development of sociological theories of organisation. The tension between the two 
perspectives has much of the character of Goethe's debate between Faust and the Gospel. 
Faust reject~ the notion that "In the beginning was the Word" (St. John chapter 1, verse 1), 
and writes that "In the beginning was the Deed" (1949 p 71), for God did not create Man, but 
Man created God. In more secular terms, the issue is whether people create society, or society 
creates people. 
Faust resolved the dilemma through a pact with the Devil. Others have gone less far, and tried 
to show the ways in which sociologists are faced with a dynamic and interactive paradox, 
rather than a choice. Marx and Weber both explored this dynamic, though their aCOlytes have 
often forgotten the essentially dia1cctical character of the interaction. More recently Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) have shown the way in which reality is socially constructed, while the work 
of Giddens (1979; 1984) represents a major attempt to develop a theory of "structuration" 
which dynamically investigates the interaction between structure and action in modem 
societies. Van de Ven and Poole (1988) argue strongly that such an approach is essential for 
understanding how organisations change. As is clear from the preceding chapters, it is this 
position, conceptualised as the dynamic between structure and process in organisations, which 
is adopted in this thesis. Organisations are here seen as simultaneously the product of human 
processes of action and institutionalised structural constraints upon that action. 
The second dimension is that of "assumptions about the nature of social science". Here, the 
options are "subjecti\'ist" approaches relying on interpretative techniques and "objectivist" 
techniques relying on more "positivist" methods of enquiry deploying more or less explicitly 
formulated hypotheses. In his review of interpretative techniques, which he calls "qualitative", 
Fletcher is damning: "As a method it is certainly vital and attractive. But more than th~lt it is 
eas\' .... In the tri\'ializing of man and the social conditions the [interpretative] method 
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degenerates into a voyeurist's phantasy" (1974 pp 143/4). He goes on to advocate what Burrell 
and Morgan would call "radical structuralism". 
While Fletcher's comments may be too harsh, there are two main problems with interpretative 
techniques. Firstly, they remove the responsibility from the researcher to see the whole that 
the actors in the situation cannot see - if they could see it there would be no point in doing 
the research. By attempting to see things through the actors' perspective, the sense of context 
of those actors' activities is inevitably lost. Secondly, the approach is naive in its assumption 
that the subjects of research are somehow independent of prior sociological knowledge. The 
problem is what Giddens calls the inherently reflexive character of sociological enquiry (1990 
chap 1), which might be more succinctly described as the Porter EffectJ3 • Most of the 
informants have been formally trained as managers, and some have MBAs. They have, 
therefore, already been exposed to the basic concepts which the researcher uses in enquiry. A 
methodology aimed at discovering the actors' own interpretations of the situation is 
meaningless when those interpretations have already been shaped by theoretical concepts 
shared with the researcher prior to fieldwork. 
The "sociological paradigm" adopted here, then, may be described as an "objectivist" one 
which rejects the dichotomy between the "problem of order" and "problem of action" 
perspectives. Instead it emphasises the dynamic process of structuration as the creative 
destruction of order through action. 
7.2 STUDYING ORGANISATIONS 
As Bryman (1989) sho\\s, there is :1 wide \'ariety of methodologies available to sociologists 
researching organisations. They range from case study work, to survey work. Both have their 
strengths and weaknesses. In favour of case study methodologies is the rich detail of process 
"~::e~'s A" __ ~ ce see- on l~!o~~a~:s' O!!lCP ~ookcases. 
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that is available from skilful researchers; in favour of the sUlvey is the sense of the typicality 
of the findings which can be of crucial importance for more policy orientated work. Yin (1989 
chap 2) advocates case studies as crucial ways of building theories. 
Some of case study techniques are explicitly derived from anthropology and have been 
deployed most effectively in the study of payments systems and work group behaviour. In the 
US, the Chicago studies of Roy (eg 1952) and Burawoy (1979) are seminal, while in the UK 
the Manchester studies (Cunni son 1982), particularly those of Lupton (1963) and Cunnison 
(1966) remain vital reading. More recently, an impressive amount of work. which may be 
called the Bristol studies. has tried to capture the "fluency of peoples' lives" (Beynon 1975 
p 14) through non-participant case studies (eg Nicholls and Beynon 1977; Smith 1987). 
However. this work has largely failed to develop the rigour of method and analysis which 
makes the more anthropologically orientated work so valuable (Emmen and Morgan 1982). 
Other case study methodologies have ranged from the largely covert (Dalton 1959). to buying 
the case study company (Foster 1969). Pettigrew (1990) has articulated the argument for 
longitudinal case studies of organisational change which are both processual and contextualist 
in character. The strength of this type of disciplined qualitative work is attested by his work 
on ICI. 
Perhaps the main problem with the case study approach is that of typicality. For instance, 
Whipp and Clark (1986). and Willman and Winch (1985) have both given us detailed case 
studies of what is now Rover, but they can tell us little about the British car industry in 
general because of the acknowledged idiosyncrasies of the company studied. They are not even 
particularly complementary for building up a picture of Rover itself because they are studies 
of different divisions at different points in time. Perhaps the most radical demonstration of the 
limitations of single case research is by Burawoy (1985 chap 3) who attempts to build a model 
of "hegemonic regimes" of production in advanced capitalism largely on the basis of two 
studies (his own and Lupton's) conducted 20 years apart in two different countries. His 
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account is unconvincing. 
At the quantitative end of the spectrum are those studies which develop operationalisations of 
conceptual frameworks to test formal hypothesis of the relationship between organisational 
variables. Although one of the most innuential studies of this type is the Aston work (eg 
Hickson et alia 1968; Pugh et alia 1969), this approach is particularly common in the USA 
(eg Blau et alia 1976; Collins 1988). It can produce valuable data on correlations between key 
variables, but even at its best it produces relationships between measures that are difficult. if 
not impossible. to interpret (Starbuk 1982). 
As might be expected from the advocacy of a dialectical approach. a methodology which 
"triangulates" (Denzin 1970 part 12) on the problem at hand by deploying both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques is advocated here. The basic options are the deployment of quantitative 
techniques in a case study selling in a process of "organisational assessment" (Yan de Yen and 
Ferry 1980). or the collection of enough case studies to allow a meaningful frequency counts 
across the cases in what might be called a case survey. The importance of the latter approach 
is that is has been responsible for some of the most innuential contributions to organisational 
analysis - Woodward. Lawrence and Lorsch. and Kanter have all used varieties of case survey 
analysis across] 0 or more cases with seminal results. 
What is advocated here, then is a case survey methodology in which the essence of the method 
is pallern recognition across cases, and the unit of analysis is the production departments of 
the business, which are defined here as those responsible for engineering design, the drawing 
office. production planning and control, and actual manufacturing. The aim is to combine 
some of the strengths of both the case study and survey approaches with a well defined sample 
of cases. The basic field work approach is the case study, but the aim. from the start is to 
achie\'e quantitative outputs. This is distinguished from Yin's (1989) "case survey" in that it 
is not a meta-analysis or existing cases, but follows a survey rather than "replication logic" 
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in its formulation. 
7.3 THE CASE SURVEY 
The sample finns to be studied was taken by a process of "planned opportunism" (pettigrew 
1990) through the mobilisation of personal networks. In this I am very grateful to Give 
Reynolds of the Department of Engineering at the University of Warwick for some valuable 
contacts. Four of the firms, MN, MI, MC and ML, were those studied by an Imperial College 
team 8 years earlier, the results of which are reported in Winch (1983). Two of the cases, MJ 
and MO, were selected for study in greater depth involving a larger number of interviews and 
a more intensive dialogue between informants and the researcher. This work was carried out 
by David Twigg. The organisational time-spans covered by the research were from the time 
of the first evaluation of CAD to the present. In most cases, informants who had been 
involved in decisions up to ten years previously were sti11 available for interview. 
The basic criteria for case selection were an existing CAD installation, and membership of the 
"metalworking" industrial sector. Metalworking was chosen because it accounts for the largest 
single proportion of CAD use - the mechanical engineering sector accounted for some 40% 
of CAD insta11ations in Europe in 1987 (Bessant 1991, figure 7.1). The importance of this 
criterion is that all the finns surveyed have similar production information and materials flows. 
The production information flows all include engineering design, and are, therefore 
distinguished from industries such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals where R&D is much 
more important, and textiles and steel which have no design process within their production 
information flows. The materials flows consist almost entirely of the cutting and forming of 
metal, and the subsequent assembly of components thereby created. They are therefore 
distinguished from industries whiL'h arc based upon the transformation of fluids and powders. 
or soleI\' the assemblv of components such as construltion. 
. . 
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None of the companies include significant electronic, as opposed to electrical, elements in their 
production processes. Where electronic components, such as avionics, are included in the final 
product, they are universally bought in. In terms of Porter and Millar's (1985) framework, 
therefore, the "information intensity" of the value chain in all the case companies is high, 
while the "information content" of the products is relatively low. In methodological terms, the 
case survey sample controls for IT based product innovation to allow a clear focus on the 
issues around process innovation. In this respect, the research is distinct from other work, such 
as that of Adler, Currie, and Senker, where electronics companies were included in the cases. 
It also concentrates upon mature industries, and so the sort of young, dynamic organisation 
of the kind studied by Dodgson (1991) was not encountered. 
7.4 THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
The case survey methodology requires consistency In method between cases, and the 
standardised collection of some key items of data. It was, therefore, decided to use a more 
structured research instrument than is normal in case study research. A copy is attached at 
appendix A. It was developed from an earlier version of chapters 3 and 6 (Winch 1988). The 
instrument formed the basis of interviews with key informants in the case companies which 
were conducted along the lines recommended by Buchanan and his colleagues (1988). The aim 
was to interview the managers responsible for the manufacturing and engineering departmenl<;, 
and the management of the system itself. Additional interviews took place based upon advice 
from the earlier infOlmants. A total or 97 informants were interviewed in 15 companies 
between the autumn of 1989 and the end of 1990. Each set of interviews, together with 
supporting documentary data, was written up as a case study and returned to each informant 
for validation. Their comments were incorporated in a second version of the case study which 
formed the basis for the survey analysis presented here. In at least one case, the feedback case 
has heen used on an intemal management de\'e lopment programme. 
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A feedback session, to which representatives from all the case companies were invited, was 
held at London Business School in May 1990. Some of the key findings - mainly from chapter 
13 - were presented and discussed in plenary and workshop sessions. Additionally, in the 
depth case studies carried out by David Twigg, a continuing dialogue has been maintained 
during fieldwork as various versions of the implementation workbook (Twigg and Voss, 1992) 
have been tried out in the case companies. 
Section A of the instrument is aimed at establishing the outer context of the case firm. 
Sections B,C, and D are then focused on various aspects of the inner context. Section B 
deploys conventional manufacturing strategy measures to identify the main features of the 
manufacturing strategy; the way in which the concept of a production strategy was developed 
from these measures will be explained in chapter 8. Section C focused more on the choice oj 
technology for manufacturing operations, and the criteria against which that technology is 
managed as part of the production mission. Section D provides a wealth of data on the 
production information and materials flows and the organisation structure. Flow charts for both 
materials and production information were developed for each company, as well as 
organisation charts at the business level, and the manufacturing and engineering departmental 
levels. Later questions in this section collected data on the character of transaction processes 
between engineering and manufacturing. The data from these sections of the research 
instrument are discussed extensively in chapters 8, 9, and 13. 
Sections E and F tum to the implementation process. Section E, after establishing the history 
and present dimensions of the CAD/CAM system, explores the organisation of the evaluation. 
and installation and commissioning processes. Section F is more concerned with outcomes 
from the process in term of both technical and business success, and finishes with some more 
genera] questions to allow the informant to explore issues not already covered in the interview. 
The data from these sections forms the basis for chapters 10, 11, and 12. 
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In many interviews, extensive additional notes were taken as the discussion developed - the 
research instrument was seen as a sketch for the interview, not a comprehensive design. 
Interviews typically lasted 90 minutes, and were supponed by tours of factories, lunch time 
discussions, collection of documentation, and follow up telephone conversations for 
clarification of points. All data were collected on a confidential basis both within and between 
cases. For this reason, infonnation which might reveal the identity of the cases is not used in 
the following chapters. 
7.5 SUMMARY OF THE CASES 
Summary information on each of the 15 cases is presented in table 7.1. They were located in 
all pans of the Kingdom except Wales, and most are household names. Collectively, the 
corporations of which these companies are part represent much of the UK's industrial base. 
Most of the companies have been manufacturing on the site(s) visited since before 1918, and 
only MH and MM have manufacturing operations which are situated on sites that have been 
established since 1945. The former factory showed all the signs of a branch plant established 
under regional aid, and has been closed since fieldwork ended. 
At the start of the research, two cases were independent companies; for one, the year of 1989 
was the 200th anniversary of such independence. In four cases the site studied was a cost 
centre, while the rest were profit centres as part of multi-divisional corporations. In the vehicle 
companies things are a lillIe more complicated because the engineering departmenl" worked 
as cost centres, serving. factories operating. as profit centres within the business. The status of 
the survey companies at the start of fieldwork is summarised in figure 7.1; the overall business 
status of the vehicle companies is g.iven. Four are the privatised off-spring of nationalised 
industries. All but two were UK owned in 1988 - the odd ones out having been recently 
acquired hy EC and US companies. Howe\'Cr. three of the companies changed status while the 
research was under \\:1) whilll halved the number of independent comp~lI1ies and shifted 
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ownership in all cases away from the UK. MH and MI were unbundled from a larger profit 
TABLE 7.1 
THE CASES 
COMPANY INDUSTRIAL OWNERSHIP STATUS UNIT CODE SECfOR SIZE 
MA Building Components UK PC 500 
MB Mechanical Engineering Ind PC 914 
MC Electrical Engineering UK PC 1230 
MD Hydraulic Components UK PC 176 
ME Aerospace UK PC 4500 
MF Vehicle Components EC CC 800 
MG Shiphuilding UK PC 12000 
MH Heavy Engineering UK CC 1210 
MI Heavy Engineering UK CC 2200 
MJ Vehicles Ind PC 12000 
MK Aerospace Components UK PC 1400 
ML Vehicles UK PC 38000 
MM Vehicle Components UK PC 2500 
MN Mechanical Engineering US PC 1100 
MO Vehicle Components UK CC 4000 
------------
centre during fieldwork, and MH hecame a separate profit centre while MI remained a cost 
centre as pan of a larger, multinational joint venture. 
Unit size is given as the number or people employed on the site visited. except for the two 
vehicle companies where the dispersed nature of production makes this measure meaningless. 
and total size is given. All the plants except one fall into the medium (500+) or large (1000+) 
Sill' categories except \ 1 D. This company shares its site with 2 others from the same 
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corporation which were unbundled from a single company in the mid eighties; it was much 
larger when it first implemented CAD. All the companies make intennediate or capital goods 
except the two vehicle companies. 14 None made light consumer goods. The cases can. 
therefore be taken as fairly typical of larger firms in the UK mechanical engineering. electrical 
engineering, and transport industries. They are also similar to the aerospace firms studied by 
Adler, the metalworking firms studied by Currie, and the mechanical engineering and vehicle 
companies studied by Simmonds and Senker. 
7.4 SUMMARY 
The methodological approach selected for investigation of the conceptual framework is that 
of the case survey which has the strength of com bining the richness of data on organisational 
processes available from qualitative case study research with the greater typicality possible 
with more quantitative survey work. The sample of cases was selected from one broadly 
defined industrial sector in such a way that key variables were controlled. Most importantly. 
the basic character of the production information and materials flows. the infonnation intensity 
of the value chain. and information content of the product were controlled. This controlled 
sample allows the exploration of commonalities and contingent variabilities between the cases. 
The sample is fairly typical of the metalworking sector of the UK economy. and the extent 
to which the findings are applicable to other sectors can be explored by others because of the 
detailed presentation of the context of implementation in following chapters. 
1.l) There ar.: pruhkms III dcflnlllOO here· dden,c ~'h>J' are nOI SlnCII) CJlplt..ll ~uods bcausc they arc nol uscJ produclIHly. In.:! the dOIT1lnan,c 
of Ihe ,"chides m.""': hI 11K Cllmp"nl ,<I' ml!<ln' Ih~l th" ,du,k, pr,)(\u,cr, ,.1:: probahl) he IfuleJ as capilli goods producers 1I1 some rr'rr~~· 
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8 
THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF PRODUCTION 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
The presentation of the findings from the case survey will follow the framework developed 
in the preceding chapters. To begin, this chapter will present and assess the picture of the 
strategic management of traditional metalworking production as the economy began to emerge 
from recession in the latter part of the eighties. It will thereby present the context of the 
implementation of CAD/CAM. In line with Pettigrew's distinction, the outer context will be 
discussed first, before moving onto the inner context as defined by the production mission, and 
the nature of transactions within the infonnation and materials Dows. The relationship of these 
to the organisation structure of the case study finns will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Throughout the following chapters, unattributed quotations are taken from interviews with 
managers in the company concerned. 
8.1 THE OUTER CONTEXT 
The general picture which emerges from the sample is of buoyant companies enjoying good 
profits in rising world markets. The level of confidence amongst the managers interviewed was 
almost palpahly greater than \vhen Cour of the cases were researched in the early eighties. Most 
of the businesses had heen severely baltered during the recession, and had emerged after 
considerahle reductions in size. and major re-organisations. For some, survival itself had been 
in doubt. Howcver, elTort directed towards laking out costs, improving quality, and focusing 
activity had paid dividends. Four of the companies claimed to he in the top three in their 
particular world market niches. while most helieved that they had areas of competitivc 
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advantage which would take them through the nineties. 
All but one of the sample was profitable, and five were making healthy profits. The informants 
were asked (Q A4) about their company's gross revenue over the previous two years 
(effectively 1987/1988). The responses are shown in table 8.1, and provide a self-reponed 
TABLE 8.1 
PROFIT ABILITY 
COMPANY PROFIT 
CODE LEVEL 
MA break even 
MB high profit 
Me small profit 
MD high profit 
ME small profit 
MF small profit 
MG small profit 
MH small profit 
MI small profit 
MJ high profit 
MK high profit 
ML sm all pro fi t 
MM small profit 
~1N high profit 
MO small proli t 
------------
measure of performance l5 . It is worth noting the fi\'c most profitable ones - MB. \1D. MJ. 
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MK, and MN - four of them will appear more than once as examples of well managed 
metalworking companies, while the fifth, MD, has a distinctive and sustainable competitive 
advantage. The issue of the sources of profitability will be addressed in the conclusions. 
Most are selling in international markets to diversified customer bases in at least one of their 
product lines. In these markets, demand was generally rising, but this was also attracting 
increased competition in many cases. One of the two companies which serve only a national 
market is in defence, while the other is a tied plant of a vehicle manufacturer. Both of these. 
obviously, face undiversi fied «4 customers) markets. One company is experiencing a falling 
market demand in its defence related product line, while demand for il~ commercial lines is 
rising. No company reported fa1ling competition. Changes in national and global politics while 
the research was under way meant that four of the companies might soon face dramatic falls 
in demand. One - not a defence company - believed, according to one informant, that it was 
facing a "cliff edge" in 1991 due to political instability in China and India, and policy changes 
in the UK. 
8.2 THE PRODUCTION STRATEGY 
Two main ways of exploring the production strategy were used. Firstly, following Hill (1985 
chap 2), informants were asked to identify the "order winning criteria" for up to three product 
lines (Q B3). This yielded 29 (non-independent) observations of the most important order 
winning criterion for a product line. Although developed as a framework for the analysis of 
manufacturing strategy, closer inspection reveals that many of the criteria he proposes arc. in 
fact. attributes of the product design. and hence the responsibility of engineering rather than 
manu facturing. If the lower hal f of the 1 ist ("rate of new product introduction"; the "product 
design" categories: and the "other" category which was speci fled by the informants who chose 
it as "technical service") is classified as engineering criteria. the result is that pure 
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manufacturing criteria tend to be twice as important as engineering criteria in winning orders 
(69% vs 31 %). Price and delivery criteria were the most frequently mentioned (249c of 
product lines each), while quality criteria came close behind (21 %). 
The second approach tackled the issue of nature of the contract with the customer. Question 
B 1 identified the nature of the market transaction with the customer through conventional 
manufacturing strategy questions for the three most important product lines at each case survey 
company. 32% of the 29 product lines identified were "made to forecast" - these were mainly 
the vehicle and vehicle component companies. 52% of product lines were "designed to 
customer order", while the balance were either "manufactured" or "assembled to customer 
order". Only two companies, MA and MD, mixed "make to stock" and "design to order" 
manufacturing strategies. However, the "designed to customer order category" hides a number 
of different forms of contract with the customer. It was, therefore, decided to develop a new 
classification scheme which was more sensitive to the actual production strategies of the case 
companies. The conventional manufacturing strategy approach identifies where the contract 
with the customer enters the materials fim·v; building on the analysis in chapter 3, the new 
typology offered here identi fies where the customer enters the production information flow. 
Only three of the companies sell all their output direct to the final customer through a 
distribution network - the two vehicle companies and one of the mechanical engineering 
companies. Here, production is on a make to forecast (MtF) basis, and the contract with the 
customer occurs after the production information flow, and indeed, the materials flow. have 
been completed. One group of intermediate goods companies is that which manufactures 
components for other final assemblers. These component companies tend to build on a make 
to order (MtO/F) basis. where the order takes the form of a contract against the customers' 
forward schedule. Each order Illay include an elelllent of customisation of the standard product 
through "variant dcsign". Some capital goods companies build or assemble to specific orders 
which take the fonn o/" individu31 contracts. for which an amount of customisation. or 
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"contract design" may be done. Again, this is essentially a make to order (MtO/C) process. 
In both cases, the contract with the customer enters the production information flow at the 
planning stage. 
It is the limitation of customer specific engineering design work to customisation that 
distinguishes the make to order companies from the design to order (DtO) companies. They 
tender on a basic design, which then undergoes significant development to meet the needs of 
the particular customer. In these cases, the contract is placed towards the end of the design 
stage. The final category is that of the defence companies, where the customer in the form of 
the responsible procurement agencies is heavily involved in developing the concept design, 
usually on a separate contract from the contract to build. They have, therefore, been dubocd 
the concept to order (CtO) companies, where the contract with the customer is made virtually 
at the start of the production information flow. The categorisation of production strategies in 
terms of where the customer enters the production information flow for the most important 
product line in each case is given in tablc 8.2. 
8.3 THE CHOICE OF PROCESS 
To identi fy the choice of process, the most senior manufacturing manager interviewed was 
asked to describe the production processes. An immense variety of ways of transforming metal 
were identified, and most companies were undertaking major investment programmes on the 
shop floor. Raw materials in sheet, plate, rod, bar, and billet form are formed by pressing, 
cutting, rolling, forging, bending, extrusion, or casting. Some go on to form welded 
fabrications; all go on to be machined by various techniques to form components. In two of 
the volume component manuLIl'tUrers. machining is organised entirely on a group technology 
basis. Two of the component companies, MA and M D havc no assembly operations. restricting 
their activities to metal ronnin~ and fabrication; both of them are particularly interesting in 
their use of CAD/CAM which will be discussed later. In all the other cases components go 
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on to form sub-assemblies, sometimes after heat treatment, before going for final assembly on 
the assembly line or station, or fitling in the erecting shop or construction hall. 
TABLE 8.2 
INFORMATION AND MATERIALS FLOWS 
COMPANY PRODUCTION INFORMA TION MATERIAL COUPLING CODE STRATEGY FLOW FLOW COMMIT 
MA MtF Tender High Volume 
-
MB MtF Development Low Volume 
MC DtO Tender Low Volume Sequential 
MD MtO/F Tender High Volume 
-
ME CtO Procurement Low Volume 
MF MtO/F Development High Volume 
-
MG CtO Procurement Low Volume 
MH DtO Tender Low Volume Sequential 
MI DtO Tender Low Volume Sequential 
MJ MtF Development High Volume Iterative 
MK DtO Tender Low Volume Iterative 
ML MtF Development High Volume Iterative 
MM MtO/F Development High Volume Iterative 
MN MtO/C Development Low Volume Iterative 
MO MtO Development High Volume Iterati ve 
-------------
No site visited encompassed the entire materials flow from metal forming to final assembl) 
or filting. Two companies have their own foundries on site, while most handle their own sheet 
and plate CUlling and preparation. In one of the vehicle companies pressing is carried out on 
a separate site. while the other is presently acquiring its own remotel} located pressint: 
capability. r-.. Lim make c"tcnsi\e use or bought out components such as fort:ings and sub-
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assemblies, and nearly half are concerned with manufacturing components for other final 
assemblers. None were significantly involved in production technologies other than 
metalworking such as electronics or the processing of liquids or powders. The extent to which 
bought out components and sub-assemblies are used varied considerably, and depended upon 
a variety of factors related to the production strategy in terms of policies regarding make or 
buy, and corporate strategy in terms of vertical integration. Some companies, also "bought in" 
work to utilise spare capacity - in one company, where the latest product line had not yet been 
productionised, extensive reliance was placed on this manufacturing strategy. 
8.4 THE MATERIALS FLOW 
The materials flow for each of the cases was charted as a process flow diagram in a simple 
input/output form from sketches made during interviews (Q. D3) As will be clear from the 
discussion of process choice above, at anything more than the most general level of 
description, the materials flows were fairly idiosyncratic to the case under study. However, 
informants were also asked to classify the materials flow for each product line in terms of 
Woodward's (1966) typology (Q. C2). "One-off', or jobbing, production predominated with 
39% of product lines, while 23% of products were produced on a "flow line" ba~e. The 
balance was evenly split between "small" and "large batch" production (19% each). Although 
there was some variation within companies - companies with flow line production might also 
produce some large batches, and predominantly one-off production companies might also 
produce some products or components in small batches, only MA mixed large batCh/flow line 
production with small batch/one off production technology. This is a special case in that the 
one-off production is for an, as yet. relatively unimponant new product. This suggests the two 
groups can be considered separately as generic low volume «100 off) and high volume 
materials flows. The results for the most imponant product line in each case are gi \'cn in tahle 
8.2. 
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The above discussion is summarised up in figure 8.1, showing the correlation between 
relationship to the customer as defined by the production strategy and the materials flow. 
Taking the 29 product lines, it can be seen that design to order/concept to order, and low 
volume production are highly correlated, as are high volume production with make to order 
and make to forecast. Because each case can be unambiguously allocated along each of the 
two dimensions, the table can be reproduced by case with come confidence. This is shown in 
figure 8.2. The situation of the two anomalous firms - both are with low volume on a make 
to order or make to stock basis - is interesting. At this point suffice it to say that they are two 
of the five most profitable companies and both in the top three in their respective world 
markets. 
Hill (1985 S.3.3) has suggested that "line" produced goods tend to compete on price as the 
order winning criterion, while "jobbing" goods tend to compete on design, quality, and 
delivery. However, the evidence from these 29 product lines is that while only lout the seven 
flow product lines competed on price as one of the top three order winning criteria, 5 out of 
the 12 jobbing product lines so did. What appears to be happening is that in many markets 
price is always the main criterion, and that some of the volume manufacturers are finding that 
their customers are prepared to pay for reliability of delivery and performance, and quality of 
design. For instance, ML "tried to avoid" price competition, and has poSitioned itli vehicles 
in the upper quartile of each market segment in a classical differentiation strategy. These 
findings are in line with Porter's (1980) analysis of competitive advantage which shows that 
cost leadership (price competition), differentiation and focus (non-price competition) strategies 
arc available in all industries. 
When this issue was probed more deeply, infonnants from design to order finns argued that 
engineering competence was becoming more of a market entry criterion, and that price and 
delivery were becoming more important. For instance. an infonnant in aerospace components 
argued that a few years ago. quality and engineering capability used to be the order winning 
133 
criteria, but now all thc remaining competition arc competent in those areas, and that price 
and reliability of delivery are the criteria now. In heavy engineering, an infonnant argued that 
the key market entry criterion is product integrity with a very good record for reliabilit::- In 
service, and that the order winning criteria are speed of delivery and price. 
8.5 THE PRODUCfION INFORMATION FLOW 
The production infonnation flows were similarly described in input/output fonn. However, 
here, three distinctive patterns could be discerned amongst the flows. These are what might 
be called the tender route whcrc thc business puts considcrable engineering effort into 
tendering to the customer for each contract. This accounts for six of the cases, and an example 
is given in figure 8.3. Here, the distinctive tender loop with the customer prior to the placing 
of an order can be seen before the bulk of the engineering design work is done. A second 
distinctive flow might be called the procurement route is illustrated in figure 8.4 - the two 
companies displaying this flow wcre the two defence companies. The distinctive feature here 
is the separation of the customer's "dcsign order" which leads to project definition from its 
"build order" which leads to the full enginccling dcfinition prior to the detailing processes of 
layout and model building. 
Thc third typc of flow identificd is thc development route, which is illustrated in figurc 8.5, 
where thc company develops a product. or at least a gcneric product type, before seeking 
specific contracts. The product dcvelopment proccss may involve considerable consultation 
with potential customers, and individual contracts can involvc customising the generic product, 
but thc actual contract with the customer does not involve a major engineering effort. Very 
often prototypes arc built as part of the dcvelopment programme. while this is rare for thc 
other two routes - amongst these. only ME used prototypes as part its production infonnation 
flow. Thc catcgoIisation of the cases is summarised in table 8.2. 
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As might be expected. the different production infonnation flows are associated with particular 
relationships to the customer as defined by the production strategy. All four of the design to 
order companies have tender route flows, and the distinctive nature of the concept to order 
companies in defence with their procurement route flows has already been identified. The 
other two companies with a tender route are the two component companies identified above 
which restrict themselves to metal fonning. and tender on their customers' designs. As neither 
has had a significant design capability in the past. it is difficult for them to develop their own 
products. Both are actively using CAD to change this situation. The remaining companies -
all make to forecast/make to order companies - used the development route. These 
relationships are presented in figure 8.6. 
8.6 TRANSACfIONS: THE ENGINEERING/MANUFACfURING INTERFACE 
The concept of transactions within the infonnation and materials flows as the binding agent 
between the flows themselves and the associated organisational structures and processes was 
developed in chapter 3. The discussion in chapter 4 focused the argument on the key 
transaction within production information flow at the interface between engineering and 
manufacturing. or the engineering/manufacturing interface. At least so far as CAD/CAM is 
concerned, this information transaction is the most important. The three main variables which 
affect the character of transactions were identified as direction, intensity. and coupling in 
section 3.4. 
At the engineering/manufacturing interface, the direction of the main data flow is, by 
definition, from engineering to manufacturing; the main variable is the destination in 
manufacturing to which the infonnation flows. This is largely contingent on the materials flow. 
In the low volume companies. the information flow goes through production engineering and 
then forward to production management on the shop floor in a relatively tightly coupled flow', 
as is shown in figures 8.3 to 8.5. None of these has a separate toolroom apart from the 
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concept to order companies. Here, tooling mainly takes the fonn of assembly jigs rather than 
tools for component manufacture. In all of the high volume companies, on the other hand. the 
production engineering function includes a large tool design capability, and the flow passes 
from there to the tool room as shown in figure 8.7. In this type of production infonnation 
flow, production management is relatively decoupled from production engineering. The 
organisational consequences of this relatively loose coupling will be explored in the next 
chapter. Typically, the high volume companies have linle or no CNC machining on the shop 
floor, and so the part programming section works for the tool room as well. As tool 
manufacture is usually a one-off process, this lends a significant degree of convergence to the 
two types of flow, so far as the engineering/manufacturing interface is concerned. 
In order to measure the intensity of infonnation flows bet ween engineering and manufacturing, 
infonnants were asked how frequently infonnation passed between the two functions (Q. 05). 
All those who answered this question replied that infonnation was exchanged on a daily basis, 
and that this exchange was usually informal. Clearly, this could mean no more than a quick 
phone call, and tells us little about the quality of the exchange. More important is the nature 
of the interdependence, or coupling, between the two functions. 
In order to address this issue, infOlmants were asked to assess their company in tenns of the 
typology of coupling developed in section 4.4 (Q. 04). Pooled coupling is, by definition, not 
relevant to information flows between functions. No particular pattern could be discerned 
between those identifying sequential flows, and those identifying reciprocal flows, and some 
infonnants stressed that what happened depended on the particular situation. From the 
discussion of the production infonnation flow in section 3.4, it might be expected that a 
clearer distinction or interdependence would have been found. The explanation for this lack 
of distinction almost certainly lies in convergence between the two types of production 
infomlation flow due to the role of tooling in the high \olume companies. 
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More telling was the picture that emerged of what the production information flow, in the 
opinion of infonnants, ought to look like. Infonnants often spontaneously volunteered different 
pictures of what happened in practice and what they would like to see happen at the 
engineering/manufacturing interface. The ideal can be defined as the coupling commitment. An 
opinion was not obtained in every case, but, those that were obtained revealed an interesting 
pattern. Infonnants from three different companies stated that while, in practice, the flow is 
mainly reciprocal in nature, the ideal situation would be a sequential flow. These were all the 
design to order companies with tender infonnation flows and low volume materials flows. 
Those companies with development infonnation flows expressed a strong preference for 
sequential flows for variant or contract design, but preferred more iterative information flows 
for new product development. 
Only MN identified itself as nonnally having an iterative information flow, while and MJ and 
ML claim to have achieved it on their latest product development programmes. MK and MO 
have the explicit aim of achieving an iterative flow from their present position of a reciprocal 
flow, while MM claimed that iterative flows were what were supposed to happen, even if 
practice did not always achieve this goal. It appears that the main di fference is between those 
companies which rely largely on sequential flows where possible, and move to reciprocal 
flows more or less fonnally as required, and those companies, who as a matter of policy are 
aiming for iterative flows. The latter group includes three of the most profitable companies. 
The overall results are presented in tahle 8.2. 
The perception of the need for iterati\'C flows is a response to a variety of internal and external 
pressures. In the vehicle companies the aim is to reduce product development lead times, and 
ML claim to have reduced the time for their latest project to the industry average of four 
years. In MM, a history of failure of product dcvelopment initiatives had stimulatcd a radical 
approach to current projects. At MK. the aim of reducing costs by 300/[ over 18 months had 
given the m~lIldale for a significant change in produ,-'! d('\l'1opmenl methods. A particular 
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target for this company is the reduction of the number of very expensive and slow 
engineering change orders (ECO) by getting manufacturing input to the design before it is 
signed off and hence liable to ECO procedures. For MN, the business strategy of being a 
follower in developments in product technology meant that product development lead times 
needed to be very quick to respond to competitors' initiatives - over the last 12 years they 
have reduced product development times from 18 months to 6 months. 
What these six companies have in common is relatively frequent product initiatives. In 
contrast, many of the other companies have long product development cycles and very few 
product initiatives. In the concept to order companies, product development cycles are long, 
and infrequent - the decade is a more appropriate period for counting major product initiatives 
than the year or month. Both of them have had only one major product initiative in the last 
10 years. In the three design to order companies committed to sequential flows, product 
technology development is so evolutionary that it is sometimes difficult to identify specific 
development projects. Under such circumstances, coming to an awareness of the benefits of 
iterative coupling, and its implementation may well be much more difficult. 
8.7 THE GENERIC PRODUCfION MISSIONS 
The production mission was defined in chapter 3 as the way the production technology is 
organised to meet the production strategy. The evidence on the elements of the production 
mission presented here, the production strategy, the choice of technology, and the associated 
information and materials flows, allows the identification of a set of generic production 
missions, which is summarised in figure 8.8. The clearest distinction is around the nature of 
the main materials flow in defined in tenns of volume. As Woodward (1966) showed, the key 
distinction is between those that produce on a one-off/small batch. or low volume basis. and 
those that produce on a large batch/flow, or high volume basis. However. it is also clear trom 
the above discussion that this distinction based upon the materials flow is of limited us~. 
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because the production infonnation flow needs also to be considered. The four types of 
production strategy, defined in tenns of where the contract for sale enters the production 
infonnation flow, yield three distinctive types of production infonnation flow. The 
procurement and tender routes lead to materials flows of a low volume nature. Make to 
forecast companies go on from the development route to choose materials flows based on high 
volume production. 
Within the low volume mission there is an important source of convergence. The concept to 
order/procurement route companies are facing two distinct pressures. Firstly, their main 
customer, the state, wants to move from a "cost plus" relationship to a "prime contractor" role 
where they take on responsibility for subcontracted activities. Secondly, the "peace dividend" 
means that they need to seek alternative product and markets; this is affecting MG particularly 
seriously. The two heavy engineering companies, MH and MI, made this shift to a design to 
order/tender route consequent upon the collapse of the home market, and the necessity to seek 
new markets abroad some years ago. It seems likely that both ME and MG will be obliged 
to follow this route over the next few years, and as will be discussed in the next chapter, they 
have both been making significant changes to their organisation structures in a response to 
these pressures. 
This suggests that two distinct production missions can be confidently identified. The 
engineering Lcd mission is characterised by a design to order production strategy, flexible 
process technology, a tender route information flow, and a low volume materials flow. The 
manufacturing Lcd mission, on the other hand is characterised by a make to order production 
strategy. relativel y dedicated process technologies. a development route production infonnJtion 
now, and a high volume materi:t1s flow. It is likely that the production departments will ha\ e 
distinctive relationships to their marketing departments, articulated through the produdion and 
marketing strategies. although this question was not pursued in the research. 
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However, a hybrid mission could also be identified at MN and MB, which combines a 
development route information flow with a low volume materials flow. MB, in particular. has 
recently been implementing a policy of reducing batch size in a move towards lean production. 
They are both mechanical engineering companies which successfully compete in global 
markets. The history of both these companies suggests that they may represent an emergent 
type of generic production mission which be described, for reasons that will be explored in 
chapter 12, as a production led mission, and is also summarised in figure 8.8. The fascinating 
question for the next decade is whether the development of lean materials flows will push 
enough manufacturing led companies into low volume production. and the process of 
modularisation of designs will push enough engineering led companies into the development 
route to make the production led mission the predominant one. 
As with all typologies, the cases which do not fit are particularly interesting. Two of the 
tender route companies, MA and MD, are only just starting to develop an engineering 
capability to increase the value which is added within their operations. Presently. they arc both 
volume producers with make to forecast and make to order strategies respectively. MA's 
business strategy is to move towards a design to order strategy with a tender route and the low 
volume production of "engineered" products. MD, aims to move more towards a development 
route as it shifts to "black box" design for its customers. In both cases, the implementation of 
CAD/CAM systems are seen as central to these shifts in strategy. They are, therefore, moving 
towards engineering led and manufacturing led production missions respectively in the search 
for a greater share of value added. MK was also making a strategic shift from an engineering 
led to a jointly led production mission at the time of fieldwork, which will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. These developments are illustrated in figure 8.9. 
8.8 SUMMARY 
Starting with the outer context. this chapter has explored some major clements of structure and 
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process in the metalworking industries along the lines of the production model presented in 
figure 3.3. The process by which the business enacts the environment through the production 
strategy was identified before the choice of manufacturing technology was discussed. The 
ways in which this choice structures the materials and information flows was then reviewed 
before three generic production missions were derived. These generic types will fonn the basis 
for much of the following discussion of implementation, but first, the ways in which these 
information and materials flows influence the structure of the organisation will be explored 
in the next chapter. 
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9 
ORGANISATION DESIGN FOR METALWORKING PRODUCTION 
9.0 INTRODU CfI ON 
The production strategy combined with the choice of process leads to the three generic 
production missions identified in the previous chapter. This chapter will address the issue of 
the relationship between the production mission with its attendant flows of infonnation and 
materials, and the design of associated organisation structures, using the conceptual framework 
developed in sections 3.4 and 3.5. The relationship between production technology and 
organisation design has been long disputed, but most observers appear to agree that there is 
an observable relationship between the work flows within the organisation, and the design of 
the organisational elements most closely related to those flows (Mintzberg 1979 chap 14). 
A perennial question of organisation design is whether to structure by function or product. 
Functional organisation, it is argued, allows the maximum utilisation of resources such as 
expensive machinery and scarce skills. Product organisation on the other hand, greatly eases 
co-ordination of the transactions within the infonnation and materials flows. Functional 
organisation makes co-ordination difficult, while product organisation threatens the efficient 
use of resources l6 (Mintzberg 1979 chap 7) One way of anempting to resolve this dilemma 
is a matrix structure (Galbraith 1977 chap 10; Mintzberg 1979 chap 7) where operational 
managers report to both functional and product orientated senior managers. The benefits of this 
approach in metal working production are discussed in Winch (1983), while it has long been 
important in organisations where geography is a major design contingency (Gulick 1 (37). 
\6) See the dls('u~sion of Printer Inc In Lol'l'Ch and u.WTC!1(,~ (IQ72). 
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9.1 THE DESIGN OF THE BUSINESS 
The predominant organisational form of the overall business amongst the case study firms is 
functional. Taking the managers reponing to the Managing Director or General Manager. the 
most common configuration is into the four primary functions - engineering. commercial. 
manufacturing. and financial (cf Kimball, cited Urwick 1937 p 58). Four of the firms studied 
have this arrangement, including three of the four most profitable ones - MK. MN. and MD. 
The founh is MM. An example of this basic functional structure is given in figure 9.1. which 
also shows the managers who are typically in support to the main four functions in a line and 
staff arrangement. These suppon functions will be discussed later. 
In two cases, two of the functions are merged - engineering and manufacturing in the case of 
another highly profitable business. MB. and engineering and commercial in the case of MA. 
In the latter case, the engineering capability upon which the company originally built its 
reputation atrophied over the years after the war once its patent had expired. The company is 
now making a considerable effort to re-establish an engineering capability to gain the value 
added in engineering design. This initiative is being led by the Marketing Director, and the 
engineering capability has been established as a separate Design Division alongside the other 
product divisions within the marketing function. These then buy manufacturing services from 
manufacturing. The Manufacturing Director argued that "manufacturing is a service to 
marketing ... the company is very much marketing led". At MB. the arrangement seems to be 
traditional within the firm. perhaps because of the relative simplicity of iL) product. 
Two companies have differentiated engineerin~ functions. At ~1I and Me. the distinction is 
betwC'en engineering and product de\'l'lopment. and can be explained in historical terms. In 
the first l'ase. a merger which took pLll'C as fieldwork v,,·as under \\a1' led to the promotion of 
thl' Engineering Director who had covered both i"un,:lions to the corporate level The two Chief 
Engineers now repon to the T\lan~l~in~ Dire,:lor din.:ctly. Tlli~ ~lrr,tn~cment was described as 
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transitional while the implications of the merger are worked through. In the second case. the 
separation of the functions is also fairly recent. and is consequent on the arrival of a new 
Engineering Director from outside the company. According to one informant. the separate role 
of Product Development Director was established to avoid overloading the new Engineering 
Director in his early days. The present Product Development Director will soon retire, and the 
post is then expected to lapse. 
At ML, in an inversion of the deparonenta1 titles used at MI and MC, a similar differentiation 
had existed between Product Development. and Design and Concept Engineering. However. 
the Director of the latter has recently resigned, and so the two functions were merged under 
one Director in August 1989. This move was described by one informant as a great step 
forward, as the two previous Directors were "warring" on the Board. So, it seems as if a 
unitary engineering function is the nonn in metalworking industries, and that attempts to 
separate completely the product development and engineering design functions are unstable. 
Three firms have expanded commercial functions. At MI, a Construction Director is 
responsible for the erection of the product on the customer's site. The importance of this role 
is indicated by the fact that the remarkable halving of product delivery lead times achieved 
during the seventies from 9 years to -:+'5 years came more from reducing site construction 
times than design and manufacture lead times. At ME, the importance of providing in service 
support to the product led to the establishment of a Customer Support Director, in addition 
to both a Commercial Director, and a Sales and Marketing Director. Thus expanded 
commercial functions seem to be related to the needs of the market in terms of the amount 
of support required by the customer at its own site. At ML, two Commercial Directors look 
after the two distinctive product lines inherited from a merger. 
MF has a differentiated manuLlCturing function. whil:h again is the result of a recent history. 
Since the take-over in 19S7. the technical function has been merged into a Product 
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Development Group, and the commercial functions have also been brought together. However, 
the manufacturing operations of the constituent pans of the business have not been combined. 
This is panly geographical - the two divisions are UK and continental based. However, the 
main reasons seem to be that the products presently in production were all developed prior to 
the merger, and the elements of design for manufacture in them means that they cannot be 
transferred between factories. Until the new technical function, which as one infonnant put it, 
"reflects the goals of five years' time", develops a common product range, few synergies can 
be reaped within the operational function. 
Similar forces appear to be at work in the differentiation of ML's manufacturing operations 
into three profit centres. In two cases these are geographical groupings, but the third division 
represents a separate product group which has only recently ceased to operate as a completely 
separate company within the group. The Product Development Director repons separately to 
the Board as a cost centre, and has now taken responsibility for the engineering function of 
the third product group. 
One of the companies, MO, has a product structure, with its UK operations grouped into four 
main product divisions, all located on the same site. A group of off-site component 
manufacturing plants also reports direct to the Managing Director. Within the product division 
studied, the organisation design is functional, but with a proliferation of commercial functions 
- strategic planning, OPT and customer liaison, original equipment sales and marketing, and 
aftennarket sales which all repon separately to the divisional Director. The four divisions are 
supponed by a centralised Engineering Serviccs and Corporatc Quality depanment responsible 
for research and development, and overall quality assurance. 
There is some evidence from the cases that such divisionalised structures are unstable. \\'here 
the divisions are successful and capable of independent existence, they tend to be fonned into 
separate businesses within the corporaL ion - ~ 1 D is the resul L of such an unbundl ing. \\'her(' 
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one or more of the divisions is unsuccessful, or ceases to be identified as a pan of the "core 
business", they can be targets for closure or sale, as happened at MN. At MC, the business 
was divided into four product divisions between 1981 and 1986 - the Large Machines. 
Medium Machines, Steel Products, and Site Divisions. The Steel Products Division combined 
all the factory feeder deparunents such as the fabrication and press shops, while the Site 
Division was responsible for site installation of the product. The period was described by one 
informant as a "total disaster". It had led to a rapid rise in transaction costs between divisions. 
and a fragmentation of the technical function, as engineers were allocated to the separate 
divisions. 
MK is moving towards a matrix organisation, but only one company - MG - presently has one. 
which is shown in figure 9.2. The changes were fully implemented by early 1989 in response 
to privatisation, the Ministry of Defence's shift towards a prime contractor system of 
procurement where one company takes the entire responsibility for the defence project, and 
more general changes in the market. Business Centres have been established which trade with 
each other. For instance, ManufactUJing has to tender to Shipbuilding for the supply of 
components. and is free to seek work outside the business. As in ME, the provision of in-
service suppon to the product has led to the establishment of a separate function. Prime 
Contracts was established to tender as a prime contractor to the Ministry of Defence. These 
Business Centres are supported by nine Service Areas, some managed by Board Directors. 
Although the Service Areas contain many of the traditional staff functions. they also include 
important clements of the primary functions, and the Business Centres are a mix of functional 
and product groupings. 
MN had a matrix organisation until the mid eighties, as reported in \\'inch (198J). The matrix 
organisation had originall y evolved in response to the problem of increasing responsiveness 
to the customer b) combining the commercial and technical functions into three product based 
divisions. and ~aining economics of scale in manu!'acturin~ hy putting the workload of the 
r-
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three divisions through the same factory. The sustained growth of the company meant that 
each division could justify its own manufacturing facilities, and the emphasis shifted back 
towards product organisation. This development was formalised in 1985 by the formation of 
self-contained businesses from the product groupings. The process was completed in 1989 
when the case study division was sold to a US corporation. The business now has a simple 
functional structure. 
It seems, therefore, that matrix organisations are only adopted when neither functional or 
divisional organisation designs are workable. However, matrix organisations are often unstable 
with a tendency to revert to functional forms (Kingdon 1973), and the case of MN shows that 
the opportunity to revert to a functional organisation was taken as soon as it could be. It 
remains to be seen how long MG sticks with its new structure, as it is unclear what benefits 
its gains from differentiating out the nine separate Service Areas. While some Service Areas 
are conventional "staff' functions, others, such as Design Technology, Marketing, Finance. 
Contracts, and Procurement, are usually part of the primary funetions. No rationale for this 
arrangement was offered by the informants interviewed. 
The remaining case, MH was formed into a new profit centre during the course of the research 
by combining half of another division's engineering function with the factory for which it has 
always designed. The result at the time of fieldwork was an organisation design with a 
relatively large span of control for the Managing Director of seven managers. three of whom 
are responsible for various manufacturing functions. It seemed likely at the time of fieldwork 
that this structure would be rationalised towards the primary functional structure fairly rapidly. 
but in the event the factory was closed. 
In the opinion of Sheldon (cited Urwick 1937). staff functions are responsible for developing 
phms and standards. This role appears to explain the emergence of most specialist stafT 
functions. The importance of a having a coherent human resource policy across the business 
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means that most of the companies have Personnel in a staff function. However, the manager 
responsible is, usually, clearly inferior in status to the managers or directors of the primary 
functions. Only ML and MA have a Personnel Director - hoth are high volume companies. 
and the fonner has a long history of industrial relations problems. At MO, the personnel 
function is devolved to the product divisions, while at MG it forms one of the Service Areas. 
The importance of standards is clear in that five of the functionally organised companies have 
a Quality Manager or Quality Director reporting to the Managing Director in a staff role. At 
MO, there is a Corporate Quality function ahove the product divisions, while at MG it is one 
of the Service Areas. Two companies pull out information technology as a specialist staff 
function, while again at MG it is one of the Service Areas. The role of these functions will 
be discussed in chapter 12. 
Perhaps the most interesting example of a specialist staff function responsible for planning is 
the emergence of programme management. Programme management is distinguished from 
project management, because the latter typically operates within the primary functions, while 
the fonner operates at the business level and co-ordinates between the primary functions. This 
role is identified by a direct reporting relationship to the Managing Director. The distinction 
is clearest at MK, where the newly re-organised engineering function contains five Project 
Managers who report to the Chief Engineer. At the same time, at team of Programme 
Managers repons direct to the General Manager. This is a new status - their earlier role was 
described by one infonnant as being little more than a progress chaser. and the direct reporting 
relationship to the top is intended to give them added authority. 
At ME. a similar elevation in tile qatus of tile Programme Director wa~ made during the 
recent re-organisation. with :1 oriel' to c()\'er hoth Engineering and the Supplies Division 
(m~lI1ulacturing). Pre\'iously. the Progr:llT1Jl1e i\lanagcr had reported to the Engineering 
Director: again. Ill' is supported hy a Chief Designer who manages a team of project managers 
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and reports to the Engineering Director. At MG, a Project Director was appointed for the first 
time during the formation of the matrix organisation, taking over a role previously handled 
by the Technical Director. While all three of these programme posts were formed during 19S8 
or 1989, MI has had a programme management function called, somewhat confusingly. the 
Project Management Department reporting to the Managing Director for a number of years. 
A similar distinction exists at ML. A directorate of three Vehicle Directors is responsible for 
the management of a vehicle from the initial conception right through the product life cycle 
and the development of derivatives on a "cradle to grave" basis. While they report within 
Product Engineering, their scope of authority ranges across the entire company, and thc~ 
include manufacturing and commercial people within their teams. There is also a group of 
Project Directors who are responsible for new product initiatives to the Vehicle Directors. This 
is the type of role described by Clark and Fujimoto as the "heavyweight product manager" 
(1991 chap 9). 
In addition to these two layers of functionally based project management, and business based 
programme management. MH and MG both have projects divisions. the latter is identified on 
figure 9.2 as Prime Contracts. These operate as separate profit centres within the business as 
prime contractors which tender on a "tum-key" basis for contracts. At ME. the projects 
division is established on a joint venture hasis with a major manufacturer of information 
technology. As well as managing the procurement of the company's basic product. project 
divisions also co-ordinate the work of" subcontractors responsible for specialist items such as 
power sources and electronic systems. The~ thereby encompass the entire value chain. and has 
a similar role to that of" project managers in the construction industry. These three lcvels arc 
summarised to Llble 9.1. r-.1C does work for a project compan~ in the same group. \11 
normally works for r-.1H's projclls division. 
At ME. MG. and f\ lA. the tLll1~';;lllions hctweell tile cn~ineerillg and manuLlcturing functions 
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take place on an internal market basis, where manufacturing services are "bought". In all three 
cases, these developments only took place in the two years prior to fieldwork. It is. therefore, 
too soon to evaluate the effects of this choice of transaction governance structure. Howe er, 
the experience of Me with internal market transaction governance, albeit organi ed on a 
different basis, does not augur well. While such an arrangement, at least in the case of the two 
defence contractors, ME and MG, does allow manufacturing to obtain work from oth r 
companies on a subcontractor basis to sustain factory loading, the high level of a et 
specificity inherent in the production technologies of shipbuilding and aero pace, and the 
frequency of transactions, suggest that a uni fled transaction governance stru ture would b 
normally favoured (Williamson 1985 chap 3). 
THE H1ERARCHY OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
FunC'tional Level: .Project Management 
Designated leaders of projcctteams wlU1iD individual functions orbetwccn function . 
. They mayor may not report to a programme manager as well as to their functional 
managers, Their task is usually to achieve internally set operational performan e 
largets. 
Business Level: Prograrmne ManagemenI 
Responsible for the- overaI1 co-ordination of project activlties within the bu iness. 
Clear non-functional authority, usually specified by direct reporting to the mUOflglng 
director, Their task is to ensure thaI the business' commitments on projCCt delivery 
are met. They llTe the. interface with the client, which may be an independent 
bu ines$ or a projecH division. 
Inler-Business Level: Projecrs Division 
Responsible for the Dverall procurement of the product on a "tum-k y" basis. 
Separate profit ccnlIC statu " relying on markel transaction for the upply of all 
goods and services. Their objccLive is to ensure that all the client' requirements are 
mel. 
Table 9.1 
THE DE ] F THE E lGI 'EER] 10 
Within lh vcrall bu, 111e.' . . the t\\ prilllar~ run'lion lh:ll al' III 1 rei' \ n e 1 lh 
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production information flow are technical and manufacturing. Turning first to the technical, 
or engineering department, a very different story from that at the business level can be found -
the matrix form is predominant. Headed by managers with titles such as Chief Engineer, 
Engineering Director, and Technical Director, five of the cases have matrix organisations for 
their technical functions - MN, MK, ME, MM, and ML. Typically in such an arrangement, 
the technical staff form a pool of expertise which is allocated to the various design projects 
as a team. The engineering discipline heads are responsible for the supply and development 
of high quality technical skills, while project managers are responsible for deploying those 
skills on a particular product development initiative. This distinction is made clear at ME with 
the Chief Designer responsible for project management, and the Chief Engineer responsible 
for technical excellence while both report to the Engineering Director. An example of this kind 
of arrangement is given in figure 9.3. Support services such as computing tend to report 
separately to the head of the technical function. 
Three of the cases, MF, MC, and MO, organise the engineering function around product 
groups, while one of the vehicle producers, MJ, organises around vehicle elements such as 
body, power and train, and so on. Here, the distinctive feature of organisation design is that 
all the engineering disciplines required for the work are contained within a product group. 
Within the product group, technical staff are then often deployed functionally. None of the 
four with this type of organisation design normally favour a design team approach within the 
product groups. 
Benodo (1988; 1989) has shown the way in which his company has flattened the organisation 
of its engineering function over the last few years. The number of levels in the hierarchy was 
reduced from 7 to 4, spans of control were broadened from between 2 and 5 subordinates to 
between 8 and 10, and staff were grouped into four broad bands from 11 grades. The company 
had found iL'iclf with a large number of engineers in managerial ~radcs who had fev. 
managerial skills. The reduction of the number of management positions by 70l/r rctumcd 
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these engineers to technical work where, in the opinion of Bertodo, their skills are best 
deployed. Both of the vehicle companies studied displayed this trend. Bertodo's example is 
from a company with a matrix organisation in the design function, but even with a product-
type grouping as at MJ, similar ends were achieved by a re-organisation in 1988. The effect 
of implementing a matrix type structure is usually to flatten the organisation. although none 
of the other companies with matrix organisation articulated their aims in these terms. This rna: 
be because they are all smaller than ML and MJ. 
Bertodo also emphasises the differentiation of the more developmental aspects of engineering 
into a separate advanced engineering section. Again. both vehicle companies displayed this 
trend, with the establishment of Advanced Engineering. or Advanced Technology sections. 
This trend towards a clearer differentiation between the development of new technologies and 
the mainstream engineering design process deploying largely existing technologies was 
discemable in other companies as well. MO established a Concept Engineering section within 
the case study division in ] 989, while the establishment of Design Technology as a Service 
Area at MG also appears to be in line this trend. ME also has a specialist Advanced 
Engineering section. 
Another three cases organise their technical departments on functional lines. MI and MH both 
retain the traditional discipline based engineering groups. which feed a separate drawing office. 
The drawing office in tum tends to be functionally split. Within MG. which is illustrated in 
figure 9.2. the drawing office - identified as Engineering Programmes on the organigramme -
is organised on a project basis. having moved from a traditional discipline basis two years 
ago. The distinctive feature of the engineering function at MG is that the drawing office 
reports to manufacturing rather than engineering - an arrangement which is. 1 was infom1Cd, 
traditional in shipbuilding. The design function - identified as Design Technology - is 
organised on a functional basis and reports as a Service Area. It is notahle that thcse thrcl' 
companies are those with the longest concept to delivery lead times. which is a fUIl-.:tion of 
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very large cost and size of each individual unit of production. 
In two of the smaller companies. MB and MD, the engineering function includes both 
engineering design, and prototype and test in the former case. and quality assurance in the 
latter. At MA, the technical department - Design Services - is completely undifferentiated 
These examples can be called unified organisation. These features are most probably explained 
by the relatively small size of the engineering departments in these three cases - less than a 
dozen staff in each case. 
At MJ. the new product development process has ocen separated out completely from the 
development work on the existing two product lines. A special cell - New Vehicle Concepts -
was established in 1985 with a direct repor1ing link to the Board. The aim is to provide a 
multi-discipl inary envi ronment for exploring conceptual designs in a CAD environment. It 
works with a core of permanent staff which can be more than doubled by secondees from 
various other departments. The idea is innovative, but has run into boundary problems with 
the mainstream engineering departments because of a perception of its favoured status, and 
the issue of when to hand the concept over to the rest of engineering for further development. 
If the pattern of organisation design is related to the production mission types identified in the 
last chapter, the most notable finding is that the manufacturing led firms tend to favour either 
the product group or matrix form of organisation. The engineering led firms, on the other 
hand tend to favour the functional or matrix forms - MC is the exception here. 1'\0 
manufacturing led firm has afunctional foml. The two production led firms both have highly 
integrated fonns - un~ried and matrix. It is also clear that four of the five firms with matrix 
organisations are also committed to the development of iteratively coupled production 
information flows between engineering and manufacturing. The odd one out is ME. The other 
two commillcJ to iterative coupling ha\c product group organisation. 
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9.3 THE DESIGN OF THE MANUFACfURING FUNCTIO\: 
Turning now to the manufacturing function, we find a very different pattern of organisation. 
Managed by men l7 with titles such as Manufacturing Director, Operations Director and 
Supplies Division Director, the organisational form tends to be a functional one. Typically, it 
is differentiated into what might be considered the four primary manufacturing functions -
manufacturing engineering, production, production control, and purchasing. Figure 9.4 shows 
such a functional organisation. Most of the cases have variations on this theme - sometimes 
production control is not separately identified, in other cases site services also come under 
manufacturing. In the nine cases with a toolroom, these also report to manufacturing, except 
at MA which has a separate business manufacturing specialist production machinery within 
the group. 
There are two main development in the organisation of manufacturing - the emergence of 
"unit" organisation in production, and associated changes in manufacturing engineering. Units 
are distinguished from group technology cells in that they are organisational rather than 
technical entities. In the two vehicle component cases, the units consist of a number of group 
technology cells as well as more conventional arrangements. Their importance for the 
argument here its that many of the manufacturing engineering functions are being devolved 
down to the units. 
Manufacturing engineering is mainly responsible for the stage three tasks in the production 
infomlation flow shown in figure 3.1. It is, essentially, the interface between the engineering 
process which produces the design in tile fonn of drawings, specifications, and schedules. and 
the manufacturing process which transforms it into a product. It translates the language of 
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design into the language of production, taking a two dimensional representation and specifying 
the means by which it is 10 be converted into a three dimensional artifact. Its growth has been 
one of the most notable features of the development of the organisation of metalworking 
production and is central to the contemporary implementation of Taylor's conception of 
scientific management. Smith (1987 chap 4) provides a useful description of some of the 
occupations in manufacturing engineering. 
The main tasks usually carried out by manufacturing engineering are production engineering 
which covers the design of jigs and tools, the planning of process routes, and the programming 
of NC machine tools; industrial engineering covering method and work study; manufacturing 
systems engineering, responsible for design of production technology and the layout of the 
plant; and production planning. The importance of each of these tasks varies considerably with 
the nature of the materials flow. For instance, the high volume producers have little need for 
NC programming and process planning, but have large manufacturing systems engineering and 
tool design capabilities. In low volume production, where the machine tool stock is general 
purpose, there is usually little requirement for tool design, but a large need for NC 
programming and process planning. 
In high volume production, the implementation of unit organisation has been associated with 
the drawing of a clear distinction bet wecn production and manufacturing system engineering 
on the one hand, and industrial engincering and production planning on the other. MM, MF. 
and ML have all developed since 19~6 what, at ML, is callcd the Manufacturing Engineering 
section which reports separately within manufacturing and includes the first two tasks, and 
Conformance Engineering which includes the latter two tasks and reports to the operations 
managers for the units that they cover. An example of what can be called this manufaccurin:.: 
planning form of organisation is shown in ligurc 9.5. As one informant put it. ~1anufacturing 
Engineers arc "future orientated", while the Confonnance Engineers arc "present orientated". 
Mrs single manufacturing engineering department is strongly differentiated along these same 
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lines. At MO, these functions, somewhat confusingly called Industrial Engineering, actually 
report within the engineering function, which is called Product Engineering, rather than 
manufacturing. 
Three of the cases - MI, ME, and MG - have no central manufacturing engineering capability. 
Here again, the factory has recently been organised into units, and each unit manager has all 
the staff which he or she requires to complete the unit's pre-production and production tasks, 
including manufacturing engineering and production control. This form of organisation is 
presently being implemented at Me. An example of the unit organisation of the manufacturing 
function is given in figure 9.7. What these four companies have in common is that they are 
all one-off production companies. Only one such company had not moved in this direction at 
the time of fieldwork. 
In all three cases, the implementation of what can be called unit organisation is fairly recent, 
and has tended to be fraught. At MG, the implementation of the unit structure began in 1986 
with the establishment of the Machining Unit. It involved the break up of a large production 
engineering capability, and now each unit has its own process planners and NC programmers, 
as required, within a Methods and Tooling Office. However, it was decided to retain a 
centralised Jig and Tool design and manufacture function to spread its costs across as many 
activities as possible. A separate Manufacturing Technology department reports to the General 
Manager Materiel. which is responsible for advising units on the purchase of new machine 
tools and the development of computer systems such as a tool management system. At Ml, 
the three units were established in 1988. Since then, turnover amongst production engineers 
has been relatively high; according to one informant, this is due to the uncertainties inherent 
in the break up of the central production engineering function. 
An obvious problem \\ith the unit organisation is that of co-ordination between the units along 
the materials flow. It is probably no co-incidence, therefore, that these companies have all 
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implemented programme management. Co-ordination is to be achieved, it seems, at the level 
of the business, rather than within manufacturing. Informants also expressed concern regarding 
the career prospects of production engineers, and the loss of the sharing of expenise within 
a centralised office. These complaints may just oc symptoms of resistance to change, but is 
remains to be seen whether the unit organisation of one-off production is a success. A further 
implication for the co-ordination of the engineering/manufacturing interface will be discussed 
later. 
At the small batch company, MK, the possibility of moving towards a unit form of 
organisation was evaluated. It was rejected on the grounds that it, according to one informant, 
"would have been suicide". The factory is organised into a number of "cells" on either product 
or group technology lines, but a central production engineering function was retained for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, plant tends to be common across the product cells, and so there 
are economics of expertise in developing common approaches. Secondly. much of the work 
is at the leading edge of technology. which includes a numocr of very sophisticated machining 
centres, and a centralised grouping can leam faster and share a developing expertise better than 
a fragmented one. Thirdly, there is a danger of the proliferation of approaches. Fourthly. it is 
felt that the status of production engineers needs Ii fling. The use of the term "manufacturing 
systems engineering" to describe their work is one way of doing this; another is to 
acknowledge them as a group with a definite expertise allied as closely as possible with 
product engineering. Fifthly, an overall function is required to allocate work to the different 
product cells. 
During 1991, the production engineers at M K are to become one of the disciplines within 
engineering's matrix structure which was described in section 9.3. Co-ordination with the 
factory is to be retained through the industrial engineers. who also report to the Chief 
Production Engineer. They are to be devolved down to the manufacturing cells. As well as the 
conventional industrial enginel'ring t:lsks. th('~ are to become responsible for making minor 
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adjustments to process plans, and to "chip away" at process optimisation. To support these 
developments in manufacturing engineering, multi-skilling within both groups is being 
encouraged through a training and career development programme. 
Relating these developments back to the generic production missions identified in the previous 
chapter, interesting differences can again be found. Manufacturing led companies have been 
increasingly implementing a manufacturing planning type of manufacturing organisation 
design consisting of unit organisation in production with their own industrial engineers and 
production planners to look after daily matters, and centralised manufacturing engineering 
organisation for future projects. Otherwise, they favour functional organisation. In the 
engineering led companies, the di ffusion of unit organisation with all manufacturing 
engineering devolved to the unit managers has been equally rapid and meant the breakup of 
traditional centralised manufacturing engineering functions. The production led mission 
companies both favour traditional junctional manufacturing engineering departments. It is also 
clear that those companies who expressed a commitment to sequential coupling are 
implementing unit type organisations, while those committed to iterative coupling are 
implementing manufacturin!; plannin!; type organisations or staying with functional 
organisation. 
9.4 SUMMARY 
A notable feature of the organisation design of the case study companies is the sheer stability 
of structure at the business level. The line and staff arrangement around the four primary 
functions of engineering, commercial, manufacturing, and financial would be recognisable to 
any commentator over the last sixty years. In the few cases where companies have deviated 
from this traditional design. there are good reasons to believe that the resulting structures are 
unstable. The only long telln stable feature which depans from the traditional model seems 
to be the dillcrentiation of the commercial function to meet requirements of the market lor 
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installation and product support in service. 
TABLE 9.2 
THE ORGANISATION OF ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURIi\G 
COMPANY MISSION ENGINEERING MATERIAL MANUFACTURING 
ORGANISATION FLOW ORGANISATION 
MA MtO/C UNIFIED Large Batch FUNCT 
MB MtF UNIFIED Small Batch FUNCT 
MC DtO PRODUCT One-Off FUNCT 
MD MtO/F UNIFIED Large Batch FUNCf 
ME CtO MATRIX One-Off UNIT 
MF MtO/F PRODUCT Large Batch MANPLA!\ 
MG CtO FUNCTION One-Off UNIT 
MH DtO FUNCTION One-Off FUNCf 
MI DlO FUNCTION One-Off UNIT 
MJ MtF PRODUCT Flow MANPLAN 
MK DtO MATRIX Small Batch FUNCT 
ML MtF MATRIX Flow MANPLAN 
MM MtO/F MATRIX Flow MANPLAN 
MN MtO/C MATRIX Small Batch FUNCf 
MO MlO PRODUCT Large Batch MAt\PLA:\ 
-------------
However, this stability at the business level provides a basis for considerable change 
elsewhere. In the stan functions, new demands from the market for time, cost and quality 
improvements is encouraging the fOImation of new staff services to enhance co-ordination 
between the primary functions. particularly rcgarding quality and delivery lead times. The most 
recenl example of this phenomenon amongst the CIS~ study companies is the emergencc of 
programme managc!l1c'nt ~h a response to market demands for improved lead time 
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performance. 
Perhaps most radically, the organisation of engineering has been undergoing considerable 
change. The shift towards matrix organisation from a traditional one of discipline based design 
offices feeding a separate drawing office is both marked and recent. The shift has occurred 
across all types of company, and appears to be driven by a concern to both improve the 
effectiveness of the design process within engineering, and to improve co-ordination across 
the engineering/manufacturing interface. These concerns affect all the case survey companies 
to a greater or lesser degree, and it seems possible that the matrix will emerge as the dominant 
form of engineering organisation design in the metalworking industries. In this case, a desire 
for changes in the coupling within the production information flow is leading to changes in 
organisation design. 
In manufacturing, change has been less marked, but is none the less significant. In the large 
batch/flow companies the traditional functional organisation of manufacturing engineering has 
been split into manufacturing planning and manufacturing support tasks. The fonner tends to 
be concerned with fulure projects, and relates closely to engineering, while the latter is 
concerned with present production, and has been devolved down to the factory units for which 
it works. Again, this differentiation is a fairly recent development. In the one off production 
companies, the trend is in the other direction with the abandonment of a centralised 
manufacturing engineering capability, and a devolution down to self-contained factory units. 
Here is a clear example of the manufacturing mission influencing the organisation design of 
manufacturing. Thesc developmenL~ in the organisation of the engineering and manufacturing 
functions are summarised in table 9.2. 
The evidence presented here provides some support for Kanter's contention that th~ 
"innovating organization .... has a quasi-free market sandwiched bct\\cen two hierarchics" 
h b'l' th t d the bottom IS nec/'\,',s:lr~' lor tt1l' (1985 p 176), She argues t at sLa I It) at e op an ,,- '-
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development of integrative and innovative processes in the middle ranks. While this cenainly 
appears to be true so far as the top of the organisation is concerned, the implementation of 
CAD/CAM is profoundly affecting the ways in which the lower pans of the organisation work 
as well in ways which will be explored over the next four chapters. 
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10 
ADOPTING CAD/CAM 
10.0 INTRODUCfION 
Now that the outer and inner context of the implementation of CAD/CAM systems in the case 
survey firms has been assessed, the argument can tum to the process of change. The next three 
chapters will follow the stages of implementation identified in section 5.1 from adoption, to 
installation and commissioning, and then to consolidation, and review the experience of the 
15 firms with implementing their systems. However, before that is done, it will be useful to 
describe the content of change in terms of the type of CAD/CAM systems being implemented 
in each company, in order to provide a basis for the descriptions and analysis that follow. 
10.1 THE CONTENT OF CHANGE 
The basic principles of CAD/CAM technology were discussed in section 2.3; this section will 
discuss the systems actually implemented by the case companies which are presented in table 
10.1. With the exception of Radan's Radcraft at MD, they are the market leaders in CAD 
systems over the last decade or so. The McDonnell Douglas GDS system is not well known 
in metalworking, but is a market leader in the construction industry. The range of systems 
covered by the cases, then, is fairly typical of those that were installed in many medium and 
large sized metalworking companies in the UK during the eighties. For much of the period. 
Computervision's CADDS has offered the state of the an. However, in terms of functionality, 
IBM's CATIA and McDonnell Douglas' Unigraphics II now appear to be ahead. In 1989, !\1E 
compared the two and found them to be broadly equal in functionality. while MK compared 
CATIA and CADDS4X and found the fom1cr superior. especially in terms or its solid 
COMPANY 
CODE 
MA 
MB 
MC 
MD 
ME** 
MF 
MG** 
MH 
MI 
MJ* 
MK* 
ML* 
MM* 
MN* 
MO 
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TABLE 10.1 
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATIO!\ 
PRESENT DATE FIRST DATE PART 
SYSTEM SYSTEM PROGRAMMING 
GDS 1988 
UNIGRAPH 1987 UNIGRAPHICS 
MEDUSA 1986 CADDS3 1982 GNC/APT400 
RADCRAFT 1980 
CADAM/ 1980 AD2000 1978 ANVIL 5000 
SYSTRID /WESTRID 
CADDS4X 1985 CADDS3 1980 MDSI 
CADDS4X 1984 COMPACT 11/ 
HEWLETT PACKARD 
CADDS4X 1985 CADDS3 1982 GNCrrUDRIP 
CADDS4X 1983 CADDS3 1982 CVNC/APT 
CADDS4X 1982 CADDS3 1981 CVNC 
CATIA 1989 CADDS4X/3 1980 NC VISION/APT 
CADDS4X 1984 CADAM 1979 CVNC 
CADDS4X 1985 CADDS3 1982 NC VISION/APT 
UNIGRAPH 1977 UNIGRAPHICS 
/COMPACT II 
MEDUSA 1986 UNIGRAPH 1979 HEWLETT PACKARD 
* = CAD/CAM link for part programming 
** = link for surface modelling only 
modelling and relational data basc l':lpabilities. Computervision's Medusa offers an al1racti\c 
packagc for less demanding applications. \\hilc IB:-" l' s CADA\ 1. a leading system in thc 
sc\cnlics, is obsolescent. 
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Twelve of the case companies - see table 10.1 - first implemented a CAD system in the five 
years between 1978 and 1982. Nine from ten of Currie's sample of large finns also 
implemented during this period (l989b table I). The only one of the case study finns which 
implemented during this earlier period, but was not large (>1000 employees) at the time of 
fieldwork is MD which was much larger at the time of first implemention - during the 
unbundling described in section 7.5, MD got the CAD system. The systems implemented 
during this period might be considered first generation draughting systems - they were 
obsolescent by the mid eighties, but provided a base on which to develop the second 
generation of modelling systems - a process most easily seen in the shift from CADAM to 
CATIA. Early users of CADAM, such as ML and ME, complemented it with specialist 3D 
surface modelling packages developed by aerospace companies which also ran on IBM 
hardware - NMG and SYSTRID respectively. 
In most cases, the implementation of alphanumeric CAM systems was earlier than that of the 
CAD systems, and had been evolving during the seventies. As can be seen from table 10.1, 
all but two of the companies have both CAD and CAM systems. However, as might be 
expected from the diversity of CAM systems in relation to the CAD systems, they are not all 
fully integrated. In other words, not all the case survey finns had achieved technical success. 
Various criteria may be proposed for such success, but the existence of a direct graphics link 
for data transactions between the CAD system, and the CAM system for the programming of 
NC machine tools for the manufacture of prismatic parts seems to be an appropriate one. 
The NC machining of turned parts tends to be a relatively simple to program because it poses 
an essentially 2D problem, and can be relatively effectively handled using non-interacti\c 
packages such as APT and Compact II. Perhaps because of this, some widely used interactivc 
CAM packages were reported to be not very good for turned parts. MN. for instancc. has 
deliberately chosen not to use its Unigraphics system for programming NC tumin~ for t11esl' 
reasons. The incentive to use interactive CAM systems for progrJmming NC turning is J1PI 
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great. Moreover, not all company's materials flows have a significant requirement for turned 
pans, and so such a test would not be generalisable. So this criterion is rejected on the 
grounds of technical underdevelopment and lack of generalisability. 
The establishment of a CAD/CAM link for tool design poses few technical problems. Both 
tasks employ the same graphics images, and CAD software can be used for tool design as 
easily as it can be used for detail draughting. These links are not without problems, but they 
are largely organisational. For instance, at MM, the tool designers tend to redraw the 
component rather than pick up the engineeling drawing directly because the engineering 
drawing contains too much data which takes a considerable time to suppress. 18 A second 
problem is more technical in that much tooling is for semi-finished parts, while the 
engineering drawing is for the finished pans. So this criterion is rejected on the grounds that 
it is technically undemanding, and not generalisable because most low volume materials flows 
have linIe requirement for looling. 
One of the most successful and straightforward applications of CAD has been for the design 
of electrical circuits, due to their simple two dimensional nature. At MG, a VAX mini-
computer has been used to develop a proprietary electrical CAD system known as 
ELECTRICAD. Thi,s can be used to create and automatically check wiring diagrams. From 
the data base thereby generated, the complete drawings for wiring looms can be created. An 
ELECTRICAM package is then used in thc loom shop to laser mark the wires for 
identification purposes. In the next stage of development it is planned to link this data base 
with the circuit testing machinery. At MG. the EDB (electrical data base) system, running on 
the CY hardware. has been under internal development since 1985. \\'iring schematics are 
prepared directly on the screens from tile specification. and then used to create cahling and 
commissionillL! dia!!rams. Data cxtraction for parts lists can already be canied out. and the 
~ ~ 
production 01 a full bill of materials is planned i\1~ has also wrillen its own package, running 
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on the same VAX as the Unigraphics system. At MC, specifications developed using 
proprietary programs running on GEC mini-computers are merged with graphics from the 
CAD library on the Medusa system. However, there are few CAM opportunities with electrical 
manufacturing, because it is largely an assembly, rather than a machining process. The 
relatively undemanding and limited nature of electrical CAD applications suggest that it is not 
a good basis for assessing the degree of technical success. 
It might be considered that pipework would also be a very favourable application for CADI9 . 
However, the inherently three dimensional nature and sheer complexity of pipe systems has 
caused problems for the case companies. At MH and MI, the inability of the software to cope 
with falls, pulled bends and site welds was only one of many problems. Moreover, both 
subcontract pipework manufacture, and therefore have no opportunity to reap downstream 
manufacturing benefits from an integrated CAM system. The only company which does not 
subcontract most of its pipework manufacture, MG, only uses the CAD system for validating 
pipe runs digitised off a 1:5 scale model with a computer controlled camera. The technique 
was derived from the engineering construction industry for the design of process plant. While 
this data is used directly to program NC pipe bending machines, the pipe runs are laid out on 
the model by manually fitting colour coded plastic wire. The reason is that the pipe runs, and 
particularly their inter-relationships in highly confined spaces, are too complex to be handled 
on the computer. 
The existence of a direct link for data transactions within the production information now for 
the bulk of prismatic pans would appear to be the most appropriate mcasurc for technical 
success, thercfore, on the grounds that is it tcchnically dcmanding. a significant potential 
application in most companies, and gcncralisable across the cases. On this criterion only fivc 
of the companies could be said to havc integrated CAD/C.-\\1 systems in that the bulk of 
prismatic work goes through the system as a direct data transfer. Two other companic'\ havc 
19) Adler "hilS,' lhlS Ipph.:.aIIOO luI' on~ of hI' ,,-: ,)1 '~":'. l~ oll"r I' clc':lTonic CIIUIIl boards 
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achieved that goal only for surface modelling applications, lca\'ing the bulk of their transfers 
to IGES or manual transaction. This appears to be due to the fact that the tool paths follow 
the designed surface, and the benefits that accrue from a successful data transfer are so large 
that it repays considerable extra effort and in-house development of the system. The classic 
example of this application is the machining of body dies in the vehicle industry, and much 
of ML's experimental work in the seventies was around this problem. The remaining 
companies rely on either data transfer through IGES links between their incompatible systems, 
or still use paper transfers in the form of drawings, although MB and MC are close to 
technical success. 
This situation is summarised in table 10.1: technically successful companies are identified with 
a single asterisk, while those that have achieved surface modelling links are marked with a 
double asterisk. It is notable that none of the fonner are engineering led companies. The data 
for ML shows body engineering only. Figure 10.1 gives the example of ME's production 
information flow to show the diversity of links between the CAD and CAM systems. In the 
cases of MA and MD, it can be argued that there is no need, technically. for such a link, 
Neither have any NC machine tools in manufacturing or the tool room for reasons to do with 
the nature of their high volume matelials flows, although this may soon change at MD as they 
try to do more finishing work to increase value added on the components they manufacture. 
In the other cases, the reasons for the lack of technical success lie in the implementation 
process, and it is to this that we will now tum. 
10.2 THE EVALUATION PROCESS 
As was disl'ussed in Chapter 5, the (,valuation process starts with the awareness of the 
perji)rnuZIlce gap. whil'h prompts an c\aluation of the possibilities, before a formal appliL3tion 
for funds is made through the justi fication. Tile 3\\areness of a performance t!~lr regarding the 
potenti~t1 of CAD and CA\ 1 grew amongst the case companies during the latter part or the 
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seventies. On the one hand, the usc of main ('rame and mini computers for alpha-numeric CAE 
applications had been growing for some thirty years. On the other, the diffusion of ~C 
machine tools during the seventies had encouraged the implementation of alpha-numeric pan 
programming packages such as APT. which also ran on minis. By 1977, US companies were 
heavily marketing the new interactive graphics CAD systems in the UK (Arnold 1983): an 
effon focused mainly on the large companies (Currie 1989) of the son covered in this 
research. and awareness spread. 
Most of the case study companies set up informal task forces to look at the possibilities in the 
late seventies - this is summarised in table 10.2. First off the mark amongst these cases was 
MN. which set up a task force under the Technical Director in December 1976, prompted by 
an article in a trade magazine describing the system of a major competitor. Presentations from 
Computervision and Applicon and a trip to the US to sec working systems sponsored by these 
vendors failed to impress. Only a visit to the company's US subsidiary where they were using 
the CAM part of Unigraphics - Uniapt - convinced them of the benefits. This resulted in one 
of the earliest installations in metalworking in the country in March 1977. 
By 19~O. most of the case companies were looking at the potential. ML had been experiment-
ing at departmental level with 3D su,-race modelling packages for much of the seventies before 
deciding on NMG in 1978. and had a very early graphics package for press tool design. but 
did not commit itself to CADAM until 1980. Other parts of the company were, at the same 
time. implemcnting CADDS 3. Tile approach at f'..1 E was morc formal. A trial system was 
installed in 1978. and in 19~O a CAD Steering Committee of senior managers was established. 
under which a task force. or \\'orking Group. of functional speci:llists evaluated the options. 
At MC. a comprehensive rcvie\\ 01 most clements of the production information flow v. as 
carried out which produced a series 01 far sighted documents in 1979/80 which co\crcd 
interraces with manufacturing and bill of m;lk'riab documcnl~llion. Thc\ evcn considcred 
writing thci r own C.-\ D!(':\ \ 1 system. 
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TABLE 10.2 
THE ORGAKISATION OF EV ALUATION 
COMPANY TASK MANUF DP CONSULT IMPL 
FORCE INC INC USED CHAMP 
MA 
* * 
MB * * * * * 
MC * * * * * 
MD * * * 
ME * * * * * 
MF * * 
MG * * 
MH 
MI * * * 
MJ * * * * * 
MK >(. * * 
ML * * * * 
MM * * * * * 
MN * * * * 
MO * * * 
A number of the case compames have heen through complete re-evaluations of their 
CAD/CAM systems, and ME had just embarked on its third evaluation at the time of 
fieldwork. This was usually prompted by the perceived obsolescence of the existing system \ 
hardware or software. or a desire to cxpand greatl) the size of the system. Those companies 
that re-e\'aluated in the mid eightics also relied upon a ttlskforce approach, with the exception 
of MD, which relied upon ~I single functional manager. The pe(tormance gap tended to \\ork 
in a much stronger W:I) with re-c\'aluation - man:lgcrs had :1 clearer sense of the both the 
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potential of CAD/CAM systems in particular, and infonnation technology in general, coupled 
with an intimate knowledge of the limitations and frustrations of their own system. 
For MC, the obsolescence of CADDS3, and hence the necessity to upgrade to CADDS4X 
prompted an evaluation of requirements and a hard look at the level of functionality required. 
The realisation that they did not need a 3D modelling capability for designing electrical 
machines led to the decision to opt for Medusa. At MK and MD, awareness of the greater 
functionality of workstations against tenninals encouraged a complete review. MO wanted 
to expand the system to the other two product divisions, and so went back to a basic appraisal 
of their requirements. Similarly, at ME, the first re-appraisal was prompted by the decision to 
make a major investment and to expand greatly the system, while the second is rooted in the 
realisation that both CADAM and SYSTRID are obsolescent; indeed, the latter was described 
by one infonnant as "tenn inally ill". At ML, the use of CADAM in body engineering and 
Computervision equipment elsewhere in the company meant that re-evaluation was likely to 
lead to the scrapping of one system, and body engineering switched to CADDS4X in 1984. 
The taskforce.\' varied in composition, and few included all three of the main interest groups 
who could be involved in such a process - engineering, manufacturing, and data processing. 
The findings are summarised in table I 0.2. At MA and MO, only the engineering function was 
involved in evaluation. The evaluation task forces at MF, MI and MG did not include 
manufacturing. At MO, MI and MF the task force did not include data processing, while at 
ME, on the other hand, it was led by the data processing function. MK can be considered a 
special case because of the role of the corporate centre in championing innovation. In the 
remaining cases, data processing tended to :ICl in an advisory role, while retaining the right 
to sign off the final justi lication. Figure 10.2 compares those cases where all three concerned 
functions were included in evaluation and the achievement of technical success. It suggests 
that the inclusion of all three is :1 necessary. but not sufficient. condition for technical success. 
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Senior management at director level was usually very supportive - In many cases the 
implementation champion was a director, and in the rest senior management provided support 
and drive. The case of MK where the corporate centre encouraged the company to adopt the 
innovation was exceptional, but at MG as well, which was then nationalised, there was strong 
championing from the centre. Only at MH and MI was there, apparently, little top 
management support for the task force's work. 
These task forces appraised the long term viability of vendors, benchmarked the functionality 
of the systems, visited demonstration sites, which included MN, and carried out in-house trials. 
Only at MM was concern for compatibility with the systems of dominant customers expressed. 
The impression gained from informants is of a learning process during which system potential. 
business requirements, and investment criteria were articulated and re-articulated until a case 
could be made. This case was then distilled into a justi fication to meet capital budgeting 
procedure requirements. Six of the companies involved outside consultants in the evaluation 
process. While in case of MD and MS, this was explicitly to fill a gap in internal computing 
expertise, ME and Me al ready possessed strong engineeIing computing skills. In the first case 
involvement seems to have been political, and in the latter, the choice to evaluate manufactur-
ing systems as well seems to have required additional skills. MK and MM relied upon the 
same strong corporate Technical Services function. 
The re-evaluators tended to display a much stronger concelll with interfacing the system with 
other business systems. The existence of manufacturing and business systems on an IS \1 
platform elsewhere in the organisation was crucial in the ME and MK re-evaluations, while 
at MO, compatibility with systems in other divisions throughout the world was considered 
important. At ML, compatihility with the CAD/CAM systems used outside body enginceril1t: 
was a cri tical factor. Clcarly, com pati hil i ty with the ohsolescent system is also a consideration. 
f\10 was greatly aided in changing systems because they were able to purchase interlace 
software from another metalworking company. At \lC, the compatibility of Medusa with 
189 
CADDS3 was critical, while the amount of development work done with MD by Radan 
encouraged them to stay with that system. At ME, during both re-evaluations. the IBM polic: 
for business systems was critical in selecting IBM CAD/CAM systems. Only MK has switched 
to a non-compatible system. and will retain a working Computervision CADDS4X system to 
allow access to old files. 
In most of the cases, informants could identify and name an implementation champion who 
could be credited with pushing the implementation through - the results are summarised in 
table 10.2. In ME, MB, MN, ML, MJ and MF this person was the head of the technical 
function. In MA, MD, MM, and MC he was the head of the department which was to use 
CAD. In the former case the evaluation task force usually reported to this person; in the latter 
it was led by this person. Neither MH nor MI could identify such a champion. Winch (1983) 
suggested that the position of the implementation champion within the organisational hierarchy 
might be crucial to his or her effectiveness. At MN, the Technical Director also had an 
oversight over manufacturing due to the matrix organisation, which is illustrated in figure 4 
of Winch (1983), while at MB, the Manufacturing Director is also responsible for engineering. 
At MK, MO, and MG, the champion was at corporate level. 
Of the twelve companies first implementing during the earlier period identified in section 10.1, 
only three reponed that they had evaluated CAD/CAM mainly on the basis of what one 
informant called "island productivity" in draughting - ME, MF, and MM. At MH and MI, the 
system was justified on its potential to reduce the cost of rectification during construction of 
pipework fouls by using the system's promised three dimensional clash detection capabilities -
for MH, rectification accounted for 7 cIr of site work at the time. It is not clear what MD 
expected from their system, despite the fact that one of the informants was the original 
inno\'ation champion. MK's system was installed as part of an initiative at the corporate level 
to tryout CAD - as one informant put it. the "money was put up to get us on the band 
wagon". They were chosen as a pilot site. and the system was funded oy head office 
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A detailed review of the evaluations made at three companies shows the breadth of the cases 
made. While draughting productivity features strongly, many other factors were also taken into 
account. This does provide evidence for the predominance of draughting productivity 
justifications in the evaluation of CAD discussed in section 6.2, but it also suggests that 
management decision making was less crude than sometimes suggested for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the first generation systems were actually sold on the basis that they would 
increase drawing office productivity, so it is not unreasonable that managers. who usually 
lacked any actual experience of working systems. should emphasise this criterion. Secondly. 
they were implemented in the depths of the worst recession since 1945 and serious doubts 
about the future in many of the companies; cost savings were strategically paramount. Thirdly. 
some companies were aware of non-cost benefits and deployed them in evaluations. even if 
they could not articulate them clearly as a basis for justifications. 
Turning to the later implcmentors after 1984, who moved straight to second generation 
modelling systems, we find a di fferelll story. Of these, only MA, implementing in 1988, relied 
entirely upon draughting productivity. However, as there is little opportunity for them to take 
advantage of downstream links or enhanced functionality due to the nature of the product, this 
is hardly surprising. At MG, implementing in 1984, the initiative was taken up at corporate 
level which provided guidelines for justification, and gave figures for the expected productivity 
savings, which moved beyond island productivity and included the downstream benefits for 
NC programming productivity, as well as improved build quality and design integrity. Their 
decision was supported by an agreement with the Ministry of Defence to fund the system as 
an agreed clement of overhead. At MB, implementing: in 1987, downstream benefits for 1\C 
programming productivity, product development lead time improvements, and product data 
integrity were emphasised. Tile decision was made in a climate of. as one infonnant - a main 
board director - put it. "when, not if' CAD should be purchased, and the payback period was 
lengthened to 3.5 years. 
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The most revealing evidence of a change in attitudes comes from those who went through the 
whole evaluation process again from 1984 onwards, which suggests a strong organisational 
learning effect as organisations became better at using their systems. MC justified its shift 
from CADDS3 to Medusa in 1986 on the basis of reduced maintenance costs, increased 
functionality, and improved draughting productivity. At MO, however, the shift to Medusa in 
1986 was justified on the ability of the system to control the mass of data within the 
production information flow, to eliminate bottlenecks within that flow, to facilitate design 
modifications, and to improve the quality of drawings going to the customer. MD also re-
evaluated in 1988, and chose a completely new Radcraft system. The main criterion used here 
was compatibility with "design led" business strategy that had just been drawn up by external 
consultants. The Board argued that a pre-requisite of such a strategy was CAD, and significant 
support came from the marketing function who found that customers appreciated the quality 
of the tender drawings from the old system, and the speed of tender turnaround. No specific 
justification for funds was prepared. 
The re-implementation at MK was justi fied on the grounds of the greater functionality of 
CATIA over CADDS4X, particularly with respect to the interface with CAPM and CAE 
software, and its solid modelling and relational data base capabilities. There are three aspects 
to the evaluation. Firstly, the compatibility with the COPICS system in manufacturing would 
allow the direct transfer of bills of materials, in a significant step towards a CIM system. 
Secondly, the cost of ECOs in the aerospace industry is very high, and so the system is 
expected to provide support for a simultaneous engineering approach which reduces the needs 
for such procedures. This is a major issue for many companies - Miller and Vollman (1985) 
report that the number of ECOs in Japanese electronics factories is only two thirds of that in 
US factories and they make them further in advance. Thirdly, the solid modelling and 
engineering analysis capabilities are expected to reduce product development lead times and 
improve design qualit). For instance. the weight of the product is critical in aerospace. and 
the new system has already proven ih ability to help engineers to take out weight from 
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designs. 
The evidence is. then. that there has been a shift away from simple reliance on draughting 
productivity at stage two of the production information flow. a trend which seems to have 
gained momentum during the latter part of the decade.20 This might be explained in a number 
of ways. Firstly. the rapid slide down the cost/performance curve that CAD/CAM shares with 
other information technologies means that the real cost of investment has dropped sigrtificant-
ly. Secondly. the greater functionality of the second generation systems. especially CATIA and 
Unigraphics II. offers proven non-cost benefits that were merely promised by the first 
generation systems. Thirdly. improved business performance during the later part of the decade 
has generated a greater willingness to make capital investments. It is noteworthy that three of 
the late implementing and re-implementing companies which appear to have moved furthest 
from justification on island productivity grounds - MD. MB and MK - are also three of the 
five most profitable cases. A fourth. MN. spent the period investing heavily in CAPM systems. 
and advanced machining and materials handling technology. Fourthly. there is now much 
greater demonstrable evidence for the non-cost benefits of CAD/CAM. In the late seventies 
there was only a handful of fully operational systems in the country; the level of uncertainty 
regarding benefits was so high that it is hardly surprising that implementation champions fell 
back on whatever "hard" justifications they could find. 
Another factor. however. also distin~ruishes those companies that contented themselves with 
a justification based upon draughting performance. either in terms of productivity or 
rectification cost savings. and those who considered the requirements of both engineering and 
manufacturing. Tv.'o groups can be identified - those who evaluated CAD and C:\\1 
separately, and those who e\'aluated CAD/CA\1 systems. Into the second category go \1G. 
MC. MO, f-.1B. Mi\:, MK, and M!\1. and into the first go MH and \11. ME. MF. MA, \1L, \1J 
20) CUrrie's dalJl on fmns for UIIS laler rc~I()J dllC-~ nol, hollo'c' cr, SUrl'ur. UlIS conlcnllon, dllho~~~ the: 1110'0 ,~'I~' she foun~ tha: j,d nOI usc • ·Cl": 
benefil case" did Imriemcnl dunn!! lhe I~!cr pup.' 
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and MD. The last two had no downstream applications to consider. but what distinguishes the 
rest of this group is either the lack of an innovation champion. or the identi fication of the 
innovation champion strongly with one function. MO. MG. MM. and ~1K all benefited from 
a corporate overview, while MN and MB had key directors bridging the two functions. MC 
benefited from extensive external advice from consultants. It seems as if a business level vie\\ 
is necessary to prevent justifications being based on an island productivity basis. 
10.3 THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
The review In chapter 6 discussed the extent to which the evaluation of integrating 
technologies could be seen as a political process of negotiation. The evidence from these cases 
is that there are three main dyads of negotiation around CAD/CAM - the relationship between 
the implementors in the implementing departments and senior management: the relationship 
between engineering and manufacturing: and the relationship between engineering and the IT 
function. In practice. these arc inter-twined. but each has a distinctive dynamic. The many 
typologies of the dependencies that generate power relations are reviewed by Mintzberg 
(1983). but the one presented by Handy (1985) of "resource power". "position power". "expert 
power" and "personal power" can effectively aid the exploration of these three dyads. 
The previous section identified the extent of an accounting culture amongst the cases surveyed. 
but such a culture can be seen more broadly as the expression of the power relationship between 
implementors and senior stall at the business and corporate level. Senior managers rarely exercise 
power over their staff nakedly. but more frequentl) through rules for how things should be done 
and through the generation of shared goals and commitments in the generation of "simultJneous 
loose-tight propertil's" (Peters and \\'ateI1l1an 1983), AI1l1strong (198S) has explored the tendenc) 
to rely on tight controls in tel1l1S of the lal'k of "trust" placed in engineers by senior managers, 
In the case of ~1L. the procedure ror the justification of the CAD,-\\1 s\stem imohcJ the 
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preparation of "Fin Caps". These were prepared by the manager(s) concerned, and then taken over 
by a finance manager who prepared a quantified assessment on both a DCF and payback basis. 
The justification then went to group level for approval before being signed off by the Managing 
Director. Although an extensive unquantified case could also be put forward, the Fin Cap had to 
be quantitatively viable and pay back within 2 years. Such a case need not always have been 
productivity based, but where most other benefits such as design integrity and reduced lead times 
only pay back over the life of a four or five year product development project. they are difficult 
to deploy effectively within the timescale specified. The financial manager assigned to prepare the 
detailed Fin Cap was the key to a successful justification -if this manager believed that the case 
was not viable, it went no further. 
There is a strong sense here of the financial manager acting as a gatekeeper to those who could 
authorise the resources required to make the investment. This was not necessarily a crude 
imposition of a financial logic, and could include considerable dialogue between the implementor 
and the financial manager. For instance, in one case, the champion of the CADAM system, when 
applying to expand the system, was asked for evidence that ML were behind the competition - that 
there was a performance gap. His researches showed that ML were actually ahead of the 
competition and an argument that this was a competitive advantage that should be sustained was 
developed and carried successfully. However, the nature of the resource power over these 
champions, transmitted by financial managers exercising position power is clear. 
This pattern of sophisticated evaluations of CAD/CAM by engineers being squeezed into narrow 
quantitative rules established by accountants was common amongst the case survey firms. For 
instance, at MN, productivity gains were not a significant motive for evaluation, yet the Jdual 
justification was made on a straightforward productivity basis. However. in some cases the 
relationship was reversed. At MA, the Board had pressed for CAD to be evaluated for some fi\l~ 
years. but the mana~cr concerned had used his {Josition pmn'r and failed to act. It ~ as not until 
he was replaced hy a manager whose brief explicitly incl uded implementation that l'\ aluation 
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commenced. At MG, the corporate centre developed detailed rules by which CAD/C:\\1 was to 
be justified. 
The resource dependency of implementors on senior management, which is maintained through 
the rules established by the finance depanment shapes the implementation process in many ways. 
However, these issues did not greatly exercise implementors - from discussions with informants. 
justification was largely seen as frustrating, but pan of the accepted way of doing things. In Lukes' 
(1974) terms it has almost receded to the "third dimension" of power in which the agenda is set 
in such a way that issues do not emerge as a source of conflict. The other two dyads of 
negotiation, however, were firmly in the "first dimension" of oven conflict in many of the case 
survey companies. 
The relationship between implcmentors in engineering. and the IT function within the organisation 
was often fraught. Typically, the justification procedure included the obligation for the IT function 
to sign off the justification to ensure that it was technically viable. The problems mainly revolved 
around policies of hardware platform standardisation developed at either the business or corporate 
level. These policies were often developed for data processing requirements and did not take into 
account the different requirements of engineering and manufacturing IT applications. The 
differences are symbolised by the frequent preference by data processing functions for IBM and 
compatible hardware, while engineering and manufacturing typically prefer DEC's V AX hardware. 
At ME, an AD 2000 system on DEC hardware was installed an built up to five screens by 1979 
for 2D draughting and 3D layout work on flight controls. On this experience. a decision was made 
to investigate a substantial CAD investment and a CAD Steering Committee of senior managers 
was set up to oversee the activities of a \\'orking Group consisting of middle ranking specialist 
managers. The WoriJng Group proposed the development of the AD 2000 system on a 
decentralised network of V AX minicomputers. This did not find favour with the Steering 
Committee which then commissioned an international firm of external l'l1nsultants. The report 
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recommended the implementation of CADAM on a centralised IB\1 system for ~D work. leaving 
the existing system for 3D work only. The issue \l, as that the business s) ~tems \l, ere already on 
an IBM mainframe which is was hoped to expand, and CADAM was already in widespread use 
within the aerospace industry. By 1985, the AD 2000 system had, in the opinion of one in fonn ant. 
been "squeezed" out by the IBM lobby. 
In 1985, the Detail Manufacturing Complex - effectively an FMS - was implemented with the aim 
of improving the efficiency of sheet metal working. It was controlled by a V AX. and DEC 
recommended ANVIL 4000, a development of AD 2000, for pan programming. There was "a lot 
of opposition" to this suggestion, but manufacturing won the day for two reasons. Firstly, the 
CADAM pan programming capability was easily demonstrated to be inadequate compared to 
ANVIL. The social shaping of CADAM as a tool for increasing drawing office productivity in the 
aerospace industry had led to the inclusion of some "quick and dirty algorithms" which meant that 
the integrity of the drawing geometry was adequate for draughting, but questionable for more 
demanding part programming purposes. It proved to be quicker to recreate the geometry than 
check the drawing office's output. Secondly, the greater computer literacy of manufacturing 
compared to engineering allowed them to mount a more effective case against the demands of the 
IT function to stay with IBM. 
Similar tensions arose at MB, where the IT function advocated ICL hardware in the interests of 
compatibility with the business and CAPM systems. Engineering advocated DEC hard\\ are 
supporting Unigraphics. Again, consultants were deployed, but this time on the side of 
engineering. Infonnants from engineering wcrc keen to emphasise that the system was 
engineering's and completely within their control. At MK, t.he decision to switch to CATIA met 
with considerable opposition from the corporate level, where a Computervision~l polic~ \\ as in 
operation. Six months or "COIllinual balllc" during which head office made attempts to uI"knnine 
the evaluation on the grounds or "suhjectivity" were ne(cssan hdorc the authorisation was 
21) B\ lhen owned r.\ Pl'lmc. 
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received. The result is that head office is now reviewing its own policies. At !\1D resistance to the 
corporate policy of standardising on Medusa during the re-evaluation was only possible because 
they already had the Radan system. At ML, the champion of the CADAM system left the company 
to work for IBM when the policy of standardisation on Computervision was implemented. 
The main issue here would appear to be that of expert power. IT functions, whether at corporate 
or business level, see themselves as the guardians of hardware and software expertise, and use this 
to develop strong positions within the organisation. When this is challenged by users who are 
acting on different criteria for evaluation, conflicts arise. The issue of hardware and software 
compatibility is fundamental as systems become more integrated. Many organisations are 
addressing the problem of how to balance the needs of user departments for specialist applications 
and the needs of the business for integrated systems in an attempt to mitigate this power struggle 
in ways which will be explored in section 12.2. 
The third dyad is symptomatic of a more general problem in many metalworking organisations -
the sometimes tense relationship between engineering and manufacturing. This tension usually 
has its roots in the financial control system - rarely arc engineering and manufacturing in the same 
cost centre, and in many cases they are in separate profit centres. At ML, for instance, where 
Product Engineering is a cost centre, and, therefore. effectively an overhead on the manufacturing 
profit centres, conflicts were reported to be endemic. These conflicLI) affect evaluation because 
many of the benefits of CAD/CAM are effectively a cost to engineering which reap greater 
benefits to manufacturing. The ability to receive data by electronic transfer direct from the product 
data base is of enonnous lahour sa\'ing benefit to part programmers and tool designers. yet may 
not offer any producti\,ity retums to engineering, Engineering, however, bears most of the cost of 
implementing the system. 
At MI, engineering and manufacturing are independent cost centres In a context where the 
corporate culture is one of the radical del'Cntralisalion 01 decision making. As a result the business 
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were described as being run by the "barons" of the various functions. Although the evaluation task 
force included both functions, the Engineering Director made it clear that, on a scale of one to ten 
with manufacturing positioned at one and engineering at ten, if the benefits to engineering fell 
below eight, then the justification was not likely to gain approval. In other cases, such as MH and 
MF, the result of these tensions was that manufacturing was completely ignored in the evaluation 
process. 
The problem here appears to be one of a battle for ascendency between peers. Their resource 
dependency is mutually based upon senior management who have, wittingly or not, set up 
organisational resource allocation and control procedures which put the two at loggerheads. These 
struggles were noticeably worse in the engineering led companies with their ethos of "engineering 
excellence". Although the metaphor of "the wall" between engineering and manufacturing is 
current in many firms, the influence of Gorbachov has been much stronger in the manufacturing 
led companies. In the production led companies, the nations have long been unified. This struggle 
permeates many of the problems with installation and consolidation that will be discussed in the 
following two chapters. 
10.5 SUMMARY 
The evidence here is evaluation is an iterative process of negotiation within the organisation, and 
that broadly based task forces to ensure effective coalition building, implementation champions 
to drive the process through, and top level support to smooth conflicts and provide resources are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for effective implementation. It also appears that 
engineering led companies find it most difficult to achieve these conditions, while production led 
companies find it easiest. The point is perhaps most clearly made by the cases of MH and ;-"11 
which are the furthest from technical success of all. Although their task force was broadly based, 
neither had identifiable implementation champions or top level support. However, evaluation is 
only the start of the process, and once the decision to adopt has been taken, maintJining 
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momentum requires effective project management. 
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11 
ACHIEVING TECHNICAL SUCCESS 
The previous chapter showed the way in which the process of the evaluation of AMT is a political 
process which sets the tenns under which installation and commissioning. and consolidation will 
take place, and the criteria of technical and business success by which those stages of the 
implementation process will be judged. This chapter will. firstly. examine the ways in which the 
case companies have installed and commissioned their CAD/CAM systems. building upon the 
organisational mechanisms used for evaluation. It will then go on to look at the organisational 
changes which are immediately consequent upon the installation in tenns of the management of 
the system. This will then be related to broader issues regarding the successful management of 
infonnation technology in manufacturing organisations. 
11.1 THE INSTALLATION PROCESS 
To manage the instaIJalion process, most companies tended to rely on the members of the task 
force who had done the initial groundwork in evaluation. In three cases - Me. MF. and MG. this 
group was upgraded to a full time project learn. A further four companies also appointed a 
specialist project manager - MO, MG, MB, and MK. In MH and MI, no specialist group or 
persons was given responsibility for installation, and il fell to functional managers who also had 
other responsibilities. There was also a tendency for the scope of the installation group to widen. 
At MG the installation project team included representatives from manufacturing where the 
evaluation task force had not done so. Initially i\1C's installation team included representatives 
from each of the tllrLT main disciplines from both the drawing office and design engineering. It 
was the first ever multi-disciplinary team within the company. \\'hen it was felt appropriatc. thc 
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lofting function was also included, but not the mainstream manufacturing people. At MB, on the 
other hand, the installation tearn narrowed in scope after data processing dropped out because the 
evaluation had not opted for the ICL hardware which provides a platform for the manufacturing 
and business systems. The organisation of the installation process is summarised in table 11.1. 
On the engineering side, achieving technical success with CAD has been relatively smooth. The 
physical installation of the hardware did not pose any significant problems, and few failed to 
produce reliable drawings fairly quickly. The main exception to this is the pipework package at 
MH and MI. Here a number of problems were experienced. First, it took six months to change the 
CADDS 3 package from A USI to BSI specifications, and then it still did not produce useable 
drawings. CADDS4X is an improvement, in that it can create a three dimensional model and 
detect clashes, but it still cannot be used to effectively produce isometric drawings. The system's 
output has to be edited, which takes a lot of time, and the relationship between the computer 
model and its representation in the drawing is then lost. The expansion of the system at MI in 
1986 also ran into problems when Computervision 's new workstation based version of CADDS4X 
proved to be bugged. As one informant put it, the company "suffered long and hard" while CY 
debugged the system. 
The story at the CAM end is less happy. Many CAM installations, based on alpha-numeric 
software, took place earlier than CAD. This, coupled with problems of achieving technical success 
across the CAD/CAM interface, and failures to involve manufacturing in the evaluation or 
installation processes created a number of serious and long lasting problems. 
Software for the programming of NC and CNC machine tools was widely available by the mid 
seventies. Running on batch processing mini-computers without a graphical interface. such systems 
were usually slow and laborious. However, a number of users built up considerable expcnise with 
such systems. and some production engineers were reluctant to lose that expertise and s'" itch to 
the unknown quantity of interactive graphical CAM systems which were often bugged and 
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underdeveloped. As can be seen from tab1c 10.1. a number of users. including companies which 
otherwise rate highly on the scale of technical integration. are still using older. alpha-numeric 
systems alongside the more modem interactive graphics. 
At MC. ONC had only just been installed at the time of fieldwork; it had relied on APT 4000 for 
many years which had been considerably developed in-house in association with the consultants 
who had helped it with the CAD evaluation during the late seventies. In 1975. MH commissioned 
the writing of TUDRIP from Kongsberg for programming NC controlled multiple drills; the 
system was also used for programming a CNC flame cutler. In 1984. ONC was installed for the 
programming of the growing number of CNC machine tools and the flame cutters. However. 
TUDRIP was retained for the drills. and has been developed to the point that it now provides 
virtually automatic programming. plus internal quality checks. However. the vendors are no longer 
prepared to support it. and the future is in some doubt. 
Manufacturing Operations at MO had long been USIng Compact II when the CV system was 
installed. There was considerable resistance to the use of Computervision's NC Vision from the 
production engineers. This was partly due to the cost and other implications of replacing a 
considerable existing investment in post processors. but also due to the part programmers' lack 
of confidence in the ability of the CV software to produce reliable part programs. According to 
one informant. the dispute became quite bitter as the part programmers tried to convince the 
proponents of CV of the inadequacy of its CAM software. When it became available. CVNC was 
also evaluated and pronounced inadequate. An attempt was then made v,'rite an interface with 
Compact II. but the nature of" the CADDS4X 3D modcl undcl1l1ined this approach. 
Programs for the machining of cam rings arc automatically part programmed using an in-house 
development of APT at M~1. \\,Ilile this soft\\are is accesscd through the CV systems' Instaviews. 
it runs on the corporate mai n frame. which aho perfonn s the post procl'ssing for \: C Vi sion. This 
arrangement is presently under review. as it had been provIlkd rre~ to the user companies until 
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1989. At MN and MK, is has been found easier to program NC lathes - a relatively simple task 
compared to machine tools for prismatic parts - using non-graphical programs. At ~1;\, this is the 
result of a policy decision that CAD/CAM is about prismatic parts, while at MK, according to one 
informant, NC Vision never rea]]y got to grips with turning. 
The decision to continue to use what might be considered outmoded CAM systems alongside more 
modem techniques, then, can be traced to a number of factors. Firstly, a considerable amount of 
money and expertise has been invested in them, particularly the post processors, and in two cases, 
virtua]]y automatic programming has been achieved for some tasks - the greater flexibility of the 
general purpose computers which support such systems has facilitated the writing of such 
programs. Secondly, the technical limitations of many of the earlier interactive graphic CAM 
packages discouraged implementation. Thirdly, the relatively simple task of programming lathes 
and drills - they arc both 2D problems - has meant that the limitations of not having interactive 
graphics has been significantly reduced. However, as might be expected, there are also 
organisational issues which will be addressed later in this section. 
The companies using alpha-numeric paI1 programmmg do so alongside interactive graphics 
systems for activities which might be considered to lie a little outside the mainstream of the 
production information flow, or for specialised applications. However, as table 10.1 illustrates, five 
cases have installed technica]]y incompatible CAD and CAM systems for their mainstream 
activities. These are then either interfaced using IGES or direct translators, or. effectively, not 
interfaced at all. The case of MK is relatively simple. It has recently implemented CATIA for 
CAD work, but, because of the lag of around 18 months between the completion of design and 
the stan of production, the production engineers are still working on designs produced on the 
CADDS4X system. The new CAM system will be installed as part of a later phase of 
implementation. 
In the other cases. however. tile incompatibility represents longer tenn implementJtion problems -
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the problems at ME were discussed in section 10.3. The manufacturing plant at ~ has a full 
CADDS4X installation, but it is not used for part programming. As the re-equipment of the factory 
took place during the mid eighties a number of CNC machine tools were installed for production 
work in group technology cells. However, it became apparent that Computervision's offer was not 
appropriate. In particular, it quoted a high price for post processors and a 6 month delivery. MF 
turned to MDSI who offered post-processors at one twentieth of the price, and on a 2 day delivery. 
Therefore, a Texas microcomputer running MDSI software was instalJed in 1985. A graphics 
interface was then written as part of a Teaching Company scheme with a local College. 
The problems with production part programming at MG have already been described. Relations 
with the toolroom - also part of Manufacturing Operations - have been only a little better. It uses 
CADDS4X for tool design, but the EDM wire erosion machines used for tool manufacture come 
with Hewlett Packard part programming facilities, and the interface between the two is through 
a particularly tortuous IGES link using a main frame which is owned by a completely separate 
business division of the corporation which shares the site. A direct interface using an microcom-
puter is presently under development. MO have a similar problem - although tool design is carried 
out on the Medusa system, the AGIE wire erosion machine is again programmed using a Hewlett 
Packard system: data transfer is by manual drawing "walked over" to the tool room. 
MH was only established as a single, independent unit during fieldwork. Prior to this, the factory 
and the design office were separate divisions within the same company. This relative independence 
was reinforced by the distance between the two - a three hour journey including one hour by air. 
The factory had gone its own way without any reference to CAD developments across the water. 
The installation of a CY tenninal in the factory has been evaluated, but this in no way solved the 
main problem of the transmission of design data between the two systems, a problem that is 
presently handled by the Post Office. Only after fieldwork had finished was an e\perimcntal 
transfer of design data madc to a new multi-spindle drill. This is not programmed using TUDRIP 
or GNC. but by sonwarc dc\clopcJ by the local UniYcrsity. 
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Even where engineering and manufacturing possess compatible systems. problems still arise in 
achieving technical success in the CAD/CAM link. MK had achieved a CAD/CAM link with a 
trial part by 1981 which was taken right through to machining with a domestically written post-
processor. However, in 1982, it upgraded to CADDS4. which proved to be so bugged that the 
CAD/CAM link became completely inoperable. It was not until the upgrade to CADDS4X in 1984 
that the problems were completely resolved. By 1989, some 95% of prismatic work was machined 
on NC machine tools and programmed using NC Vision. Evaluation and development work with 
Computervision on CVNC has been halted by the decision to replace the system with CATIA. 
At MI, there has never been anything more than an experimental link between CADDS4X and 
CVNC. While the satellite factory has had NC Vision since 1982, it was not until 1985 that CVNC 
was installed at the main site. It proved, in the words of one informant, "almost too hostile to 
drive". By 1989, the output of part programs from the production engineers was so inadequate that 
work was being subcontracted out. The poor user-friendliness of CVNC has taken the blame for 
this state of affairs, although one informant suggested that organisational issues which will be 
identified below were at the root of the problem. As a stop-gap, a PC based system - Supercam -
was being justified the time of fieldwork. In January 1990. a major Teaching Company scheme 
with a local University started with the brief to examine the whole issue of the engineer-
ing/manufacturing interface for the manufacture of a major component. 
At MB. there is a strong intention to implement a full link to CAM. but this had not occurred at 
the time of fieldwork. The problem is purely organisational. As a company who had implemented 
only the year before fieldwork began. it was still learning how to use the system. It had run into 
a classical "Catch 22" of needing the system to cope with a high workload, but not having the 
slack resource to take time out from immediate concerns to learn how to use the system. The 
installation of the system coincided with the installation of a large number of CNC machine tools. 
and the choice was between manually writing the pan programs to get those running. or learning 
how to usc the CAi\ 1 capabilities. The major productivity gains lrom accessing the design data 
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base were not yet available because engineering were only creating that data base for new product 
initiatives, not the ones presently being manufactured. 
In section 9.3, the implementation of the unit organisation of manufacturing was identified in the 
one-off materials flow cases. This development, it appears, can pose a threat to the maintenance 
of a CAD/CAM link. At MI, the implementation of the Unit structure at the satellite factory has 
meant that tool design is now done manually. In the central production engineering department, 
the 6 terminals were allocated as required to tool design and part programming. Now, three of the 
Units have been given 2 terminals each, but this has meant the fragmentation of the spare capacity 
that was used for tool design, and the present system is not capable of supporting any more 
terminals. The problems at the main factory have already been described above, and one informant 
put the disruptions down to bad management of the Unit re-organisation and a loss of morale 
amongst production engineers, with the CVNC system merely acting as a scapegoat. At ME and 
MG, no such problems have arisen, but neither has been conspicuously successful in the past in 
achieving a CAD/CAM link, and it is unlikely that the loss of a central capability will help in this 
respect. The unit form of organisation seems to make it more difficult to develop a common policy 
across the engineering/manufacturing interface. 
The five companies that have achieved technical success on the criterion defined in section 10.1 
have a number of features in common. Firstly, the original evaluation covered both engineering 
and manufacturing benefits of both a cost and non-cost kind; secondly, CAD and CAM were 
evaluated jointly, rather than as separate systems; thirdly. the evaluation task force included 
representatives from manufacturing; and fourthly. two of them had implementation champions 
promoting the evaluation at a level above the individual engineering and manufacturing functions. 
If the corporate involvement at MM is included, this count rises to three. The only other case to 
meet these four criteria is MB, whose problems, as described above, are very much learning cUI\'e 
ones. 
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Two other companies have achieved partial links for surface modelling applications onh'. At MG. 
most of the above criteria were met, apart from the rather crucial one of including manufacturing 
in the evaluation team. The result of this was that it only considered the downstream benefits for 
the Mould Shop, which is part of Shipbuilding Operations, where the plates are cut for the hull. 
The programs for the CNC flame cutters are directly derived from the 3D model by the lofiers, 
who were included in the installation team. However, the interests of Manufacturing Operations 
were apparently ignored, and this appears to be behind the resistance put up to CY based part 
programming. 
At ME, the achievement of a surface modelling link for the design and machining of mould tools 
appears to be much more of an informal affair, and to have received little senior management 
support. The organisation of the system management function, which will be discussed in section 
12.2, appears to have been a help. The replacement of aluminium fabrications by fibreglass 
mOUldings opened up the opportunity for a CAD/CAM link. The surface of the component is 
defined mathematically as a series of discrete sections. A complete surface is then "skinned" across 
the sections using a domestic development of SYSTRID known as WESTRID. This 3D model is 
than loaded into CADAM for the design of internal components by the design team, and the planar 
elemenL~ of mould tools by the tool room. Both the component surface in WESTRID and the 
planar tool clements in CADAM are then merged into ANVIL for the design of the complete tool 
as a combination of planar and surfaced elements. The rough cut part program for the 3 axis miller 
is then written in ANVIL, while the final cut is again written in WESTRID. 
The situation at MF is, perhaps. a classical example of what happens when a group is not included 
in an organisational change. Manu racturing engineering was, apparently. not even consulted on 
the choice or s\'stem. and all manuracturin~ based informants displayed a distinct lack of 
. ~ 
enthusiasm for it. The sentiment is that with a cheaper. simpler system. they could have done 
much more. The system had. effectively. been left behind when the engineering function was 
centralised at the main site lea\'ing only a rump in the shape of Residential Engineering II.) give 
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technical support to the factory. The problems of "ownership" of the system were made more 
difficult initially because the system was actually managed by the Residential Engineering 
function. One indication of the lack of support for the system is that the CAD System 
Administrator has the lowest status of any of the system managers amongst these cases, and has 
no independent budget or authority. The result is that the system is little used for jig and tool 
design, and, as described above, not at all for part programming. The most successful applications 
have been plant layout and annotating drawings for invitations to tender to component suppliers. 
Although manufacturing were involved in the initial evaluation at MI, the lack of an implementa-
tion champion at a senior level appears to have seriously hampered progress. Indeed, some 
informants hinted that the then Engineering Director was downright obstructive to a broadly based 
justi fication, as discussed in section 10.3. This attitude seems to be rooted in the corporate culture 
of a radical decentralisation of decision making to cost centres which the case shares with MH and 
MC. The problems of implementation at MH have already been indicated, at it seems likely that 
the ten year delay before MC actually installed a linked CAD/CAM system despite an early 
awareness of the benefits is linked to this culture. 
11.2 MANAGING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROJECf 
The project management styles for each implementation are identified in table 11.1, which refers 
to the most recent major implemention, and draws upon the scheme developed in section 5.3. The 
classification draws mainly on the answers to questions in section E of the research instrument. 
but also relies upon a more general sense of how informants articulated the issues around 
implementation management. The paltem is notable for the rarity of participative approaches. 
those companies which appear to have relied upon a model 0 approach. and the bare majorit: v. ho 
can be considered to have had a [cchnocraric approach. 
MA and ~ 1 D faced a h)\\ informatio/1 load. ~ 1 D was re-implementing a packa~c v.ith which it hJJ 
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TABLE 11.1 
THE ORGANISATION OF INSTALLATIO!\ 
COMPANY PROJECT MANUF DP PROJECT PM 
ORG INC INC MANAGER STYLE 
MA 0 
MB TF * * T 
MC PT * * * T 
MD 0 
ME TF * * * T 
MF PT * 0 
MG PT * * T 
MH 0 
MI 0 
MJ PT * * * T 
MK TF * * P 
ML PT * * * T 
MM TF * T 
MN TF * * * T 
MO TF * * * T 
notes: TF = task force T = technocratic 
PM = project team P = participative 
-------------
previously been happy on a total of three workstations, and had no CAD/CA\1 linkages to v.'or~ 
about. Similarly, MA were implementing simple, well-established system for architectural 
engineering design consisting of two workstations. RelJti\'cly little organisational leamin~ v.as 
required in each case. The same cannot be said Cor the other three companies with nliltid 0 
implementations. At MF, installation was a "real dri\'c in job; [its] amazing we got awa! \\ ith it 
as we did". Dcspite this. considerable progrcss has been made o\'erall with CAD. but the isolation 
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of the division within which the research was concerned from the mainstream has meant that thi5 
somewhat unco-ordinated approach has led to considerable problems of integration. Yet again. \1H 
and MI appear as examples of less than effective implementation with ensuing poor performance. 
Virtually all the cases handled the problems of information load and resource scarcity by moving 
slowly. A typical initial installation was four or less terminals, applied to the easiest problems. The 
learning and skills gained from that installation were then deployed in justifications for further 
equipment as system usc reached capacity - if the system was fully used for productive work. then 
an application for further funds was made. The story at MC is typical of many. An evaluation in 
1980 had identified the value of CAD/CAM, but the resource scarcity ensuing from the recession 
in the early eighties led to plans being shelved. However, another site which already had a 
CADDS 3 system was merged with the case site in 1982 - that system was acquired and second 
purchased. By 1986. the system had developed to eight terminals seIVed by two central processors. 
A re-evaluation at that time led to a change to Medusa. and five Sun 2 workstations were installed 
in June 1986. These proved to be rather slow, and were replaced by Sun 3 workstations the 
following February. By September 1988, 21 workstations were operational, and a further 12 were 
installed in March 1989. Additionally, the system began to spread into manufacturing - two 
workstations were located in Production Engineering for development work, and three in 
Operations Planning for pan programming. The CV system was gradually run down and by 1989 
was only used for some automated draughting routines. The "Catch 22" of resource scarcity at \1B 
where manufacturing is caught bet ween needing the system to meet its high workload. but not 
having the slack resourcc to learn how to use the system precisely because of that workload. was 
discussed in the previous section 
Thc effects of si::.c \\!crc noticcable at t\ 1 E and \, 1 L. Both took major pol icy decisions to implement 
lareC' scale CAD/CAM s\'stems alter initial cxperien(cs on a smaller sl'ale. At 1\1E. the decision 
~ -
to make an initial invcstmcnt of £Sm (lq~m prices) encouragcd caution. Tile decision to choosC' 
IB~1 which was already estahlished for business s) stems and CAD:\\1. the standard amongst tl1l'lr 
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competitors in the aerospace industry, went against the organisational learning on the trial system. 
which was offered by a small and relatively unknown company. This decision was supponed by 
a report from an internationally reputed firm of specialist consultants. Similarly, when ~1L took 
a corporate decision to standardise on Computervision with an investment of £24m over 3 years 
(1984 prices), it was in the context of the identification of the production information flow for 
body engineering and press tooling as critical to the company's future competitive advantage. To 
ensure the technical success of this investment, an intensive relationship with the vendor was 
established which will be discussed further below. 
Size and speed combined at MK to make the implemention there the most risky amongst the cases_ 
The decision to replace a technically successful CY system which was being used for the bulk of 
drawing work with a £2.2m (1989 prices) investment in CATIA to allow further technical and 
organisational integration has meant the adoption of the only example amongst the cases of a 
participative approach. The implementation is in the context of a major overhaul of thc busincss 
process. As pan of this, a task force has been examining the production information flows within 
and between the engineering and manufacturing depanments, and has recommended changes to 
these to take advantage of CATIA and new methods of design team working. The implementation 
project management can be considered participative because it is in the context of a much wider 
process of organisational development which requires considerable organisational learning as pan 
of a move towards CIM. 
The inner context in terms of whether the mission is en~ineerin~, manufacturing, or produ([ion 
led appeared to make little difference to the preferred fonn of project management organisation. 
Howevcr. the difficulties at MI and MH can be clearly placed within the existing inncr comc\t of 
highly scgmentalist organisation with little tradition of communication and co-operation hctween 
thc "barons". Similarly, tile inner context at MK of a major organisational deyclopmcnt programme 
clcarly cncour;lged a paI1icipati\'c approach to CAD/CA~1 implementation- On the CyiJel1l-C of 
thcse cascs, it does appear that participative appro,k-hl's only emerg~ where the lflr;)micllion if/dd 
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is high, and in addition, size and speed are also significant. 
11.3 VENDOR RELATIONS 
Generally, relationships with vendors were reported to be good, but did not usually figure highly 
as part of informants concerns. Where they did, it was around relations with Computervision. At 
ML, the strategic concern to achieve a CAD/CAM link for the body engineering and press tooling 
production infonnation flow meant that after 1984, a joint project team was established involvin,g 
representatives from the vendors, Tool Engineering, Manufacturing Engineering and the corporate 
IT department to tackle the NC programming capability - in particular the taking of surface 
definitions from the product data base and using them to program 5-axis millers. After some five 
years, the system is technically successful with around 10% of press tooling being prepared in this 
way. The balance is cut by 3-axis millers or copy-milled from NC cut models - both these routes 
require hand finishing. MK similarly engaged in collaborative development work with 
Computervision for the development of the part programming capability. MI are jointly developing 
3-D models of a key component with a similar aim in mind - earlier in-house attempts had 
foundered on the mathematics of the complex shapes involved. 
The experience at MH has been less happy. The problems with the CADDS 3 software for 
pipework which "never worked" have already been discussed, and CADDS4X is still inadequate 
for MH's type of work. In an attempt to improve relations, a three tier hierarchy of meetings has 
been agreed with Prime. The "operations" level consists of bi-monthly meetings bct\l.'Cell Prime 
engineers and users. the "tactical" le\'el consists of a meeting between representatives at the group 
level (including MI) and Prime engineers. while the "strategic" le\'el is a twice annual meeting 
between directors and senior management on both sides. Even so. in the si \ months prior to 
fieldwork. relations had deteriorated O\'cr the latest sortv.-are ur~rade which was SUrr()"ed. fir1JIl). 
to sol\'C the pipl'\\ork problem. 
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11.4 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
The human resource management issues were reviewed in section 6.3. However, they did not 
feature strongly in the concerns of most informants. None of the cases which are vehicle or vehicle 
component manufacturing companies reponed industrial relations problems associated with the 
installation of their CAD/CAM systems. However, four of the other cases did. MH's engineering 
function is located on the same site as the branch factory of MI, and two other companies in the 
same corporation making products for the electrical distribution and transport industries. These 
other two companies installed Calma systems in the late seventies and the drawing office union -
TASS - took the opportunity to negotiate the formalisation of the salary structure which had 
previously been based on individual payments. Although the Ml drawing OffiLT was ronnall~ pan 
of a completely separate company, the effects of coercive comparison across the site meant that 
when the CADDS system was installed, management were obliged to accept the same salal) 
structure. 
A similar process occurred at MG. Another yard in the corporation had earlier installed CADA\1, 
and agreed a "going rate" for the acceptance of CAD of 5%, plus another 2clc for competence on 
the system. In addition, a 20% premium was paid for moving to double day shift working. The 
management at MG were obliged to accept this agreement, but the real problem arose when the 
union proposed 1100 staff for training when there were only 24 terminals. The issue was resolved 
by doubling the number of terminals installed and negotiating the reduction of the number tl) be 
trained to 300 in the first year and 200 in the second. The tracers, who were ellecti\el~ made 
redundant by the system. were trained up as drawing staff. These prohlems delayed the 
achievement of full technical success until 1986, nearly two years after the initial installation. 
\ . '1 dId at ~ll' Althou(Th the S\'\lem was delivered in 198(), what one infonl1ant .' sImI ar c ay occurre i\ 1"\... ~ .•. 
described as a "stand oft" with the unions LOok place for about a year. Jnd tl'chnical SUClT,,' \I. ~l" 
not achinTd until a nc-w technolog) agrl'cment had bcl'n negotiated with thc unions. The 
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settlement included a no redundancy clause; a review of health and safety issues; training for all 
staff; and a £400 lump sum to be paid on completion of training. Shift working was not an issue. 
At ME, however, it was the main issue. During a major downsizing of the company in the mid 
eighties. some years after the system had first been installed, an anempt was made to move to a 
double day shift attracting a 25% premium. Although many of the staff were prepared to accept 
these new conditions, the matter was, in the opinion of one informant, badly handled. Management 
tried to force staff to work the new system, and threatened recalcitrants with dismissal. The 
ensuing rift with TASS led to a month long strike. Management were obliged to concede the issue. 
and afterwards, "heads rolled", including that of the Engineering Director. 
Stark (1988 chap 1 0) has suggested that training for CAD/CAM implementation should take five 
fOnTIS - awareness training; basic user training; advanced user training; user section manager 
training; and CAD/CAM manager training. No company reported a formal programme of 
awareness training. although the task forces which carried out the initial evaluations can be 
considered as the main way in which the organisation makes itself aware of the potential of the 
technology. However, such expertise remained impacted with the task force and others involved 
in evaluation decision making, and rarely diffused out to the rest of the organisation. 
Basic user training almost always took the form of a week-long course to cover the principles of 
2D draughting. Initially. such courses were held by the vendor. but in most cases, the CAD/CAM 
management function slowly took responsibility for this. More advanced courses may take up to 
a month, and usually cover 3D modelling. Most informanL, emphasised the vital role of practice 
on live projects for developing competence with the system - formal training can only give a 
technical overview of how the system works. Such practice was supported in various ways by 
internal user groups as we)) as more infonnal advice from the system managers and more 
experienced users as required. 
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MB made extensive use of open learning techniques prior to the installation of the system. in 
addition to conventional basic user training. EITB videos were adapted to the company's 
requirements. and given to the engineers to take home, together with a workbook. DTI videos were 
also used. One informant considered that this gave a 12 month lead time advantage in 
implementation. and stated that "the secret of CAD introduction is training. Open learning is magic 
because you can do it all before you invest in equipment. Open learning is wonderfully cost 
effective". This enthusiasm may not be unconnected with the fact that the Manufacturing Director 
is also the Chair of a company that distributes open learning materials. 
The issues of industrial relations and training have not loomed large as part of the CAD/CAM 
implementation process. None of the implementation task forces included personnel specialists. 
Where there have been industrial relations problems they have, like those in the car industry 
(Turner et alia 1967 chap 3), been associated with pay, conditions and job security, rather than the 
implemention of new technology itself. Training programmes appeared to be minimalist and 
reactive. and. like White and Ghobadian (1984). little evidence was found of payment systems 
being changed in response to the implementation of new technologies. 
11.5 SUMMARY 
The installation and consolidation process was managed in much the same way as the evaluation 
process. although the task force was sometimes strengthened. Most of the problems in achieving 
technical success derived from the failure to evaluate CAD and CAM jointly. and the lack of an 
implementation champion who could push the project through. Technocratic approaches to the 
management of the implementation project were overwhelmingly favoured, which limited the rate 
of organisational learning associated with implementation. As a result, progress in all companies 
was slow, a problem that was compounded by resource scarcities. 
Few companies paid significant attention to human resource management questions - only MK 
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with its participative approach could be said to have systematicall:- thought through such i~~ucs, 
However, this lack of attention to human resource management issues in implementation may be 
a mistake. As Adler concluded from a review of the implementation of new technolo~ies. "in the 
--
overwhelming majority of cases, it was the human resource issues that were the stumbling block 
in implementing new technologies" (1988 p 48). 
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12 
ACHIEVING BUSINESS SUCCESS 
12.0 INTRODUCTION 
The implementation model developed in chapter 5 stressed the distinction between technical 
success and business success as outcomes from the CAD/CAM implementation project. While a 
number of companies could be clearly identified as having achieved technical success, thc situation 
with business success is a lot less clear. The next two chapters will explore the question of the 
extent to which organisational changes complement the technical changes have been made, and 
attempt to explore the extent to which business success has been achieved. This chapter will 
discuss the final stage of the implementation process in some detail, and discuss one of the 
organisational changes most immediately associated with implementation - the system management 
section. It will then review the lessons for effective management of implementation projects that 
can be drawn from the experiences of these 15 cases. Chapter 13 will explore the more general 
issue of differentiation and integration in metalworking production first raised in chapter 4. 
12.1 THE CONSOLIDATION PROCESS 
The outcome of the instal1ation phase is defined as technical success, and the varied extent to 
which the case study companies achieved technical success was discussed in the last section. The 
outcome from the consolidation phase is defined as business success. Providing a reliable measure 
of this criterion proved impossible, as most companies did not measure the perfonnance of the 
system on any sort of regular basis. Two companies - MJ and ML - did conduct audits aided by 
the vendors, but the results from these were privy to the Board alone. This section will discuss the 
ways in which the rest of the companies havc attempted to measure the pcrfonnance of the system. 
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and the extent to which identifiable business benefits have been achieved. 
Typically, the CAD/CAM system was run as a cost centre under a manager whose main objectivc 
was to stay within budget while meeting the requirements of users. The most frequently used 
measure of system performance, found in nine cases, is system uptime. In another case this 
measure had been dropped because of the reliability of the later generation of systems. Fivc of the 
companies claimed to measure labour productivity. but only one. MN was able to present a 
comprehensive set of productivity savings over manual systems. A 3: 1 gain in mechanical 
drawing; 4: 1 in electrical drawing; and 12: 1 in pan programming for prismatic pans were reponed. 
One-off contract drawings are still prepared by hand as it is slower to use the system. 
These figures confirm the impressionistic evidence from the other cases that the main productivity 
gains came in producing system designs such as electrical drawings which are inherently two 
dimensional problems where the relationship, rather than the distance, between points is the critical 
factor, and in part programming where the ability to access the product data base in integrated 
CAD/CAM systems, and the much greater ease of proving programs brings benefits. In the case 
of mechanical drawing, which is the main activity of all the case companies. it is not at all clear 
that the costs of purchasing and running the system do not outweigh the savings from productivity 
gains. unless repetitive work is required. Certainly. an appraisal at MH carned out in 1983 came 
to this conclusion. Where 3D modelling is used. drawing office productivity can even fall 
compared to manual drawing, and what productivity benefits there may be accrue in using the 
model for finite clement analysis or part programming. 
Nine of the companies claimed to measure design to manufacture lead time, but the difficulties 
of clear assessment were ackno\sledged. Most were vague as to how they were doing this. and 
aside from taking indi\'idual projects and imputin~ a manual time to them, seemed to be getting 
little hard data. Again, Ml\: were the only ones to l'onri(kntly offer a figure of a hal\'in~ or 
drawing produl'tion time, \ 1 \ 1 still USl'S a productivit) mC~lsure, while rcalising that this is not thc 
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key issue, but has not yet found an alternative. The criterion emphasised at present is "success in 
executing my work". It is perhaps notable that the only two companies that claimed to use more 
than five measures out of a list of 10 in the research instrument (see Q.F4) were !\1A and ~1B _ 
the recent implementors. The suspicion is that they had not yet acquired the confidence in the 
system to drop the rhetoric of a hard-nosed appraisal of their investment. 
Another problem with making an hard measure in terms of cost savings is that the parameters are 
continually shifting. MK found that the productivity of part programmers using the system steadily 
dropped, measured by the number of programs produced by each engineer. This was because the 
new generation of CNC machining centres on the shop noor were much more powerful tools than 
earlier generations, and so each program was more complex. Similarly, the availability of more 
sophisticated engineering analysis soft ware to the design team means that more analytic work is 
done which takes longer, but can improve product quality and performance. 
A number of companies reported unforeseen benefits from their CAD/CAM implementation. Most 
were fairly marginal, such as the ability to do plant layouts for the manufacturing system 
engineers. However, the one remaining independent company - MB - reported the importance 01 
the system in creating the perception of a dynamic engineering company amongst City analysts. 
The system is deliberately "shown off' to visiting analysts who apparently believe that unless a 
metalworking fim) has a CAD/CAM system, something is wrong. In a similar spirit, the President 
of Unimation stated that "} don't think a guy will be able to go to his country club if he doesn't 
have a CAD/CAM system .... He's got to be able to talk about his CAD/CAI\l system as he tees 
off on the third tee - or he will be embarrassed" (cited Noble 1986 p 330). 
The overall picture emerging is thatlillle atlempthas been made to measure quantitatively whether 
the implementation of CAD/e.; ~ 1 systems has yielded business benefits - the most frequentJ) used 
measure. system uptime. is more a me;lSure of technic;t1 th~H1 business su,,'cess. The other main 
measures - productivity and design to manufacture lead tiTlle were anI) halr-heartedl) used This 
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was not because they were considered unimponant, but simply because of the uncenaintic:, and 
ambiguities of measurement. There has, however, been a shi ft over the last ten vears amon~~t 
. ~ 
these companies, and productivity is now seen as a less imponant criterion of business SUc(C~~ 
than measures such as customer response times and product integrity. CAD/CAM systems. on their 
own cannot deliver such benefits - they can only facilitate broader organisational changes aimed 
at such goals. Indeed, it is probably these changes in the approach to assessing the performance 
of CAD/CAM systems that has led to the shift in evaluation criteria noted in section 10.2. 
The appraisal of the perfonnance of CAD/CAM systems tends to be bound up in the performance 
of the depanments that use it - the system forms pan of the budget of those depanments. Usually. 
these are cost centres, but as noted earlier, in three companies. engineering and manufacturing are 
established as separate profit centres, and engineering purchases manufacturing services in an 
internal market transaction. However, these management accounting arrangemenLIi can be a major 
handicap to the achievement of business success, panicularly as the power dyad between 
engineering and manufacturing identified in section 10.3 comes into play. 
The problem lies in the fact that for manufacturing to gain the full benefits of CAM, engineering 
need, in many cases, to do more work than they might otherwise do, and therefore to incur 
additional cost. This is most notable in the case of the 3D models that manufacturing require for 
programming the machining of complex prismatic pans. At MK, a 4: 1 productivity gain over using 
APT was achieved in part programming once engineering moved to full 3D modelling; however, 
this benefit to manufacturing represented a cost to engineering. At other companies, engineering 
have been less willing to accommodate manufacturing. 
At MI. despite work by a CAD/CA~l Steering Group over a number of years from 1983 to reduce 
feature variet\ and to standardise items such as comer radii ;md tooling. one infonnant argued that 
"engineering design for efficiency without much consistenq "::::. At \1G. the drawing olTicc WJS 
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again accused of inconsistency, and not fully modelling items such as comer radii. tending, rather. 
to draw the comer square and annotate it. This raised the question of who owns the drawinc~ 
I:: 
geometry - if the drawing office draw the radii their costs go up; if the pan programmers draw 
them, they are interfering with the drawing. An experimental CAD/CAM link at MH in 1989 to 
the new multi-spindle drill was considered unlikely to go ahead on a routine basis because it 
involved the drawing office in additional work preparing the plate drawings so that the pan 
programmers could use them directly. It is perhaps notable that all these companies score low on 
the technical integration scale, and, as will be seen in the next chapter, also have poor 
organisational integration. 
Manufacturing, too, share a responsibility in acting unilaterally to mInImISe costs at the 
departmental level while increasing them at the business level. At MG manufacturing were accused 
of scheduling componcnts that had been designed on CAD onto conventional machine tools. At 
MM, a major rcduction in the level of investment in CNC machine tools for production meant that 
many of the expected downstream benefits were lost, and the policy of preparing all drawings on 
the CAD system was considered rather pointless by engineering. This issue came to a head at MK 
in 1985 when the drawings for a particular contract were partly prepared on the CAD system and 
partly manually. Manufacturing then suhcontracted out the manufacture of most of the pans that 
had been modelled in 3D. whilc the manually drawn parts were manufactured in-house. However, 
the responsc of thc Chief Enginccr was positivc - thc only way out of the dilemma was for all 
drawings to be prepared on the system. and he authoriscd a major expansion. 
While the issues regarding thc apportionment of costs between engineering and manufacturing can 
be resolved hy changing the cliteria for cost centre performance and valuing co-opcrati\c 
behaviour which saves money at the business levcl. the problem of manufacturing planning is 
more intractahle. A product de\l:'lopment project is like a wavc rolling through the compan: \I,hich 
washes through engineering long hefore it breaks on the shores of manufacturing. In man! of the 
companies with long product de\'clopmcnt lead times or product life cycles much of the design 
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work for existing production was carried out before the CAD/CAM systems were fully 
implemented. Thus at MG and MJ, the present product development programme is the first which 
can fully exploit the CAD/CAM link with an "all CAD" boat or car, and in both cases. the product 
is some years from being in production. At ME, the present production aircraft were designed 
before CAD was fully implemented, and the latest aircraft has not yet been productionised. Even 
in the companies with shorter product lead times, MK quoted 18 months as the typical period 
between the design and manufacture of a component, while at MH this is two years. Under such 
circumstances it is difficult for manufacturing to predict how they are going to make a particular 
component. The key issue is whether the reaction is that of MK - to prepare all drawings on CAD 
- or to see it as yet another reason why full technical integration is not worth pursuing. 
12.2 MANAGING THE CAD/CAM SYSTEM 
One of the earliest decisions that is usually made in the consolidation phase is the way in which 
the new system is to be managed. Earl (19H9 chap 7) provides an extensive discussion of the 
management of IT systems in general, and the role of IT Directors. He identi fies two main issues 
that need to be resolved - the level of centralisation of the system. and the balance of influence 
between system users and IT special ists in system development. The evidence from this case 
survey suggests a third issue - the relationship between the management of production IT systems 
such as CAD/CAM to the management of MIS elsewhere in the business. All the case companies 
except MD, which has one of the smallest systems amongst the cases, set up a system management 
section soon after installation. However, there is a considerable variation between the cases in how 
this section is oHumised. This ran~e of or~anisation is summarised in table 12.1, together with the 
~ ~ ~ 
presence at the business level of an IT Director independent of the Finance Director. 
At three of the cases - f\ 1]. MF and M H - the CA D and CA \ 1 systems are managed separately by 
dedicated CAD Mamz,t:cTS and CAM ~1allal;crs who repon within the cngineerin~ or manu! a-:turing: 
departments as ~lppropriall>. The explanation for this is simple - these are the three case" where 
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engineering and manufacturing are located on completely separate sites. Other than this. the three 
have little in common. Until the re-organisation during fieldwork. MH came under the auspices 
of MI's systems directorate which is discussed below. yet has no data link between its two 
systems. MF's systems communicate through a HASP link which was installed in 1987. anJ no 
technical problems were reported during operation. However. it was clear from the infonnants that 
while MF is actively developing a co-ordinated CAD policy at the corporate level between its 
three main design offices, this activity does not include the branch manufacturing site studied for 
this case. 
MJ has a much greater level of co-ordination. Li fe is somewhat easier in this case because both 
the Engineering Centre and the main manu facturing plants are in the same city. as opposed to 
different countries of the Union in the case of the other two. Product Engineering Technical 
Services and Manufacturing Technical Services provide CAD and CAM support respectively. and 
closely liaise with each other. There is a weekly meeting chaired by the Technical System 
Development Manager who reports within the finance department. It is this section which manages 
the hardware and the product data base, and the system is one of the more integrated amongst the 
cases. Thus. of itself. separate CAD and CAM management does not hamper development of close 
integration of the system. so long as effective organisational integration structures are in place, 
However, geographical remoteness does appear to hamper co-ordination - while distance can easily 
be overcome technically. organisational co-ordination is more difficult due to the time and co~ts 
incurred in travel. 
~ \(3 The second. and most common, way of managing the system is to establish a CAD CA' 
Mallager who manages both parts of the system. Usually reportin~ to the engineering dircct()r, the 
CAD/CAM Mana~er also supplies a technical service to manufacturing, ~ lP, \1 B, \ lC. and \1 \ 1 
all have this arrangement. \Vithin its limited brier. this son 01 arrangement often \I,orb \I,ell. 
th d r f CAl III " ,n" 3 the lerm C ,0,[·,>'1 ~3) In m,,-t cases. lhl< pcrsOl' I' dc~cnbcd 11< II C·, I' \1.sna!!cr 1I,'"c\cr. In line With e c IIlIUOn 0 ',,,-, .,. - • 
manaj:cr " rrdcfTcd here 
~ 
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However, such managers are usually distinct from the managers for both the CAE system used for 
engineering analysis, and the CAPM systems used for manufacturing planning and control. For 
instance, at MC, the manager of the Medusa system reports to the Engineering Director. but the 
software systems for engineering analysis are mounted a GEC minicomputer under the auspices 
of the Product Development Director. while the manufacturing systems and the alpha-numeric pan 
programming and process planning are on Data General and GEC minicomputers respectivel> 
under the auspices of the Computer Department. which reports to the Finance Director. Thus the 
four different computer systems used at each stage of the production information flow are managed 
by three separate sections, and boundary problems do surface. In particular. the implementation 
of GNC for part programming linked to the Medusa system. and sharing the same Sun 
workstations is leading to conflict between Engineering and the Computer Depanmcnt over who 
is to be responsible. 
The third type of arrangement found was that of what might be called the elM Manager. where 
responsibility for the majority of the systems that are used along the production information flow 
are under a single manager. MK and MN both fall into this category. At the former. separate 
support functions for CAD and CAM reported to the Chief Engineer and Chief Production 
Engineer respectively until 1988. In the autumn of that year, the present CAE Managcr was 
appointed with an overall system brief; while he reports to the Chief Engineer, he has a strong 
"dotted line" relationship to the Operations Manager. A team of 12 now reporL~ to him covcring 
manufacturing systems such as DNC. as well as CAD/CAM and CAE. This is illustrated in figure 
12.1. The existing COPICS (IBM CAPM) system is managed by the finance depanment, but the 
CAE Manager is responsible for the interface between it and the CAD/CAM system. This is being 
developed through two IBM packages - Product Engineering Support. which is 3 relational 
database for engineering product information. and Distributed Communication System which 
carries the manufacturing data. 
At MN. the CAE Engincering Devclopment Manager has had a number of dilkrcnt Jobs S\l)(l' he 
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TABLE 12.1 
THE ORGANISATION OF SYSTE~1 \1A\'GAG\IE~T 
COMPANY SYSTEM IT 
CODE MANAGER DIRECTOR 
MA CAD 
MB CAD/CAM 
MC CAD/CAM 
MD 
ME DP 
MF CAD 
MG SYSTDIR * 
MH CAD 
MI SYSTDIR 
MJ CAD 
MK CIM 
ML SYSTDIR * 
MM CAD/CAM 
MN CIM 
MO CAD 
-------------
was appointed CAE Manager in 1977. when the system was first installed, including S) ~tem 
Manager responsible for both business and production systems. He presently reports to the 
Technical Director and has a team of 6 focused on networking and installing workstations. as well 
as all computer hardware. There is now a data processing manager responsible for business 
applications reporting to the 1\ lanaging Di rector. who chai rs a monthl) Business and \ 1Jnu Llctur-
ing Control System De\,elopment Group L'O\cring all IT 111 the company. 
The managelllent of the c.-\ D/CA \ 1 system s in tllL'S(, companies. then. h;ls tcrhled to follow the 
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evolution described by Stark (1988, chap 3), but they all adopt what Earl identifies as the 
"decentralised" approach to IT management. Initially, the manager has a relatively junior status _ 
he may have been an early user, or have project managed the installation of the system. As the 
system, and hence the budget allocated to its running, grows then the status of the manager 
responsible grows too. The earlier manager either grows with the job, or is replaced, but he still 
does not act as a champion of the system. As the awareness of interfaces with other production 
systems grows, then systems expertise on the part of the manager becomes increasingly important, 
but without a loss of understanding of the production process - the type of "hybrid manager" 
identified by Campbell and Warner (1987) starts to emerge. This manager begins to develop a 
strategic role covering both the further development of production systems, and the interface with 
the company's business systems. As Simmonds and Senker (1988) have suggested, the new breed 
of CAD/CAM management requires the skills of engineering, computing and strategic 
management. 
ME has adopted a completely different strategy from the other case companies by retaining 
responsibility for the management and development of the system within the Data Processing 
section, which reports to the Management Services Manager - an example of what Earl identifies 
as the "centralised" approach. This manager's responsibilities cover the entire range of computing. 
both within the case company and the other companies in the corporation. He has long represented 
a very powerful voice. championing the merits of IBM systems - sometimes against the wishes 
of the users in engineering and manufacturing. Seven specialist computing groups repon to him -
CAD, CAM, ELECTRICAD. and Engineering Computation (CAE) amongst them. An overa)) 
CAD/CAM Manager took early retirement in 1986, and has not been replaced. This centralisation 
has not encouraged the development of integrated systems for two reasons. Firstly, there is no 
champion for production systems as a whole. and secondly. there is a lack of commitment to CAD 
by engineering because they do not have responsibility for it - the Design Office Manager who 
is in charge of the system within engineering merely provides a space for the terminals. 
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Three of the cases have what might be called a Systems Directorate which takes responsibility for 
the overall development of production systems - akin to Earl's "federal" arrangement. At \11 
management of the CAD system, and the CAM systems at the main site and branch site are 
located within their respective departments. However. co-ordination is provided by a Computer 
Systems Development section which reports to the Production Director. This section also covered 
MH until the re-organisation. However, although it includes two applications programmers. the 
role of the section is limited to liaison and advice. While it must sign off all justifications for new 
systems, its role is one of support to initiatives elsewhere, and to interdepartmental committees 
concerned with issues such as a common data directory. A Company Development Working Party 
meets quarterly to develop system policy, but cannot impose iL" policies on the operating 
departments - the source of system initiatives is clearly located with the departmental managers. 
A result of this is that some managers flout the policy - for instance the V AX only policy was 
broken by the Project Management Department, and another part of the company bought CADAM 
instead of CADDS. 
The Business Process Development Group at MG developed, eventually. out of the initial 
CAD/CAM project team. The team went on to examine the potential for other IT systems. and was 
soon merged with the Computer Systems Department, who managed the new system, under the 
CAD/CAM project team manager. This arrangement lasted for two years. but it became apparent 
that IT systems were not being di Ilused through the organisation. In the opinion of one infonnant, 
this was for two reasons. Firstly. the level of awareness of the potential of systems was low, and. 
secondly. there was a general suspicion of the role of the Computer Systems Department. 
It was, therefore. decided to devolve responsibility ror IT systems to the users, and CAD wa-; the 
first candidate for this treatment. CA D and CAr--.1 ror lofting was. therefore. pLtled under the 
responsibility of Engineering Programmes, \\hile ~1anuracluring Operations retained their own 
CAM management and the datl processing department was placed under the wing of the 
Infomlation Technolol!\' Di redor. The ori ~inal manal!cr became the B PDG ~ 1anagcr rqx)rting 
'-... ..... .... 
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directly to the Managing Director. He runs it as a project team evaluating new systems, co-
ordinating initiatives, and raising the level of perception of IT within the company. The Group 
operates by setting up interdepanmental project teams to look at particular issues of systems 
integration. Membership is usually by secondment on a full-time basis, and each team has a project 
manager who reports to a project sponsor. The sponsor is usually a director particularly interested 
in the area in which the project team is working. At the completion of the project. it is the 
responsibility of line management to implement the proposals. 
An example of their work is the CIMS Group which investigated resource planning throughout 
the company. For instance, it made a full analysis of the data flow in the stores and mapped its 
requirements. It recommended the implementation of an MRP system which would interface with 
the CY system. The project started in late 1987, and the proposal went to the Board in February 
1989. However, it was deemed too late to implement it for the present product lines, and the new 
product has not yet received build authorisation from the Ministry. 
ML have developed a sophisticated relationship between system managers reponing to user 
depanment heads, and the overall co-ordination of systems within the company by the IT Director, 
who reports to the Strategic Planning Director. During the seventies and early eighties, a 
centralised corporate IT department evolved into an independent profit centre, and was launched 
as a separate company in 1987 through a management buy-out. At the same time, IT sections 
evolved within the operating departments on an informal basis. The reponing relationships were 
confused, and there was little co-ordination between departmental IT sections. The inability of such 
an arrangement to grasp the strategic implications of IT led to the implementation in 1989 or the 
organisation illustrated in figure 12.2. Nov.', a small IT strategy group under a Director of IT 
reports to the Strategic Planning Director, and is responsible for a framework for IT systems 
complementary to business objectives which is then implemented hy the depanmentally bascd IT 
sl'L'lions. 
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At the present state of the art, the elM Manager approach does appear to work well in the smaller 
company, perhaps supported by a high level IT committee. If that person has systems as well as 
production expertise, he or she can champion funher developments, and act as an overall co-
ordinator, panicularly of interfaces with the company's business systems. However in the larger 
companies, this is inadequate. ML is the largest single company amongst the cases. and after \1L. 
MG and ME have the largest single sites. MH and MI in combination with another site was also 
of a similar size before the re-organisation. Here, a Systems Directorate approach is more useful. 
Centralising system management, as ME and MG have found out. leads to implementation 
problems in the user functions. On the other hand. the Systems Directorate needs enough authority 
to keep wayward users in line. or the result is the proliferation of systems and lack of technical 
integration found at MH and MI. If the directorate there reponed to the Managing Director. rather 
than the Production Director, its authority would probably be greater, for its present remit runs 
only infonnally over engineering. It is perhaps notable that, as table 12.1 shows. the more 
successful Systems Directorates operate in the context of an IT Director championing IT across 
the business. 
However, in all these cases, the broader issue of strategic co-ordination of the production systems 
and business systems remains unaddressed, with the possible exceptions of MN and MK. In some 
cases. most notably at MB. there is a strong sense of CAD/CAM being an engineering system. and 
a keeping of data processing, usually under the authority of the Finance Director. at anns length. 
From the production point of view, the issues stan to come to a head as the CAD/CAM systems 
begin to interface with CAPM systems to fOlm CIM systems. Although used by manufacturing. 
CAPM systems as heavy data processing applications have usually been managed by computer 
sections. which. in tum. usually report within the finance department. Only MK is at this point 
now. but the technology is now becoming available, and organisational constraints as to who is 
responsible for what parts of the system are likely to emerge. Unless mechanisms for ovcrall co-
ordination are ill place. progress towards full ClM systems is likely to be slow. and the integration 
of CIM with business systcms to form Computer Intl'grated Busine...;scs a dream. 
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12.3 EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION MANAGEMENT 
The lessons for the effective management of CAD/CAM implementation that can be drawn from 
the experience of these 15 cases can be most easily identified by comparing the experiences of 
those five companies which were identified in section 10.1 as having achieved technical success 
with the two that are furthest from that goal - MH and MI. In the latter case. there is no technical 
integration despite the fact that the CAD and CAM systems are fully compatible. while MH shows 
little prospect of moving' towards any sort of electronic data transfer on a routine basis. 
Inspection of table 10.2 shows that where MH and MI stand out most at the evaluation stage is 
the absence of an implementation champion. MI did most of the right things early on. but failed 
to follow through and ensure that someone was responsible for managing the overall implementa-
tion process. Moving on to installation and commissioning. table 11.1 shows that the absence of 
any form of specialist project organisation for implementation is again notable at both the poorly 
performing companies. Inevitably. both companics had Model 0 implementation project 
organisations. while all the top performing companies had at least technocratic project 
organisations. 
Howevcr, there are other companies which are not yet technically successful which had well 
organised implementation project organisations - notably MC and ME. What distinguishes the 
technically successful companies is the organisational context within which implementation has 
occurred. As thc ncxt chaptcr will dcmonstratc thc fivc tcchnically succcssful com panics all have 
relatively high lcvels of organisational intcgration. and all havc. as tablc 8.2 shows. ircrarir(' 
coupling commitmcnts. Most of thc othcr companics have relatively low levels of organisational 
integration. and no particular coupling commitment. i\1I stood out in the discussions in scction 
10.3 as an c ,ample or con n ict bct \\ecn cngincering and manufacturing. while \ 1 H Llccs lh~ 
additional problem of the most serious gcographical separat ion of cngineering and manu I.lduring 
233 
amongst all the cases. Both are resolutely sequential in their coupling commitments. A project 
team is an overlay on an existing organisation - no matter how well managed in itself. it cannot 
solve problems which are generated by the underlying organisational structure and processes. 
12.4 SUMMARY 
The last three chapters have analysed the management of implementation in the 15 case survey 
companies. It is clear that a well managed implementation project organisation is broadly based 
to include the three most interested departments, which are engineering, manufacturing and 
information technology; is driven by an implementation champion who is backed by top 
management; and facilitates single loop learning through technocratic projcct organisation. 
However, it is also apparent that these are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for achicving 
even technical success, never mind business success. Those companies which also paid significant 
attention to developing what Kanter (1985) calls "integrative" rather than "segmentalist" 
organisational structures and processes were the ones that achieved technical success and arc 
starting to reap significant, if often unmeasurable business success. It is to the development of 
integrative organisation that the next chapter is addressed. 
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13 
CO-ORDINATING THE ENGINEERING/MANUFACTURE\G I~TERFACE 
13.0 INTRODUCTION 
The last five chapters have presented the main findings from the case studies, and indicated the 
ways in which they can be analysed using the conceptual framework for the implementation of 
Advanced Manufacturing Technologies outlined in chapters 3,4 and 5. This chapter will focus on 
a particularly important aspect of organisation design in metalworking production - the interface 
between engineering and manufacturing. The integrating nature of CAD/CAM technology means 
that it is implemented across this interface, and some of the immediate issues it poses were 
discussed in section 4.3. However, the effectiveness of co-ordination across the engineer-
ing/manufacturing interface is also an issue for many other sources of competitive advantage - as 
Porter (1985 chap 2) points out, it is the linkages within the "value chain" which are critical. The 
improvement of product development perfonnance through the implementation of total quality 
management, simultaneous engineering, and value engineering all require more effective co-
ordination of this interface. The requisite level of integration in metalworking production is 
increasing, and CAD/CAM plays a crucial role as an "enabling technology" for greater integration 
across this interface. 
The chapter will develop this theme of the co-ordination of the engineering/m~mufacluring 
interface at two levels. Firstly, it will look at the organisational processes by which the production 
information nO\\' is co-ordinated between the draughting and planning stages identified in figure 
3.1. Secondly, it will look at the organisational linkage structures hy \I, hich these proCCS"l'S arc 
facilitated. The factors by which transactions \\ithin the production infomlation flow bct\\Cl'n the 
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FIGURE 13.1 
ENGINEERING/MANUFACfURING COORDINATION PROCEDURES 
COMMUNICATION 
PATTERN 
PHASE 
PRE-
PROJECf 
SEQUENTIAL Designers' taci t 
knowledge of 
manufacturing 
RECIPROCAL Design rules 
ITERATIVE Functional 
strategy 
coordination 
Source: adapted from Adler (1988) 
PROJECf 
Early manufacturing 
stan with early 
design data 
Design reviews 
Joint design 
teams 
POST-
PROJECf 
Manufacturing 
flexibility 
Engineering 
change order 
Post -project 
appraisals 
draughting and planning stages vary were identified in the Production Model shown in figure 3.3 
as direction, intensity, and coupling. Thompson's model of interdependence - or coupling -
between departments was presented in section 4.4, followed by Adler's development of it into a 
full typology of organisational process. That section went onto discuss the typology of 
organisational linkage structures offered by Galbraith. The first twO sections of the chapter will 
present developments of these two typologies, and then repOI1 the extent to the structures and 
processes identified were found in use amongst the 15 cases. The chapter will finish with a 
discussion of the relationship between technical and organisational integration in tenns of the 
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structuration of the engineering/manufacturing interface and conclude with a discussion of the 
conditions for business success. 
13.1 THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION 
A revised version of the Adler typology is shown in figure 13.1; it simply replaces the tenn inolog) 
used by Adler to describe transaction governance by that developed in section 4.4. "Pooled 
interdependence" is not relevant to relationship between engineering and manufacturing - at the 
very least, the relationship must be a sequential one for a product to be designed and manufactured 
at all. The procedures are to be read as complementary, rather than as alternatives in the context 
of a given organisation, particularly horizontally on the temporal dimension. lnfonnants were 
asked to identify the three most frequently used in their company (Q DS) - the replies from the 
most senior informant are presented in table 13.1. 
Examples of all these procedures were found within the case study companies with the exception 
of early manufacturing start with early design data (EMS), although MJ had been experimenting 
with such an approach on a very limited number of components for the latest product initiative 
which involved letting pre-production components go through on relaxed tolerances. Only one 
company, ML. used post project appraisals (PPA), and then only for a product initiative by a 
division which has only recently been fully integrated into the main part of the company. The 
absence of post project appraisals was confirmed at the feed-back session LO project participants 
who, when asked the question directly, replied that their companies did not evaluate project 
performance after completion, and the informant at ML explicitly noted their absence in the main 
part of the company. The reluctance to use them could well be related to the political reper-
cussions of allowing what might be considered a failure to be recognised by senior managenlent. 
The traditional co-ordination procedure within the engineering indu-;try i-; dcsign( rs' 1(1el1 
km)H1ed~e of producrion (TK). It usually operates in concert with some IOIll) 01 In,lflli(c.l(('lfing 
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flexibility (MF), even where this is not explicitly recognised as a co-ordination procedure. It is 
notable that two of the three companies which did explicitly recognise manufacturing flexibility -
MH and MI - are the two cases which are probably the least integrated organisations amongst all 
the cases. Generally, those companies which relied upon this pairing of sequential procedures were 
TABLE 13.1 
CO-ORDINATION PROCESSES 
COMPANY TK EMS MF DRl DRv EC PPA JOT FSC 
MA * 
MB * * * 
MC * * * 
MD * * 
ME * * * 
MF * * * 
MG * * * 
MH * * * 
MI * * * 
MJ * * * 
MK * * * 
* * * ML 
* * 
* MM 
* * * MN 
* * 
* MO 
--------------
the engineering led ones, and they tended to complement these basic procedures with design 
. . k f . 'n T in these companies is, in the words 
reviews or engtneertng change orders. The tas . 0 engmeen g 
of one infonnant from MI, "to define the finished product". The exception here is MB which has 
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institutionalised tacit knowledge in that all its design engineers have served trade apprenticeship~ 
in their factory. The procedure started to break down as new machining technologies began to be 
introduced during the eighties - particularl) CNC machining centres - and training sessions were 
introduced for the engineers in new manufacturing techniques. 
Although there was a lot of discussion about design rules (DRl), for the most pan. their 
development has not gone past very detailed work on items such as comer radii. The two 
component manufacturing companies which identified it as imponant were referring to variant 
design procedures rather than new product development. The main exception to this is the 
implementation of a new tool management system at ME and MK. The tool library of "preferred 
tools", which is a heavily rationalised version of the previous range of tools, can be accessed by 
the CAD system, and design engineers are expected to design components that can be made with 
the tools in the library. 
The rolc of design reviews (DRv) in the engineering led companies tends to be strongly influenced 
by the outer context or the industry as articulated through the customer's requirements. In 
particular, defence contractors such as MG and ME, are committed to extensive design reviews 
as part of their quality assurance procedures. These may well be attended by the customer's 
representatives, and form pal1 of the mutual interaction with the customer inherent in the concept 
to order production strategy. Such reviews do not always involve manufacturing. 
The manufacturing led companies are placing increasing emphasis upon design rcricH's as an 
engineering/manufacturing co-ordination procedure. MF, for instance, has implemented a hierarchy 
of reviews. Three years ago. according to one infonnant. drawings were "lobbed over the bri,-'~ 
wall". First. a "methods review" was established at which the detailed design is presented to the 
manufacturing engineers. This is held just prior to the point where the design is frozen and will 
thereafter be subject to engineering change order procedures. ~e\l. a "process rniew" was 
implemented at which the manufacturing engineers present to the design engineers how thl'! pLln 
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to make the product. which is held after the design is frozen. Most recently. a "concept review" 
has been implemented at which the conceptual design is presented to senior manufacturing 
management, and issues such as materials, quality, and manufacturing engineering are discussed. 
The implementation of these review procedures has been facilitated by the separation of the 
manufacturing engineering function for new products from that for existing products under the 
manufacturing planning type of organisation which was discussed in section 9.3. 
Virtually all companies use some form of engineering change order CECO) procedure for altering 
the design to allow manufacturing to make it more easily, or to respond to late changes from the 
customer. They vary considerably in fonnality, and arc apparently at their most bureaucratic in the 
aerospace related industries, where the outer context in the shape of the regulatory system 
demands particular procedures. In the aerospace components company, MK, the costs of goin~ 
through the ECO procedure were a major driving force in pushing the company towards in-project 
co-ordination procedures, particularly joint design teams. Two of the three companies - MA and 
MD - which do not have such procedures both rely on the customer for most of the design work, 
while MG appears to rely the traditional manufacturing flexibility of the shipbuilding process 
instead of using ECO procedures. 
loint design teams (JOT) are most popular in the manufacturing and jointly led companies, \11. 
MO, and ML have been increasingly deploying such teams for their new product dC\'e10pmcnt 
programmes. MK have the declared aim of moving to joint design teams, and had just started 
implementation at the time of fieldwork. At MM, the Business Development Organisations arc 
joint teams from the engineering. manufacturing and commercial departments which focus 
exclusively on new product initiatives. Mi\ has been workin~ with joint design tcams for more 
than 10 vears, and has now ~ot to the sta~e that the design and development of its latest rnhluct 
. ~ ~ 
, ' . '" H ,,' recentl \" l't has moved J\\ a\ from was project mana~ed by a manulactunng el1~!I1eel O\\c\lr, .'" . 
the fonnal inclusion of the production engineers in the design learn because. incrcasin~l~. the 
production engineers are becoming highly spl'cialiseJ due to the increas!l1~ Cl1rnplc\it~ of 
240 
production technology, and so a single engineer can no longer cover all production proces~cs. 
Reliance is placed increasingly on informal links in the context of a company culture which has 
valued a manufacturing input to design over a number of years. 
Functional strategy co-ordination (FSC) is in place in three companies - ML. MN and MS. In the 
case of the latter two, this takes the form of manufacturing representation at Director level on the 
Product Planning Committee, or Product Development Group. Both companies are thereafter f3irl) 
relaxed about their co-ordination procedures, and rely heavily on informal co-ordination. rather 
than supporting functional strategy co-ordination with a battery of other procedures. One inference 
from this might be that once there is true engineering/manufacturing strategy co-ordination. then 
the rest follows as part of the company culture. At ML. the agency of functional strateRY co-
ordination is the Vehicle Directorate which was identified as a form of programme management 
in section 9.1. Here, teams representing the manufacturing, engineering and commercial 
departmenL~ decide on the overall conception of the new product, and project manage the 
development route information flow through to "job }" and then on through the product life cycle. 
This Directorate is responsible for making applications to the Board for the release of funds at 
various stages of the programme, and for ensuring that the product initiative meets the 
requirements of the overall business strategy. 
The use of iterative co-ordination processes tends to be more favoured by the manujacrurinl.; led 
companies - amongst the engineering led ones, ME used joint design teams, but only for the 
specialist application of mould tool design. MK is the only engineering led company to eXlensi\ cl) 
deploy such processes, and for the reasons suggested in section 8.7. is approaching a produuwll 
h'd mission. With the exception of MD, all the highly profitable companies identified in scdion 
8.] deploy at least one iterative co-ordination procedure, and. with the exception of ~1S with its 
deliberate development of tacit knowledge, tend to shun sequential co-ordination procedures. 
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13.2 THE STRUCfURE OF INTEGRATION 
Galbraith's typology of organisational integration linkages was discussed in section 4.4. Examplc~ 
of all the linkages that he identifies were found amongst the cases; however, other mechani~m~ 
which are sufficiently distinctive to warrant separate identification were also found. A proposJI 
TABLE 13.2 
THE HIERARCHY OF INTEGRATION 
COMPANY DC SD LR TF PT RC CL PM MO 
MA 
MB * * 
MC * 
MD * 
ME * * * * 
MF * 
MG * * * 
MH * * 
MI * 
MJ * * * * * * 
MK * * * 
* * 
ML * * 
MM * * * * 
MN * * * 
* MO * 
d' fi ~urc 13 '1 The orJcrin~ prilh:1 p\-.: lor a revised version of Galbraith's hierarchy is presente m Ig: ,-
. . " h h' her up the hierarchy, the simpler and CJSIL'r the lin~Jgc IS 
of the hIerarchy IS complextt) - 1 e Ig . 
I, k the greater the probable cost t" the org,IllI".llion in to operate. The more complex the In age, 
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terms of increased ovemeads. For this reason, what Hrebiniak and Joyce call the "principle of 
minimum intervention" (1984 chap 1) applies. In this context, this means that if adequate 
co-ordination can be achieved through mechanisms higher up down the hierarchy, then they should 
be favoured. The extent to which these mechanisms are used by the cases is summarised in table 
13.2. 
Direct contact (DC) is the simplest, quickest and easiest fonn of engineering/manufacturint: 
liaison, and such infonnallinks are more or less common in all the organisations studied. Factors 
such as the existing company culture, and the "ecology" (Handy 1985 chap 5) of the organisation 
in terms of its physical layout appear to be the most important factors in facilitating this structure. 
Companies were only identified as using direct contact if they had made a positive move toward~ 
facilitating it such as placing manufacturing engineers and design engineers in physical proximity. 
The importance of physical proximity is demonstrated by the low levels of integration achieved 
by the two companies - MF and MH - with remote split sites. Four companies - MS, MJ. MK. 
and MG - have tried to increase the amount of infonnal contact by physically seating manufactur-
ing engineers in the same areas as design engineers. Oearly. continuity of personnel within the 
organisation is also likely to be a factor here as longer served employees build up personal 
networks, and human resource management policies of moving personnel between functions during 
their careers with the company as at MB are also important. The development of IT system 
processes such as electronic mail and teleconferencing can also be a major support for thi~ 
structure. 
Secondment (SO) is a well established co-ordination structure. and can be u~ed as part 01 a career 
development programme to embed the sort of culture which facilitates direct COnlelt'!. Selondml'nl 
can be used as a co-ordination structure on its own. while it also fonns the basis of m~my other 
structures such as cells and project teams. It is used most systematically in the ma!ll~t~Idlirifl,1-: led 
companies. particularly vehicles, where a representative from manufacturing en~inl'cring ma~ r...' 
seconded for a year or two to the product development team in engineering. The intention i, thal 
r-
I 
i 
I 
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secondees then move back to manufacturing as the new product is being productionised. ~1G and 
MN have experimented with longer term secondments of production engineers to engineering. but 
found that secondees tend to loose touch with the latest developments in manufacturing proce5sc5 
on the shop floor. 
Liaison roles (LR) of two types were found. The first type is those that come in pairs where the 
manufacturing person has an identified opposite number in engineering. For example. at MB. a 
Standards Technician in engineering, and a Material Standards Engineer in manufacturing liai~c 
closely, particularly over such matters as the types of steel specified and the choice between 
castings and forgings. The second type is where a particular group within one function also reports 
to another function. Thus, at MB, the production engineers report primarily to the Manufacturing 
Engineering Manager, but they also report across to the Works Managers. In the two companies 
where engineering and manufacturing are on distant separate sites, an outpost, called Residential 
Engineering at MF, of engineering is located on the manufacturing site to deal with routine issues 
such as ECOs and concessions. 
Task forces (TF) are a widely used technique for solving particular finite problems. They can be 
distinguished from committees in the sense that they are usually responsible for the implementa-
tion of policies rather than policy formation. Companies normally use them on a casual basis a~ 
required; for instance, in most cases, as shown in table 10.2, the evaluation of the CAD/CA~l 
system was carried out by a joint engineering/manufacturing task force. Some companies are 
starting to develop more formal strategies to facilitate task forces. For instance, Quality Panels an: 
increasingly used in ME operating under the guidance of a comminee of senior mana~l'rs. Tlli..'~l' 
are popular amongst middle managers because a presentation to the Board is made at he end 01 
the Panel's work. Where necessary, such as in the latest review of the CAD/CAM system, these 
task forces cross the engineering/manufacturing interface. 
Project [cams (PT) can be distinguished from task forces by their full-time. and. usually. l()llgcr 
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tenn nature. The most obvious example of this is the product development team. Most or lh\? 
engineering functions in the organisations studied, except MH and MI. have moved toward~ 
product orientated design teams, often within a matrix structure for the organisation of engineerin~ 
as discussed in section 9.2. Examples of project teams which crossed the engineer-
ing/manufacturing interface are less common, and certainly still considered something of an 
experiment. ME has utilised a Manufacturing Systems Engineering project team to re\ie\\ the 
process of modifications to existing products in service in response to customer demands. \ 1G has 
set up a separate section to promote project team initiatives - the Business Process Development 
Group - which facilitates a variety of initiatives across the company and reports direct to the 
Managing Director. 
Although more strictly related to dedifferentiation rather than integration as discussed in section 
4.1, role convergence eRC) can be included here for convenience. Within engineering there 
appears to be a general move towards role convergence between engineers and drawing staff on 
design work. The old division of labour between the design office and the drawing officc is 
breaking down, and only MH, MI, and MG retain drawing offices completely differentiated from 
the design section. However, at another level, differentiation is being reinforced by the 
proliferation of specialist conceptual, or advanced engineering, design groups working on particular 
development problems and deploying very sophisticated technical expertise. Within manufacturing. 
a number of companies are trying to converge the manufacturing engineering roles - tool designcr. 
NC programmer, and process planner. MD has taken the opportunity of the departure of the 
Production Engineering Manager to merge planning and tool design with the aim of training the 
younger planners up as tool designers. MI has just reached an agreement with the trade uniun. 
MSF, for flexibility within the production engineering function. However, only at \lE is role 
convergence across the engineering/manufacturing interface between detail drawing staff and 
production engineering staff even mooted, and even here it is just a possibility at pre~cnl. 
Effective implementation of all the above lateral linkage structures was found across the lull r~lI1gl' 
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of cases studied. They have in common the fact that they only require changes in job design for 
their implementation. This is fairly obvious in the case of the first three and role convergence. but 
even in the case of project teams, a functional person is seconded to the project team, and expccL'I 
to return to a clear functional home at the end of the project. Indeed, the essence of project 
management is co-ordination across established departmental structures. It is because they do not 
require structural change of the overall organisation that the structures already discussed tend to 
be easier to implement, to be fairly widespread, and to be developed pragmatically. \\'herc 
problems were experienced, such as with secondment at MJ and role convergence at M\ 1. it was 
in combination with their deployment in cells 
In order to support these changes in job design, and to improve engineering/manufacturin~ 
co-ordination procedures even further, some of companies have implemented changes in 
organisation design as well. Thus, it is suggested that hierarchy of integration makes a qualitatiVL' 
change at this point. While the earlier linkage structures can be overlaid upon the existing 
organisation structure, the ones now under discussion require changes to that structure iL'Icif. for 
this reason, they are less commonly found, and more difficult to implemenl. 
At ME a cell (CL) has been established, defined around the technology of surface modelling which 
was described in section 11.1. This method of working across disciplines was established when 
the component - a major innovation in materials technology - was introduced at the beginning of 
the eighties. In ] 988, the method of working was formally recognised by the establishment of the 
WESTRID Group as a cell of four people consisting of NC programmers and design stall silting 
together in the design office. While this cell organisation is not yet reflected in changes in 
reporting relationships. which remain departmental. it has become a major force for the 
re-evaluation of the whole CAD/CAM system because of the way it works at the intcrlacc OCI \\ (en 
CAD and CAM. It is within this group that role convergence across the engineering/manufacturing 
interface has been mooted. 
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Other companies have used cells in a much more proactive way. The establishment at ~1J of ~ev. 
Vehicle Concepts (NYC) in 1985 was described in section 9.2, and is discussed in greater detail 
by Winch and his colleagues (1991). More recently, MM has established the Businc~5 
Development Organisations (BDO) described in the previous section as commercially orientated 
new product development cells24• At ML, the New Model Centre operates as a cell consisting of 
a small planning team reporting to the Operations Director which is responsible for ensuring that 
all the manufacturing resources are in place for new product initiatives, and the pilot build facility. 
As product initiatives move through the development life cycle, staff are seconded to it from the 
relevant operational sections. 
The experience of these cells has been mixed. NYC at MJ has provoked significant animosit: 
elsewhere in the organisation, and secondees returning to their home sections have been treated 
like "pariahs" (Winch et alia 1991). The BDOs at MM also have their critics. One informant 
distinguished clearly between "multi-disciplinary teams" or cells of the BDO type, and "multi-
functional teams" or project teams for product development. The danger with the cell, he argued, 
is that it risks the development of "jacks of all trades" who are amateurs at what they do, while 
the project team brings together experts from different disciplines who come together for a 
particular project, but do not have to "live together" all the time. The problem at MJ and \1 M 
seems to be that the cell has been set up as an elite product development section, and stands 
outside the mainstream of the production information flow. Where the cell is part of the nomlal 
product development process and integrated into the production information flow. as at \ 1E and 
ML, fewer problems arise. 
The discussion in section 9.1 identified the emergence of programme management (P\1) in man: 
of the case companies, particularly the engineering led ones. These are, in esscncc, the product 
orientated "integrator functions" described by Galbraith (1970) in his study of Bocin~ which ha\l~ 
responsibilities for co-ordinating both engineering and manufacturing. They usually ha\ L' a numht:r 
2JI Thl.\ dcvelopmen\ IS dls.:~\c4l In more Jcuil h~ WIn5Wlln and haneL' (IQQO) 
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of project managers of project teams reJX)rting to them and may l'n tum report to . 
, • a projl .. 'cts 
division. Projects divisions are not considered here as integrating structures because they. in man~ 
senses, fonn part of the outer context of the organisations studied. They are always separate 
divisions of the corporation and act as the customer's agent. 
The most sophisticated lateral linkage structure in Galbraith·s hierarchy is the matrix organis(uion 
(MO). However, no instances of a fully developed matrix across the engineering/manufacturing 
interface were found currently amongst our cases. MN had such an organisation in the carl) 
eighties, which was reponed in Winch (1983). It moved to a much simpler structure in 1985 
because each of the product divisions had become big enough to support their own manufacturing 
operations, and there was no longer any need to use matrix organisation to gain manufacturing 
economies of scale. MK is so close to implementing a matrix organisation as part of its 
organisational development programme that it has been classified as having one in table 13.2. The 
next stage after moving the manufacturing engineers into physical proximity with the design 
engineers is seen as including them within the overall matrix organisation of the engineering 
function, thereby creating a matrix which straddles the engineering/manufacturing interface. 
The mechanisms lower down the hierarchy tend to be used to support mechanisms higher up down 
- in panicular, while the job design innovations are viable on their own. they can be significantly 
reinforced by organisation design changes. For instance. cells provide a good opportunity for 
developing role convergence. Matrix organisations provide a fertile ground for deploying projCu 
teams extensively - particularly. it seems, within the engineering department. Programme 
management can provide authority and support for all sons of other initiatives such as task forces 
and project teams. In practice, organisations deploy multiple lateral linkage structures to JL'hicyc 
a range of specific goals. For instance. at MJ. all of the integration mechanisms exccpt role 
. " ~ nd deploycd with v'lrvinl' convergence, programme management ~md matrLX orgamsatwn were ou .. '.. :: 
degrces of success (Winch et alia 1991). 
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Overall, the manufacturing led companies deploy an average of 3.6 linkage structures, if the 
idiosyncratic MA and MD are excluded, while the engineering led companies deploy an a\erage 
of 2.8. The two production led companies only manage an average of 3.0, but this is because \1B 
is largely undifferentiated, and so does not need sophisticated integration structures. Those 
companies that have an iterative element to their co-ordination processes use an average of .to 
linkage structures, while those that only use reciprocal and sequential processes, again excluding 
MA and MD, use an average of 2.0 structures. This strongly suggests a process of structuration 
in the way in which structure supports process. The five highly profitable companies identified in 
section 8.1, excluding MD, deploy an average of 4.25 integrating structures, while the less 
profitable ones, excluding MA, deploy an average of 3.0. Overall, it can be argued that the 
deployment of integration structures tends to be favoured by manufacturing led companies and to 
have a correlation to profitable business performance. 
13.3 THE STRUcrURATION OF ORGANISATIONAL INTEGRATION 
The dynamic of co-ordination across the engineering/manufacturing interface is a special case of 
transaction governance within the production information flow. The last two sections have shown 
the importance of both structure and process in this dynamic. The evidence is that structural 
integration and processual integration are corrclated - those companies which deploy a high 
number of structural linkages also tend towards iterative processes within their production 
information flows. The only company where this is not true is MB. but this compan}. as discussed 
in section 9.2 is relatively undifferentiated, and does not, therefore, have much of a role for 
integration structures. Structure and process can, therefore, be considered to be mutually supponive 
in achieving organisational integration within the production information flow. 
The extent to which this correlation reveals a process of structuration can be shown with an 
historical perspective on the cases. This shows the ways in which structure is used to create 
process. and process generates structure. The former is clearest at M:\. where 3 m3lri x organis~llion 
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evolved over the decade prior to 1985. This provided a context in which joint design teams could 
flourish and functional strategy co-ordination could be established. It also provided a welcoming 
inner context for the implementation of the CAD/CAM system (Winch 1983). After 1985. the 
organisation structure reverted back to a simple functional one with the emphasis upon integrating 
structures at the job design rather than the organisation design level, whilst retaining the iterative 
elements of process. Even the deployment of project teams across the interface is now less 
common, but what has been emerging is a business culture where direct contact is the nonn. This 
same sort of business culture based on direct contact is also actively encouraged at the other 
production led company, MB. 
The organisation development initiative at MK provides an example of a company presently 
implementing a highly integrated organisation structure in the fonn of a matrix organisation in 
an explicit attempt to generate integrative processes. It remains to be seen whether iL~ evolution 
over the next five years is a move away from the matrix organisation as integrative processes 
become part of the organisational culture. The dynamic here is, perhaps, best captured by the sense 
of loose/tight relations developed by Peters and Watennan (1983 chap 12), but it also shows that 
their insistence upon a simple form (chap 11) is misleading - a complex fonn, such as a matrix 
organisation, may well be a crucial step upon the road to effective loose/tight relations sustained 
through the business culture which simultaneously deploys highly integrating processes with 
simple, cheap, and effective integrating structures. At the same time, Kanter'S insistence that "to 
produce innovation, more complexity is essential" (1985 p 148) is also misleading - the relative 
advantages of simplicity or complexity in organisation structure depend upon the history of the 
organisation in relation to its outer context. 
Process can also be seen to be generating structure amongst these cases. The devc!or'ml'nt of the 
cell around the process of surface definition of mould tools at ME is an example. Here. the 
overwhclming processual logic of those involved in surface definition working together in jOifll 
design teams has led to the almost subversive evolution of a cell defined around the tl'chnolog~ 
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of surface modelling. It took well over five years to be recognised by senior management and is 
only now, after almost a decade, starting to have an influence elsewhere in the organisation as the 
benefits of integrating structures start to be appreciated. A similar concern for process around 
surface definition encouraged the movement of lofting staff into direct contact with the drawing 
office at MG. These two cases indicate the ways in which the evolution of integrating processes 
generates integrating structures, and, at least in the case of ME, shows how structure is staning 
to influence process as the lessons of the WESTRID Group start to diffuse out through the rest 
of the business. 
13.4 ORGANISATIONAL AND TECHNICAL INTEGRATION 
The earlier sections in this chapter have developed and presented typologies for the structure and 
process of integration within metalworking companies. While the development of a requisite level 
of structure is crucial for the effective development of the processes of integration, once the 
processes are pan of the company culture, then simpler linkage structures may be all that are 
required. So, there is a sense of integrating processes being substitutes for integrating structures, 
but that a sophisticated integrating structure on its own IS not an adequate definition of 
organisational integration. This can be most clearly seen In the way in which programme 
management can be imposed over an otherwise unintegrated structure. In the end, structure is a 
means to process, for it is through the production information flow and associated materials flow 
that the business creates value. Structure is a way of ordering process; integrating structures arc 
a means to the end of integrated processes. 
On this basis, inspection of table 13.] reveals that eight of the cases can be considered to he 
organisationally integrated in that they have elements of iterative production information now~ 
However. ME only achieves this for the highly specialist surface modelling ~lpplilation. Jnd 
remains relatively unintegrated for most of the production information flov .. It can. lhcrdorc. t .. : 
eliminated from his group of organisationally integrated companies. The result" 01 ltlis 
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classification are displayed on the organisational integration dimension of figure 13 .. 3 
The criteria for the assessment of technical integration were described in section 10.1. The rcsult~ 
are displayed on the technical integration dimension of figure 13.3. The top left hand comer can 
be considered the high performance zone of high organisational and technical integration. 
Achievement of this status is correlated with business success - three of the five highly profitable 
companies as defined in section 8.1 are in this sector, while ML and MJ have achieved remarkable 
business turnarounds over the last decade. The other two highly profitable companies are MB. with 
high organisational integration, and MD. Those companies in the bottom right hand comer with 
low organisational and technical integration, with the exception of MD with its low level of 
requisite integration due to the nature of the production process, might be considered to be thc 
poor performers and to have achieved neither technical nor business success. 
The two cases that have achieved integration for surface modelling applications alone arc 
interesting. The exploration of the possibilities of surface modelling technology appears to have 
facilitated technological integration, due to the major savings available from maintaining complex 
shapes on a single data base for both drawing office staff and manufacturing engineers to usc. 
Perhaps because of its specialist nature, it does not seem to have prompted more widespread 
organisational changes. The cell development at ME is very localised, and the main co-ordination 
structure between the drawing office and the lofters at MG is direct contact through physical 
proximity. Aside from these special cases, no company has presently achieved high technical 
integration without high organisational integration. 
On the other hand. two companies have high organisational integration without high technical 
integration. MB's presence there is probably explained by being one of the late implcmclltors 
amongst these case, and its inability to implement the part programming clement of the system 
is due to resource shorta~es as discussed in section 12.3. MO is further from technical int~gration. 
but is actively working on an intcl face between its CAD/CA~1 system. and the C\C wire L'rosion 
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machines in the tool room and the new DNC machining cell in the factory. For these companies. 
high organisational integration is a way of achieving high technical integration. Both have inner 
contexts which favour organisational integration - MB is relatively undifferentiated. while MO i~ 
the only company identified in section 9.1 as having the type of product division business 
organisation design advocated by proponents of organisational integration along the production 
infonnationflow (Winch 1983). 
Perhaps the most interesting question that can be explored using figure 13.3 is the preferred route 
from the low performance to the high performance sector. MN moved through the high 
organisational integration sector during the seventies as it developed a matrix organisation in a 
response to market pressures which provided a welcoming inner context for the development of 
technical integration. On the other hand. the more popular route appears to be through high 
technical integration - MJ and ML took this route working around the process of surface 
modelling, and it was also followed by MK with the earlier CADDS4X system and by MM. While 
this route may well provide opportunities for organisational learning about the potential of 
CAD/CAM there are reasons to suppose that the route through organisational integration is 
preferable. Firstly, the case of MB does suggest that high performance is possible with high 
organisational integration alone. Secondly the other benefits of organisational integration associated 
with total quality management. value engineering. and simultaneous engineering suggest that thi~ 
route has more general benefits along the way. while technical integration can only yield 
CAD/CAM related benefil~. significant though these might be. related to productivity savings and 
product integrity. 
13.5 SUMMARY 
Figure 13.3 is an attempt to summarise the experience of the 15 case survey companies with the 
implementation of CAD/CAM systems over the last decade. The experience has heen vcry mi \ed. 
be f 1 I ~C' 'ons can he dnwn for ~)lh as the last si x chapters have shown. However. a num 'Or 0 genera c."':-' . ' 
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organisation theory and the sources of high performance business in the metalworking industrie~. 
and those others with similar production information flows such as electronics and construction. 
These will be explored in the next chapter, but here it might be useful to relate the ex~rience of 
these companies back to the discussion in section 5.2 on implementation project organisation. In 
particular, the distinction was drawn between those companies which implement and then adapt 
the organisation, those companies which have developed already the desired organisation, and 
those which attempt synchronous implementation. 
Of these cases, only MN and MB, the two jointly led companies, had integrated organisation 
processes and integrated or undifferentiated organisation structures prior to the first implementa-
tion. In these cases, technocratic implementation project organisation has been adequate. due to 
the relatively low information load. All the others are suffering from a greater or lesser degree of 
organisational lag - the problem being much greater in the engineering led companies than the 
manufacturing led ones. Amongst these cases, only MK is attempting synchronous implementation. 
and this is only on the basis of the technical success achieved with an earlier system - the inherent 
riskiness of the implementation project and the way in which the company has adopted a 
participative project organisation has already been discussed. It does seem as if the synchronous 
implementation advocated by some is only likely to be viable in special cases, and that what is 
need is the minimisation of organisational lag through double loop organisational learning. \\!hcre 
companies do not already have an integrated organisation, this can be facilitated through the 
adoption of a participative implementation project organisation. 
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14 
IMPLEMENTING AN INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGY 
14.0 INTRODUCfION 
The implementation of CAD/CAM systems in the metalworking sector is a complex and difficult 
process. Like the implementation of other integrating technologies. it requires the mobilisation of 
all the functions involved in the production process, the commitment of senior executives, effective 
project management, and a sophisticated capacity for organisational learning. Few of the 15 finns 
included in this case survey can be considered to have effectively handled this task, but hindsight 
is a perfect science, and these companies were struggling with considerable uncertainties as they 
attempted to implement a completely new type of advanced manufacturing technology with few 
examples of best practice to follow. The aim of this chapter will be to draw some lessons from 
their experience of the process of implementation so that others can learn to do things more 
effectively. Before that is done, however, it is important to summarise the evidence on the content 
and context of implemention so those concerned with other industries and other AMT's can be 
guided in drawing their own lessons. 
14.1 CONTENT: INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES 
The concept of an integrating technology developed in section 2.2 describes a new type of :\\1T 
which only began to diffuse widely during the nineteen eighties. An integrating technology is 
distinguished from other AMTs such as CNC machine toob. flexible manufacturing s! stems. JnJ 
applications such as electronic mail by both its systemic and its complex charalters. as summarised 
in figure ~.2. The main examples presently being implemented in metalworkint: arc CAD/C:\\1 
and CAPM, but these. in turn, form two of the main building blolks for Computcr Intcgratl'l1 
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Manufacture - CIM. The integrating nature of these technologies across the three spheres of 
production means that they pose many of the same issues as other de\elopments in the 
management of production such as total quality management and simultaneous engineering.:s In 
the automobile industry, this emergent re-configuration of production organisation has been called 
"lean production" (Womack et alia 1990). 
The evidence from this case survey is that the reality and the rhetoric are far apart. As discussed 
in section 10.1, and summarised in table 10.1, only five of the firms studied could, in 1990. be 
considered to have an integrated CAD/CAM link for prismatic parts operating on a routine basis. 
The majority of the case only had links for very specialist applications. or were making data 
transfers through IGES links, with the attendant limitations on functionality. Many of the problems 
were apparently technical in origin in that there were incompatibilities between the CAD and CA\1 
systems, but in one case there was no data transfer between fuJly compatible CAD and CA~1 
systems. Here, the problems were clearly organisational in origin, but where the systems were 
incompatible, the basic problems were also organisational. Frequently, the explanation lay with 
the fragmented organisation of the process of evaluation and adoption of the new technology 
which, in tum, was the result of the organisational context in which implementation was taking 
place - in other words, the way in which the production process was being managed prior to 
implementation. 
14.2 CONTEXT: MANAGING PRODUCTION 
f Ll d t· process IS to focus on the The established approach to the management 0 le pro uc Ion .. 
manufacturing process alone. The materials flow, and the clements of the production infomlation 
flov.· most immediately associated with it such as production planning. have bounlkd the hari/ons 
. . . d' , ., h'I' be'~rl 'Ilrnost entirel\ j\lnarcd Previous of most anal YS1S. and the engllleenng eSlgn process <:-. ... <. • t:- . 
f lu Is" of .... ·hal he .II the ·flfth ..... "· 01 dc~elorrr.cn: :5) Bc:s,<;anl (lQ9J) pro\'ldc:s a \Jluabl(' O\'c:r.·le ..... of lh(,~ JC\'c!opmcnL' .s part 0 S ar.a ~ , •.. 
in produClion t~c'hnology 
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work has, until very recently, consistently failed to appraise the issues associated with the 
production infonnation flow and its interaction with the materials flow which were identified in 
section 3.4. The approach developed theoretically in chapter 3, and empirically in chapters 8 and 
9, attempts to break with this tradition, and to develop a way of looking at organisations engaged 
in the production of goods which covers the whole production process from conception to 
completion. 
The production model developed in section 3.5 and summarised in figure 3.3 is an heuristic which 
specifies the interrelated set of contingencies which are considered here to be essential for the 
comprehensive analysis of production organisations. Chapter 8 explored the upper line of the 
model empirical1y and developed a taxonomy of the three generic production missions which 
develop in response to particular outer contexts - in particular, the product market environment. 
These were defined as the engineering led. the manI~racturing led and the production led missions. 
The first two were identified as the established missions in metalworking production, while the 
third was cast as an emergent fOlm 2(,. 
The main features of each type of mission were summarised in figure 8.8. and a more detailed 
comparison is provided in table 14.1. The model starts with the relationship to the customer as 
articulated in the production strategy. Four basic types of order pattern were identified, defined 
around where the market transaction with the customer enters the production information now. The 
concept to order strategy is used in the procurement of defence goods; it is also found in other 
industries involved in the creation of large capital assets such as construction. The distinctive 
feature here is that the product is specifically designed to an individual customer's requircmenLI\. 
and so the customer enter the production infOlmation flow right at the start. Often the "design 
order" is separate from the "build order". TIlis strateg) generates a distinctive production 
information flow which was called the procurement route. where there is a clear distinction 
>, " (V nd W nch fonhwm,n&> du( 10 Ih( L'" M ~"I\lc.s llound 
2(,) The pr, >,i" .. ·/I, '" /,J mlSSlI>n hits been .:ailed cl"whcrc Ihe rl"pOnS( led mIssIon ass I I. 
I ' ..... of the '" hole prv.:.c." 01 er~lIlccrll" a:'~ 
thl' word "producllon", 11,'''','(r, II WIIS dl"IJcd 10 fC'.Atn "prllducl1on" hcr~ I.~' "d\ of artlcu Illflg I " 
mllluficlunng wmhlTlcd 
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TABLE 14.1 
n=13 ENGINEERING LED MANUFACTURING LED PRODUCTION LED 
CASES MC, ME, MG, MH, MI, MK MF, MJ, ML, MM, MO MB, MN 
Production Strategy concept to order/design to make to order/make to for- make to order/make to for-
order ecast ecast 
Production Information procurement route/tender development route development route 
Flow route 
Materials Flow low volume high volume low volume 
(one-off/small batch) (large batch/flow line) (small batch) 
Order Winning Criteria "turn-key" capability product quality product variety 
product delivery programme new product development new product development 
price rate rate 
after sales serVlce 
Market Entry Criteria product technology price product technology 
.~ 
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between the "concept design and feasibility", and the "project definition" stages as shown in figure 
8.4. This, in tum leads to a low volume materials flow because the customer-specific requirements 
of the product restrict order volumes. 
The second production strategy identified was design to order relationship to the customer. where 
the customer enters the production information flow after the concept design has been completed. 
Here, the distinctive feature of the production inform ation flow is the tender loop, shown in figure 
8.3, where the company tenders to the customer on a basic design, and then proceeds to funhcr 
design development and detailing after being awarded the contract - usuall y on a "tum-key" basis. 
For this reason it was cal1ed the tender route. Again, the customer-specific nature of production 
means that a low volume materials flow is chosen. These two missions were shown to possess 
important sources of convergence as the product market for concept to order products shifts 
towards the design to order pattern. The two were, therefore, grouped together in the engineering 
led mission. It was given this title because of the clear hierarchy within the business - traditionally. 
manufacturing has been seen very much as a service to engineering, and the prime source of 
competitive advantage was believed to be "engineering excellence". 
Another group of companies related to the customer on a make to order basis where the order 
pattern is a contract against the customer's forward schedule. Here the market transaction with the 
customer enters the production information flow at the production planning stage. These were all 
vehicle component suppliers to high volume production companies. In these cases. the production 
information flow was defined as being of the development route form where the company itsel! 
undertook the development of products, or generic product types, which could then be customised 
to the requirements of particular customers through a process of "variant design". as illustrated in 
figure 8.7. These companies, as they ~'ere supplying high volume manufal'lurers also pruduccd in 
high volumes - defined as more than 100 orr in one batch - on either a large batch or flow line 
basis, 
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The two vehicle companies produced on a make to forecast basis where the contract with the 
customer enters the production information flow at its end, and production planning is on 
forecasting basis, instead of against actual orders. Again, these companies both had a development 
route production information flow, where the distinctive feature is that product development take~ 
place against forecasts of market demand, rather than to the requirements of specific customcr:-. 
It is illustrated in figure 8.5. These are the classic "mass production" industries, which deploy high 
volume flow-line materials flows. This distinctive configuration of make to order or make to 
forecast order patterns with development route production information flows and high volume 
materials flows was called the manufacturing led mission because in these companies the main 
sources of competitive advantage have traditionally been seen as manufacturing based. with 
engineering, and indeed marketing, being expected to meet the requirements of manufacturing. 
Four of the companies in the case survey could not be fitted into either of these two configur-
ations. MA and MD both had tender route production infonnation flows leading to high volume 
materials flows. This was because neither had significant design capabilities. Invitations to tender 
from potential customers included concept drawings, and so the production information flow was 
restricted to some detailed design and tooling drawings. The contract with the customer, thereforc. 
was entering the production information flow during the draughting stage. However, as discusscd 
in section 8.7, both these companies were trying to move away from this situation to incorporate 
more of the value chain within their own operations and, as illustrated in figure 8.9, were moving 
towards the engineering led and manufacturing led missions respectively. 
The other two companies which did not fit into the two main generic missions were MB and \ 1'.; -
both have development route production infonnation flows coupled with low volume matcrials 
flows. A third, MK, was also seen to be moving in this direction. These companies arc three of 
I · ld market..; The\ have the five highly profitable cases in the survey, and compete strong: y In wor . . . 
also arrived at this distinctive production mission through determined organisational devc1opml'!1l 
over recent vears. This suggests strongly that they are cases of an emergent conliguration which 
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was called the production led mission, because of the equal emphasis that they give to the 
concerns of both engineering and manufacturing as pan of the whole production process. 
14.3 CONTEXT: ORGANISATION DESIGN FOR PRODUCfION 
The production mission represents a strategic choice on the pan of the business in response to the 
threats and opponunities presented in the outer context. It is through the production strateg\ that 
'- -
the business enacts this external environment and that choice bounds the subsequent selection of 
technologies and make/buy options which fonn basis for the production information and materials 
flows. As discussed in the previous section, on the evidence of these cases, this set of choices 
generates three distinctive configurations, or production missions. In section 3.4 it was suggested 
that it is the production infonnation and materials flows and the character of the transactions 
within them which result from the choice of production mission that are the main contingencies 
influencing organisation and job design in tenns of both structure and process. 
The conceptual framework for analysing these transactions was summarised in the lower line of 
figure 3.3. An analysis of a particularly important transaction within the production information 
flow - the engineering/manufacturing interface was developed in chapter 4, and is also the focus 
for an extended treatment for an example of the manufacturing led mission, cars, by Clark and 
Fujimoto (1991). One of the most important transactions within the materials flow. the relationship 
between buyer and suppJier, or what has been called the "supply chain", has been the focus or 
much analysis of late - Bessant (1991) provides an overview, while Womack and his colleagues 
(1990) again explore the issue within the car industry. 
From the evidence presented in chapter 9, a clear pattern emerged of the ways in which companil'~ 
. oct' . 's'ons which IS 
were organising themselves to enable them to complete theIr pr uctlOn mls. I . 
summarised in table 14.2. While there was remarkable commonality at thc busincs~ lcvel III 
organisation design, due to the almost universal choice of functional organisation and the 
2() ~ 
TABLE 14.2 
n=13 ENGINEERING LED MANUFACTURING LED PRODUCTION LED 
CASES MC, ME, MG, MH, MI, MK MF, MJ, ML, MM, MO MB, MN 
Business Organisation Functional Functional Functional/Matrix 
Engineering Organisation Matrix/Functional Matrix/Product Matrix/Unified 
Manufacturing Organisation Unit Manufacturing Planning Functional 
Favoured Organisation Programme Management Programme Management Project Teams 
Design Linkages Projects Division Cell Task Forces 
Organisational Integration Low High High 
I 
II 
Coupling Sequential/Reciprocal Reciprocal/Iterative 
I 
Iterative 
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instability of both product and matrix organisation structures, at the level of the engineering and _ 
manufacturing departments, great divergence was found which turned on the type of couplin~ 
desired within the production information flow - what was defined in section 8.6 as the couplin~ 
commitment. 
As can be seen from table 9.2, matrix organisation is becoming the established way of organising 
engineering for all types of mission - the divergences become clear when the alternative option 
is examined. For engineering led companies, the favoured alternative is functional organisation. 
while for the manufacturing led ones, it is product organisation. This would suggest that the two 
types of firm are approaching the establishment of matrix organisation in engineering from 
opposite directions. The production led companies favour highly integrated engineering 
organisation - either a matrix organisation, or where the organisation is small enough. a unified 
organisation. 
So far as the organisation of manufacturing is concerned, table 9.2 again shows that thc 
manufacturing led companies have opted entirely for the manufacturing planning type of 
organisation, with its clear distinction between "manufacturing engineering" and "conformance 
engineering" as illustrated in figure 9.5. At the engineering led companies, the unit type 01 
organisation illustrated in figure 9.6 is rapidly becoming the favoured option, although some still 
have a functional structure. Meanwhile, at the production led companies, a functional structure is 
favoured - notably, the engineering led company which is moving towards the production led 
mission explicitly rejected the unit option. This retention of the functional form would appear to 
be due to the twin problems of retaining a centralised expertise to contribute to engineering's 
project teams, while at the same time managing general purpose technologies on the shop l100r 
as opposed to the specialised ones typically managed by manufacturing planning typo' 
organisations. 
The choice of matrix organisation in engineering would appear to be largcly cxplaincd by the 
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coupling commitment. Examination of tables 8.2 and 9.2 shows that four of the five finns \\'ith 
matrix organisations in engineering espoused iterative coupling commitments. while in the fifth 
case no opinion was obtained. The other two finns which espoused iterative coupling commit-
ments both have product organisations in engineering. The three companies. all engineering led. 
which espoused sequential coupling commitments all had functional organisation for engineering. 
and had, or were moving towards, unit organisation in manufacturing. It was also amongst the 
engineering led companies that, as discussed in section 9.1, the development of internal market 
transaction governance between engineering and manufacturing was found in which engineering 
"buys" manufacturing capability from the factory. A strong picture emerged of manufacturing and 
production led companies expressing considerable concern for the engineering/manufacturing 
interface, while engineering led companies did not consider it to be one of their priorities. 
Those companies with a functional organisation of engineering showed relatively little concern for 
the project management of design development at the departmental level. However. those same 
engineering led companies tended to be much stronger in the development of progrummt' 
management - only at ML was programme management found in the manufacturing led 
companies. The development of projects divisions to provide tum-key services to the customer was 
restricted to the engineering led companies. as might be expected from the nature of their market 
transaction with the client. The complexity of many capital and defence goods has meant that no 
metalworking company is capable of having access to all the necessary product technologies. 
particularly electronics systems and power sources. Yet the risks are too great to simply sub-
contract for these technologies as a manufacturing led company would because of severe problems 
of asset specificity - the client often wishes to specify the system that will be used. and in any 
case. there are few alternative suppliers in the market. In response to these problems. project'-
. . . . t tur' I\\'illiamson 1"!~~ chap~) to diVISions have emerged as a type of tnlateral governance s ruc c \ . 
take some of the risk off' the client. while not passing it directly to the producer. 
This emphasis upon the entire production process. including ent!incl'ring design. rather than the 
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more conventional emphasis solely on the manufacturing process suggests that some widely USCJ 
organisational models require amendments. Mintzberg's model of the "five basic pans" of the 
organisation (1979 chap 2) hardly mentions engineering design, but it would appear to be allocated 
to the "support staff'. The thrust of the argument above suggests that it should. rather. be 
considered as part of the "operating core". Similarly, Porter's model of the "value chain" (19S~ 
chap 2) allocates engineering design to one of the "support activities" - "technology development" 
- while it could more usefully be considered to be pan of the "primary activities". The problem 
appears to be that both Mintzberg and Porter have, implicitly, based their analyses on the model 
of the traditional manufacturing led company, and ignored the existence of the engineering led 
companies. Even amongst the manufacturing led companjes, the recent work at Harvard and \ 1IT 
on the car industry (Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Womack et alia 1990) suggests that the traditional 
support relationship of engineering to manufacturing can no longer provide competitive advantage 
in the face of "lean production" techniques, and that engineering has to be increasingly seen as a 
primary part of the operating core. 
14.4 PROCESS: IMPLEMENTING CAD/CAM 
An implementation approach to the process of technological change in organisations was 
developed in chapter 1 and articulated in detail in chapter 5. It was argued that the process of 
implementation is a dynamic and recursive one in which organisations configure and reconfigure 
the new technology to meet the needs of their information and materials flows. An important 
finding is that many organisations have gone through more than one cycle of implementation. anJ 
. ..' b th oblems 'lnd possibilities of C:\O/C:\\1 use preVIOUS cycles as organISalIOnal learnIng a out e pr • .. ' 
technology. This model of the implementation process was summarised in figure 5.2. while a more 
detailed heuristic for the selection of an appropriate implementation project organisation was 
presented in figure 5.3, 
, . I '\'\1T in chaptcr b shcw.eJ ho\l. fc\l. A review of the existing I iterature on the ImpkmentaLIOn 0 . . . 
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studies have covered the entire implementation process from evaluation. through installation and 
commissioning. and on to consolidation within the existing organisational context. Chapters 10. 
11. and 12 covered in detail the experience of the 15 companies in this case survey with 
implementation. All had, in order to be included in the case survey. to have adopted CAD. \\'hile 
most companies could claim to have achieved technical success for their CAD implementations 
fairly easily. this was much less true for the CAD/CAM links - only one third could be said to 
have technically successful links, and another third had implemented technically incompatible 
CAD and CAM systems. 
Business success was more difficult to measure. as only two companies audited their CAD/CAf\l 
systems. and the results of these audits were privy to the Board only. Only one company was able 
to provide a detailed breakdown of benefits from the implementation in tenns of productivity 
improvements and reduced product development lead times, and a general picture emerged of little 
effort being directed at appraising the returns from the substantial investment in CAD/CAM that 
these companies had made. As explored in section 12.1, the problem appears to be bound up with 
the ways in which cost centres are controlled within metalworking organisations. Inherent in its 
nature as an integrating technology, CAD/CAM is normally implemented across more than one 
cost centre, while the business benefits from CAD/CAM - be they concept to completion lead time 
reduction, productivity, product integrity or whatever - are distributed unevenly across cost centres. 
Most notably, the 10-fold productivity gains possible for part programming in manufacturing 
through accessing directly the product data base directly can only be achieved at a cost to 
engineering in setting up the 3D model on the data base correctly. 
The extent to which the adoption of CAD/CAM leads to technical success and business SUC(CSS 
is. on the evidence of these cases, a function of the effectiveness of the project management thc 
implementation process. Those firms. such as MH and MI which failed to dcvelop any IOnll ()I 
project org~misation for implementation fared noticeably worse than the other corn panics. 
Inspection of tables 10.2 and 11.1 reveals the overall requirements for effective implementation 
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project management. These are the inclusion of all three interested panie~ in the implementation 
task force, (ie engineering, manufacturing and the IT function); a strong implementation champion 
who may either be the implementation project manager, or be directly responsible for that 
manager's activities; and support from senior management. However, as the discussion in section 
12.3 shows, these are necessary rather than sufficient conditions for effective implementation 
management - an implementation project team can only be as effective as the context in which it 
operates. 
That context is very different in the engineering led companies on the one hand. and the 
manufacturing and production led ones on the other. On the measures developed in chapter 13. 
none of the engineering led companies could be considered to have a high level of organisational 
integration; nor could they be considered to have high technical integration on the criteria 
discussed above for technical success. Only in the very limited application of surface modelling 
did two of the engineering led companies achieve a measure of technical success. Yet. as figure 
13.3 shows, all those companies which had high technological integration also had high levels of 
organisational integration. This strongly suggests a link between the achievement of technical 
success and the establishment of high levels of organisational integration, and emphasises the 
importance of the consolidation stage within the overall implementation process. 
The crucial variable appears to be the organisation's view of the engineering/manufacturing 
interface. A comparison of table 8.2 and figure 13.3 shows that five of the six companies 
identified as espousing an iterative coupling at that interface measured high on both measures 01 
technological and organisational integration, while the si xth had high organisational intcgrati(~ll 
On the other hand. the three companies that espoused a sequential coupling commitment all h;ld 
low levels or both organisational and technological integration. The effective implementation of 
CAD/CAM is very much function of whether the organisation sees its competitive ad\antagl' ly1l1g 
in the effective management of the enginecringlm;mufacturing interface. or whcther its is tx'licn:,1 
to lie elsewhere in engineering or manufacturing:. 
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14.5 CONSOLIDATION AND THE PROCESS OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
The discussion in chapter 1 stressed the ways in which technological change is simply a special 
case of organisational change, while the framework established in chapter 5 emphasised the 
importance of the consolidation process by which the organisation's structures and processes adapt 
to the changes in the infonnation and materials flows consequent upon the implementation of 
advanced manufacturing technologies. The discussion in section 5.2 discussed three possible 
relationship between the processes of organisational and technological change during mutual 
adaptation to new technologies - the enabling organisational context for the new technology 
already exists; the technology is implemented and there is "organisational lag" while the 
organisation adapts, or both technology and organisation mutually adapt in a process of what somc 
have called "synchronous innovation". 
Only one of these cases - MK - could be considered to be going through a process of synchronous 
innovation using the participative fonn of implementation project management organisation which 
manifests a concern for both organisational and technological change. However, this was a re-
implementation, and MK was only able to embark upon this somewhat risky approach on the basis 
of nearly 10 years of organisational learning derived from its earlier implementation. The other 
successful implementors had used a technocratic fonn of project management organisation which 
only manifests a concern for the technological change process alone. As discussed in section 5,3. 
the uncertainties inherent in implementing integrating technologies pose considerable injormU[lOn 
loads. and most finns have chosen to proceed more cautiously, implementing the technology tlrs!. 
There are, for most companies, two routes from low technological and organisational intcgration -
choosing to increase organisational integration first. or choosing to increasc technological 
integration first. Of the companies scoring high on both dimensions. only M:\ LOok the lonllCf 
. th' CAD/CAM "'tenlS before developing stronl.!cr route - the remamder developed elr S) s . ~ 
. . I I' k h' 'nn1manufactun'n ll I'ntcrfacc of the kinds discussed in organIsatlona In' ages across t e engmeen &I Co 
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chapter 13. In developing awareness of the benefits of integration, surface modelling applications 
have been particularly important, for the reasons discussed in section 13.5. Both MG and ME are 
presently starting their progress towards high integration by this route. 
In achieving organisational integration, companies deliberately used the organisational linkages 
identified in the hierarchy of integration summarised in figure 13.2 to achieve the iterative 
organisational processes summarised in figure 13.1. Once such linkages have been finnl\ 
established, evidence from the two production led companies suggests that iterative production 
infonnation flows across the engineering/manufacturing interface become self-sustaining through 
the organisational culture, and the more complex and expensive linkages can be abandoned. 
However, the benefits that accrue from technological integration provide a learning vehicle to 
generate awareness about the potential of organisational integration, as is well illustrated by the 
role played by the WESTRID cell at ME in the present re-evaluation. This dynamic interaction 
between structure and process in these organisations provides evidence for a structuration approach 
to the dynamics of organisational change, in which the process of organisational learning is central. 
14.6 SUMMARY 
This evidence from the 15 firms in this case survey of the implementation of CAD/CAM systems 
in the UK metalworking sector leads to a number of conclusions. The first is the imponance of 
the examining the whole production process from the conception of the product to its completion 
for the customer, rather than focusing simply on the manufacturing process, Second. it is apparent 
that there are at least three generic production missions, and it is important to spccit'~ whi(1l the 
finn has chosen in order to understand the overall context of CAD/CAM implementation. Thirdly. 
while effective implcmentation project managcment can improve the chances of aehic\ ing 
ffi ' d't' lnd thc crucial variable \" thl' tcchnical and business succcss, it is not a su IClcnt con I lon, ~ 
ovcrall organisational context in which implementation takes place. Finally. busincss succes" ean 
only be achieved if organisational change also takes placc. and organisational learning is CIllie;!1 
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to this change. As well as providing a guide for others wishing to implement CAD/CAM systems 
and other integrating technologies, this research raises some broader questions which will be 
pursued in the final chapter. 
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15 
IMPLICATIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
15.0INTRODUCfION 
The last fourteen chapters have developed a distinctive conceptual approach to the analysis of 
manufacturing organisations, and then deployed it in the analysis of a case survey of 15 UK 
metalworking companies which have implemented CAD/CAM systems over the last decade. The 
study focused on CAD/CAM as an example of an integrating AMT for two reasons. Firstly. 
because it is, together with CAPM, one of the main buildings blocks of CIM, and. secondly. 
because of iL~ role as an enabling technology for two of the other main developments in the 
organisation of production over the last decade - simultaneous engineering and total quality 
management. 
In the developing some of the implications of this thesis, the argument will explore of some of 
the implications of this research for the development of organisation theory. A tectonic approLlch 
to the analysis of complex organisations which has relevance far beyond the issue of the 
implementation of AMT will be advocated which emphasises the structuration of organisations 
through the dynamic of structure and process within specific industrial contexts. Finally the theme 
raised in the introduction of the paradox of flexibility and productivity will be revisited and some 
possibilities for the future suggested. 
]5.1 AN APPROACH TO ORGAN]SATION THEORY 
The experience or the comp~lJlies reported in this resear(h suggests that any adequate thc,)r:- 01 
. . . -h ld b . ble to 'han'teri,c tllL' organisation must consist of three clements. Flrstl). It s ou cal . '- . 
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organisation at any given point in time. This means an understanding of both the di fferent pans 
of the organisation, and how they fit together to fonn the whole. Secondly, it should understand 
the relationship of the organisation to its environment in a detailed way. Thirdly, it should be able 
to analyse how that organisation changes over time in tenns of the relationships between the pans, 
and the fonn of the whole, and the relationship to the environment. In other words, it should be 
able to simultaneously handle both morphogenesis and morphostasis. This applies whether the 
organisation chosen for analysis at the level of the work group, the section, the depanmem, the 
business, or the corporation. The framework presented in section 1.2 gives one way of deciding 
which is the most appropriate organisational level for the topic under consideration. 
The approach to organisation theory taken in the analysis deployed over the last fourteen chapters 
is heavily influenced by the empirically based critique of classical management theory which 
developed during the sixties - largely in the UK. The influence of Bums and Stalker, Lawrence 
and Lorsch, and Woodward can be seen throughout the thesis. The debate over the relevance of 
this contingency approach has been long and hard. One of the most important critiques came from 
within - that of Child who argued that the contingency approach ignored the role of strategic 
choice in the design of organisations. In essence, his critique poses the issue of process, against 
the emphasis upon structure inherent in the earlier work. 
Another approach which was also developing in the UK over the same period is that of the 
Tavistock Institute which became known as socio-technical systems theory - notably that of Trist. 
and, of most immediate relevance to this research, Klein (1964). Here the emphasis is more upon 
process, particularly on the process of production, cast as the technical system, and the proccsses 
of individual interaction, cast as the social system. There is also a concern for how organisations 
change which is lacking from the earlier versions of the contingency approach. Howevcr. the work 
f th 0"0 tcchni 'al docs tend to suffer from a lack of awareness of the structural context 0 c s Cl - '-
systems under investigation. 
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The strengths and weaknesses of these traditions are debated in some depth in Yan de Yen and 
Joyce (1981), but the main problem seems to be a failure to build creatively upon the original 
perspectives. In the case of contingency theory. this would appear to be the result of the 
development of a "pairwise approach to fit" (Van de Yen and Drazin 1985 p 344) based on 
correlation analyses which tend "to focus on simple relationships among few variables in search 
of direct causation" (Miller and Friesen 1984 p 11). Social-technical systems theory has made 
almost the directly opposite error of concentrating on Single case studies as a result of an emphasis 
upon consultancy rather than academic research (Brown] 967). Two main groups of analysts have 
attempted to move beyond both simplistic quantitative research, and single case studies - the 
Montreal group, and those associated with Andrew Yan de Yen. 
The Montreal school (Mintzberg ] 979 & ] 983; Miller and Friesen 1984) has advocated a 
"configuration approach" to organisational analysis: 
"The objective of this approach of synthesis is to discover richly described, revealing 
configurations that are sufficiently common to capture an important organisational entity 
or occurrence .... Ultimately, the aim is to generate typologies or taxonomies" (Miller and 
Friesen 1984 p 12). 
It differs from the conventional contingency approach because the latter presumes that the 
relationships between variables remain constant between types, while in a configuration analysis, 
they vary. 
While there is much that is attractive in the configuration approach, and Mintzberg's five basic 
types of organisation remain a powerful tool, the discussion in chapter 9 illustrates its weaknesses 
All 15 of the cases surveyed would have been classified in Mintzberg's terms as "ma..:hine 
bureaucracies", yet the data presented show considerable contingent variation between the cases. 
and three configurations - the manufacturing led mission; the engineering led mission. and the 
. .' . I h ach of the five ba,i( production led mission - were identified. There )s no reason In pnnc)p e w ) e 
configurations cannot be subjected to further analysis at levels below that of the busines~ unit. and 
this is precisely what is proposed here. 
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The "organisational assessment" approach of Van de Ven and his associates (e.g. Van de Ven and 
Ferry 1980) has chosen a much more detailed empirical methodology. Through the implementation 
of four different research instruments, and the collection of contextual information. a complete 
quantitative picture of the organisations under study can be constructed. The quality of the research 
instruments is beyond doubt, and they provide an indispensable mine of ideas for instrument 
development. However, the approach is enormously resource intensive both in terms of the 
researchers' time and the goodwill of the organisations under study - a problem of which Van de 
Ven is, himself, aware (1981). A case survey based on organisational assessment methods is 
beyond the resources of most traditionally funded academic research projects, and it is unlikely 
that anyone organisation would be prepared to fund more than an assessment of itself which 
means that the crucial comparative element would be lost. At best. different units of the same 
organisation can be studied, which is what Van de Ven and Ferry did, but this means that it is 
unlikely that there will be sufficient variation between the units to alJow the identification of 
configurations. 
In an important sense, the approach deployed here is positioned between the generality or 
configuration and the specificity of organisational assessment by providing a robust and 
parsimonious methodology for collecting and analysing data on both structure and process. This 
may be called the tectonic approach27. It approaches organisations in a manner similar to 
organisational assessment, but uses a much simplified research instrument. with the aim of 
identifying configurations at the departmental and business level. This means that it is possible to 
reach the number of cases required for pattern analysis leading to the development of taxonomies 
of configurations; one possible development of the tectonic approach would be to pcrfonn enough 
case studies to allow the appraisal of the configurations found using simple statistical tests 
All the firms in the case survey were clear]y one broadly specified industry - metalworking -
~7) ". sene.~ of arts .... hich form anj perfect vessels. Implements. d .... elhn!!s. and places of .sscmhl~ 
tcctonl,$" Od.Jrd l-n!!I,sh Dlcllonary, 2nd cdillon 
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defined in tenns of the commonalities between the infonnation and materials flows across the 
sample. This industrial definition allowed enough variety within the sample to enable the 
identification of distinctive configurations. but retained enough similarity to enable the 
configurations to be meaningfully related to each other. This facilitated the comparative analysis 
of the ways in which the parts related to the whole in each configuration and deepened 
understanding of the dynamics of change. Clear industrial definition greatly eases the assessment 
of the relevance of the lessons for this particular sample of businesses for those in other industries. 
For instance. the findings of this research might be expected to be more directly relevant to 
industries with relatively similar infonnation and materials flows such as electronics, less relevant 
to those with more differentiated ones such as construction and chemicals, and of little relevance 
beyond the most general principles to the service industries which do not process materials at all 
such as finance. One way of exploring some of these contingent variations in terms of production 
information flows was indicated in figure 3.2. Thus, it is through the clear specification of the 
industrial context and its enactment in the strategy process that the tectonic approach analyses the 
relationship of the organisation to its environment. 
The tectonic approach can, therefore, handle effectively the analysis of organisational form, and 
the relationship of that form to it~ environment; can it also handle the genesis and transformation 
of form? The approach pays equal attention to structure and to process - the latter is particular}) 
manifested in the information and materials flows, and the choices regarding the production 
strategy. In an extensive review of the requirements for a theory of change in organisations. Van 
de Yen and Poole (1988) suggest that the structuration approach as developed hy Giddens ~c~ 
1984) provides the most likely way forward. Others, such as Ranson and his colleagues () 9~() I. 
have also advocated Giddens' work, while Barley (1986) demonstrates the value of a structuration 
. . . ' t' n' at the J'ob desi\Tn }C\l~l. The approach for the analYSIS of technologIcal change 10 organlsa 10 S . e-
., 'h h n the waYs in which structure hoth analYSIS of the eVIdence from the case survey as s ow . 
. . . . ' d t rials flows and bv strategic choice' constrams and IS constramed by the mformatlon an rna e. . . . ' 
regarding both the production strategy and the decision to implement CA O/CA;" 1 The leLl, Jnll 
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approach can, therefore, claim to handle simultaneously both morphostasis and morphogenesis. 
At the conceptual level, the approach is of broader relevance than the metalworking industrie~ 
While the findings are specific to certain sectors of manufacturing, the way of analysing 
organisations can be applied elsewhere. If the operational flows within the organisation _ which 
in manufacturing are the production information flow and the materials flow are redefined. then 
the tectonic approach can be applied in other industries, particularly in the service sector. For 
instance, the operating (production) flow can be through of consisting of funds in financial 
services; clients in personal services; or customers and merchandise in retailing. These will again 
be supported by distinctive flows of financial and human resources, and marketing infonnation 
flows. 
15.2 RESOLVING THE PARADOX OF FLEXIBILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY 
The paradox of flexibility and productivity in the management of production organisations was 
posed in the introduction. The paradox is generated because the strategies that have been so 
successful in generating the remarkable growth in productivity over the last four decades have 
compromised the ability of organisations to respond flexibly to the new demands being transmitted 
by the market during the last decades of the century. The new challenge posed for production 
management is how to create flexible organisations without jeopardising their ability to continue 
to generate advances in productivity. 
There are, essentially. two responses that an organisation can make to paradox - the first IS 
endurance through trying to live with it, and cope by incremental adjustment; the second IS 
transcendence through developing new organisational forms which. to take the anJ.lo~~ 01 
, 'l'k 1 I d to managerial o\erlo'ld dialectics. create a synthesis with the old, The first opllon IS ley to ea • 
d "k ' hIt d'ctory )'n'onnatl'on' then to the generation 01 sLII.:k as eClSlon rna ers cope wIt apparent y con ra I I' • 
" h' h th pole' of the paradox' and linall\ by decoupling those elements of the orgamsatlOn w IC are at e s . . 
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to a loss of competitiveness as overheads rise and decision times lengthen due to the implementa-
tion of more and more vertical co-ordination procedures. The second option may seem more 
difficult and expensive in the short run, but is more likely to pay dividends in the medium term. 
In the long tenn, the new organisational fonn will provide the base for the next paradoxical 
transfonnation. 
The transfonnation of metalworking organisation since 1945 is broadly summarised in figure 15.1. 
The transfonnation has two moments - form and context. Context summarises the ways in which 
production is consumed, and how the wishes of consumers are transmitted to producers through 
the market. Form, on the other hand, describes the types of organisations which are designed to 
respond to those wishes. The two are linked through the strategy process and market structure. 
Perhaps the most important feature of the post war context for the present discussion is that 
competition was essentially national in orientation and revolved around growth in national market 
share through cost competition - productivity was the key to competitive advantage. Regulated by 
Keynesian demand management policies, it led to the distinctively bureaucratic organisational fonn 
of the large corporation meeting demands for mass consumption through mass production which 
is called here the unitary form. It is unitary in two senses - firstly, the corporation is an 
unambiguously bounded entity with a clear delineation between the internal and the external. 
Secondly, it is divided into clear functional units - the "chimneys" of Ford (pascale 1990 chap 5). 
or the columns of Apo]]o's temple (Handy 1985 chap 7). 
Few metalworking organisations fully met this mass production model - vast areas of production 
in capital and defence goods remained resolutely batch orientated - but the mass production 
industries became the model for others to emulate. and functional units the basic ckrncnls 01 
organisation. The unitary form became an hegemony, just as "normal science" does under ~I 
paradi~m (Kuhn 1970 chap 9), which sti fled the articulation of alternative modch I! is perhaps 
si~nificant that many of the clements of the new form which will be articulated bcl()\.~. panicuLtrl: 
, 
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the organisational structures and new techniques of project management, first began to emerge the 
sector furthest from a mass consumption market - the defence industries. 
As world markets changed after the end of the long boom, they began, falteringly at first, to 
transmit new demands. The main changes were a breakdown of the national regulatory 
mechanisms for demand, and the shifting of the competitive arena to the global level. These 
factors increased both competition and uncertainty as markets became both more dynamic and 
increasingly complex. Productivity growth was now a necessary rather than sufficient condition 
for competitive advantage, and flexibility of response to customer demands became the new source 
of competitive advantage - the paradox of flexibility and productivity was thereby posed. The 
dilemma is that the solutions developed to solve the problem of productivity in the unitary fonn 
compromised the flexibility of manufacturing organisations. 
One proposal for the resolution of this paradox is Piore and Sabel'S (1984) advocacy of a return 
to the pre-unitary, or craft form, of "flexible specialisation". This is the option chosen by the 
construction industry (ibid chap 5), an example which exposes well its limitations. Here, the 
premium placed upon flexibility has stunted productivity growth and stifled innovation - the 
strategy has only been viable because construction markets remain almost entirely national in 
character (Ball 1988; Winch 1989). The other examples of the craftform cited by Piore and Sabel 
are mainly of companies choosing focus strategies in niche markets such as designer clothes and 
high technology goods early in the product life cycle. In neither case is productivity central to 
competitive advantage, and, by definition, only a small proportion of production can be for niche 
markets _ the bulk of turnover must come from the main markets. I\iche markeL" arc alsl) open 
to attack from mainstream producers as the battlc for the luxury car market segment illustr,llCs 
The problem is that under the craft form, fimlS have normally achil'ved flexibilit] through sLII.:k 
resource _ a return to this foml would amount to endurance rather than transcendence. \\'hile :.he 
. . " ··t· . not ad'ilu'He to meet the produCli\ it\' 
craft fonn may be a suffiCIent response to um:Cr1.llflt], 1 IS \.:'1 ' • 
\V lack 'md hi" collcJ"ues cntici'l' the growth demands of global competition. For thesl' reasons on • . ~. 
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work organisation developments at Volvo as a doomed attempt at "neocrafismanship", rather than 
a viable basis for global competitiveness (1990 p 101). 
Some analysts stress the differentiation of the production process within the network to gain 
flexibility. Thus Miles and Snow (1986), and Eccles and Crane (1987) propound the notion of the 
"dynamic network", in the search for flexibility. However, Miles and Snow again cite construction 
as an example, while Eccles and Crane focus on invesunent banking, an industry whose 
institutional weaknesses have been severely tested in the recent recession. The problem with 
"dynamic networks" is that the sources of integration are poorly developed, and rely on the 
activities of "brokers" whose power and motives are unclear. 
Others have chosen to stress the integration that comes from stable relationships within networks. 
Johnston and Lawrence (1988) outline the benefits of the "value-adding partnership" (V AP)28, 
while Charan (1991) shows the way in which clearly defined networks of middle managers can 
help a company to gain flexibility without compromising efficiency. Perhaps the most important 
work along this theme is that of Rockart and Short (1991) who stress the role of IT in making 
possible the "networked organisation" as a response to the new forms of global competition. 
Arguably, such a form of organisation is differentiated enough to achieve flexibility of response 
while developing the high levels of integration required to sustain productivity growth. 
Thus a new organisational form is required and its shape is beginning to emerge around the notion 
of networks - it may be called the network form. It is networked in three senses. Technologicall), 
it relies heavily on IT for the transmission of the bulk of information around the organisation. 
Organisationally. lateral communication is the norm through both formal and informal 
. . f h fi Ie's clear - suppl i~T'\ enter into Interpersonal networks. Contextually. the boundanes 0 t e lrm are s. . . 
value adding partnerships while non-core activities are sub-contracted out, and the "flexible lirm" 
. r he th I f\ of. t)'P1ClI .;on.~tnJcllon COflU'ICI IS. biller 1l1'_,,~ , 
28) AlthourJ1 pav~cly, thc)' also CIIC conSlT'JclIon .~ an c.um ric of a \" .... ~ ere .. I. 
ovcr thc dlMhutlon of "mlT~In" Within thc ",.Iue ,twll1l" 
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(NEDO 1986) may become the model for human resource management. 
None of the 15 organisations in this case survey have fully made the transformation to this new 
form. However, the evidence presented here does allow some important features to be sketched 
out, and some of the dynamics of transition to be indicated so far as production in metalworking 
firms is concerned, particularly at the engineering/manufacturing interface. Three main stratcgie~ 
for change at this interface were identified. The first is the implementation of integrating 
technologies and techniques in pursuit of a technical integration; the second is the development 
of iterative processes within the production information flow; and the third is the development of 
organisational linkages to generate and sustain the iterative organisational processes. These will 
be discussed in tum. 
The implementation of integrating technologies and techniques has a major force for 
organisational change in the case survey companies during the last decade. Integrating technologies 
were identified in chapter 2 as the group of advanced manufacturing technologies such as 
Computer Aided Design and Manufacturing systems, and Computer Aided Production Management 
systems whose implementation must cross functional boundaries for success to be achieved. It i~ 
this inter-spherical, or systemic, characteristic, combined with their complexity which distinguishes 
integrating technologies from other AMTs. These characteristics were summarised in figure 2.2. 
which also gave examples of other types of AMT. Integrating techniques are those such as total 
quality management, value engineering, and simultaneous engineering which are similarl~ 
inherently inter-spherical in their implementation. The research chose to focus upon CAD/CAM 
because of its inherently integrating character across the engineering/manufacturing interface. Jnd 
because. as one informant put it. it is an "enabling technology" which allows TQ\1 and 
simultaneous engineering to be implemented successfully. 
The implementation of CAD/CAM systems is a process that can be divided into the three slagL'~ 
discussed in chapter 5 and summarised in figure 5.2 - evaluation and the dcci~ion to adopt; 
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installation and the achievement of technical success; and consolidation and the achievement of 
business success. Technical success was defined as the point where the implemented system is 
performing to specification, while business success is the point where the system can be said be 
yielding the returns envisaged during the evaluation stage. The evidence is that these stages are 
both cyclical in that many companies have implemented CAD/CAM and then re-implemented their 
CAD/CAM systems, and recursive in that the organisational learning from the process of 
consolidation provides the basis for the next stage of evaluation. 
In terms of the evolution towards the network form, the implementation of CAD/CAM has two 
roles. Firstly, the achievement of an integrated system in which all the actors within the production 
information flow are able to access the same product data base is an obvious example of the IT 
aspects of the network form. However, no company had yet achieved this goal, although it was 
an articulated ambition in many. The extent to which technical success had been achieved in the 
case companies was summarised in table 10.1. As can be seen, many companies had yet to reach 
even this goal, partly due to the installation of technically incompatible CAD and CAM systems. 
However, these technical problems were due in turn to the poor project management of the 
implementation process. 
The second role of the implementation of CAD/CAM is in changing the organisational context. 
The integrating nature of CAD/CAM technology means that attempts to implement or rL'-
implement it tend to stimulate inter-sphere dialogue and debate. At MG, the Business Process 
Development Group, which acts as the main change agent within the organisation develorX'd out 
of the original CAD/CAM implementation team which was the first ever cross-ful1ction:t1 team in 
the organisation. At ME, a cross-functional cell, which developed around the CAD/CA\1 interlace 
for surface modelling. is now providing a role model for other inter- functional task force~ and 
teams. The development of a matrix structure at MK to integrate the production engineer.-; within 
the product development teams is intimately linked to the re-implementation of a completel~ nev. 
CAD/CAM system which has the functionality to support interactive team working. However. this 
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lone example of "synchronous implementation" (Ettlie 1988) using a participative implementation 
project team organisation is only possible on the foundations of 10 years of organisationalleaming 
associated with the previous system. 
In virtually all the case survey companies, the CAD/CAM system had either played a role in 
revealing to managers the inadequacies of the existing levels of organisational integration. or 
provided a catalyst towards moving a more integrated organisation. At MN and MO. the 
implementation of value engineering and simultaneous engineering respectively also had the same 
effect. In these cases, the existing levels of organisational integration provided a welcoming 
context for CAD/CAM implementation. However, it is also clear from these cases that integrating 
technologies cannot provide a technical fix for the resolution of the paradox of productivity and 
flexibility, because they must be supported by levels of organisational integration appropriate to 
the organisation's production information and materials flows. 
The product development process can be thought of as a flow of information which stimulates a 
flow of materials within the manufacturing process, in the manner described in chapter 3. The 
point at which this "production information flow" (Winch 1983) crosses from the engineering to 
the manufacturing function is a major interface within the product development process. The major 
question regarding the quality of this transaction is whether information flows sequentiall). 
reciprocally, or iteratively across the interface. Figure 13.1 presented a typology developed from 
the work of Adler (1988) which articulated the variety of ways in which this transaction can be 
co-ordinated, while table 13.1 presented the three most common means of co-ordination amOI1~Sl 
the cases. 
In all the cases surveyed except one, the engineering and manufacturing functions were highly 
. " . board level The onc ex.-:eplion wa\ differentiated, and represented by dtfferent ex.ecutJ\es .ll . 
differentiated at the level immediately below director. The examination of the ver:. different task 
. . h 4 h . 'd why thi" i" likelv to continuc to tx: contingencies faced by the two functtons In c aptcr s O~ c . .' . 
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the case. Except in the very smallest finn with limited engineering design capability, co-ordination 
between engineering and manufacturing cannot be achieved through de-differentiation, or the 
merger, of the two functions, but the through integration of the differentiated functions usin~ 
organisational linkages. 
For these reasons, the cases have all developed horizontal organisational linkages over the last fc\l, 
years in order to increase the infonnation processing capacity (Galbraith 1977) of the enginecr-
ing/manufacturing interface and thereby facilitate the development of iterative production 
infonnation flows. A typology of such links, developed from the work of Galbraith, was presented 
in figure 13.2, while their incidence across the cases was presented in table 13.2. The ordering 
principle of the hierarchy is complexity, with the most complex at the bonom of the list. They are 
grouped into those which only require changes in job design for implementation and those which 
require more thoroughgoing organisation design changes. The more complex the linkage, the 
greater the probable cost to the organisation in tenns of increased overheads. For this reason, the 
principle minimum intervention applies (Hrebiniak and Joyce 1984) - if adequate co-ordination 
can be achieved with simpler linkages, then they will tend to be preferred. 
The dynamic of co-ordination across the engineering/manufacturing interface is a special case of 
transaction governance within the production infonnation flow. The chapter 13 showed the 
importance of both structure and process in this dynamic. The evidence is that structural 
integration and process integration are correlated - those companies which deployed a high number 
of structural linkages also tend towards iterative processes within their production information 
flows. The only company where this is not true is MS, but this company is relatively 
undifferentiated, and does not, therefore, have much of a need for integration structures. Structu~ 
and process can, therefore, be considered to be mutually supportive in achieving organisation.1I 
integration within the production infonnation flow, The extent to which this correlation reveah 
a process of structuration (Giddens 1984) in which structure is used to create proccss, and pn),,'css 
, ", t- han l' in these ofl'anhation, generates structure was also dIscussed. Here lIes the mam engme 0 c gc . C' . 
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15.3 THE PROCESS OF TRANSCENDENCE 
The networked metalworking organisation is, then, very different from that nonnally existing in 
the industry, and only a few of the case survey organisations are very far along the road towards 
the networked form. Many still rely largely on the sequential processes indicated in figure 13.1. 
and few have moved beyond reciprocal processes. However, all are implementing some fonn of 
linkage mechanism to gain greater organisational integration between the engineering and 
manufacturing functions, and some have explicit ambitions to achieve a fully iterative production 
information flow. An indication of the range of position amongst these cases is given in figure 
15.2. It is intended merely to illustrate the relationship of each case to the ideal types established 
earlier, rather than to suggest a teleological evolution. The dynamic paradox of flexibility and 
productivity will be resolved within each industry in different ways depending on the specific 
context. Thus "lean production" (Womack et alia 1990) may well be the appropriate resolution for 
the car industry, but it is to reiterate the errors of the debate on "fordism" to suggest that it is a 
universal panacea29. This will tend to lead to the suppression of the lessons that can be learnt 
from industries as diverse as biotechnology (Dodgson 1991) and North Sea oil (Stinchombe and 
Heimer 1985) on the potential shape of the network form. 
The strategy process is central to the dynamic of change. Strategic shifts by both customers and 
competitor finns generate changes in market structure, which are signalled to the business JS 
performance gaps. Most of the time these are part of the normal give and take of competition, and 
can be relatively easily accommodated through incremental shifts in the production mission. 
However. over time, more fundamental shifts take place and tensions start to develop in the 
existing organisational form. Attempts to alter the mission with reconfigured infom1alion and 
materials flows are constrained by the existing structure which cannot accommodate the required 
changes. Eventually, the tensions accumulate to such an extent that only a shift in fonn IS posslhlc. 
_A' theIr cnthuswm for lean producuoo. and lhal ~9) While Womlck and his colleagues may well argue lhat they arc OCCL~lonalh cam~ I"'I~ In . .' 
. '" _ 5 r . U1 ~a (Junger Ie "'1,1I1,j(- (m\ crnphull). C.l(':.' 
their claims arr not unlvcn;.al. lhcir French puhlishcrs. In • subtle mlstnl'l511110n of the tlllc to u;; ~.I(ffV q . 
hIve no rr~rVII110I'l5 rt:glrdmg lhc hegemonic polenLJ.1 of Ic~ production 
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As the tensions are generated through the market, they tend to be common to firms within an 
industry and to propel industry wide changes - those firms failing to change tending to disappear. 
Where the shifts in market structure are profound and widespread, they engender changes in the 
organisational paradigm as has been witnessed over the last few years, although the effecl" are 
inevitably uneven between industries. 
The main problem of achieving a shift of organisational form is awareness. Organisational fonn 
is a relatively intangible phenomenon, so it is rarely possible for changes in form to diffuse 
directly from one organisation to another. What can diffuse are innovations in technologies and 
techniques. Awareness of a performance gap can mobilise relatively easily around the use hy 
competitors of new technologies such as CAD/CAM, and new management techniqucs such as 
TQM. Through the implementation process, awareness of tensions between the effectivc usc of 
the new technologies and techniques and thc existing organisational structure and processes grows, 
Organisational lag is inevitable in this process: it is the quality of organisational learning which 
will minimise it. Thus the implementation of new technologies and techniques is central to shifts 
in organisation form, the extent of the shifts varying with the character of the innovation on the 
dimensions of system and complexity discussed earlier. The integrating nature of CAD/CAi\1 
means that it tends to be relatively influential in developing such awareness,30 
Change comes through the dynamic resolution of tensions between structure and process in the 
organisation. Strategic decisions - be they proactive or reactive - require changes in the flov. s of 
information and materials for their implementation, One of the most important ways of changin~ 
flows is to change the technology, and so the implementation of AMT is onc of the main sourCl'S 
, . db' thc organisation', of change in the organisation, These changes III process become constrame) .'
, f 'I' th fl' At the same time changes in structure structure, and so It too changes to aCI Itate e new ows. ' , . 
, ,-, I th t nt'al 01 technolo(lical chan~cs, arc used to deliberately alter mformatJon flows to re ease c po c I . t" 
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Change is usually incremental within a given paradigm of organisational form, but when tensions 
become paradoxes, a shift to a new paradigm occurs. 
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GLOSSARY 
Unless o~erwise indicated, all the definitions in this glossary are taken or d from the 
glossary In Ingersoll Engineers (1985). a apted 
advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) General tenn to cover th I" . 
. . e app ICatlon of vanous 
developmg techniques such as CAD, FMS robotics and ATE to industn'aJ f . 
, manu actunng. 
algorithm In CAD/CAM software, a set of well-defined rules or procedures based th . 
" on rna ematlc 
anfd geometnc fonnulas for solvmg a problem or accomplishing a given result in a finite number 
o steps. 
alp~anumeric (?r alphameric) A tenn which encompasses letter, digits. and special character.-; 
whIch are machme-processable. 
APT (Aut~matically Prog.rammed Tools) One of the principle software languages used ITl 
computer-aIded manufactunng to program numerically control1ed machine tools. 
batch manufacture The production of pans in discrete runs of batches. interspersed with other 
production operations or runs of other pans. 
beta site A user's CAD/CAM site of facility selected by mutual agreement between the user and 
the vendor for testing out a new system. application package. hardware or software enhancement 
before its sale to other customers of the vendor. 
bill of materilIls (BOM) Manufacturing: data referring to pans and materials that list: what they 
are used for, how frequently and how they are structured. 
BOM See bill of materials. 
CAD (computer-aided design) Describes the more demanding and elaborate preparation of 
complex schematics and blueprints. In these applications, the engineer constructs a highly detailed 
drawing on-line using a variety of interaction devices and programming techniques. Facilities are 
required for replicating basic figures; achieving exact size and placement of componenL~; making 
lines of specified length, width, or angle to previously defined lines; satisfying varying gcometric 
and topological constraints amongst components of the drawing; etc. A primary difference 
between interactive plotting and design draughting lies in the amount of effort the engincer 
contributes. with interactive design draughting requiring far more responsibility for the eventual 
result. In interactive plotting, the computation is of central importance and the drawing is 
typically secondary. A second difference is that design drawings tend to have structure, i.e .. to 
be hierarchies of networks or mechanical or electrical components. These components must be 
transformed and edited. If. in addition to non-trivial layout. the application program involvcs 
significant computation of the picture and its components. this is the third and most complex 
category, that of interactive design. In addition to a pictorial datum base. or data qructurc. that 
defines where all the picture components fil on the picture and also specifies their geomctric 
characteristics. an application datum base is needed to describe the electrical. mechanical. and 
other properties of the components in a form suitable for access and manipulation by the analYSIS 
program. This datum base must naturally also be editable and acccssible by the interJcti\ l' user 
CAD/CAM (computer-aided design/computer-aided manufacturing) The integrali.'d u~c 01 
CAE. CAD. and CAM systems drawing upon the same product data hase. 
CAE (computer-aided engineering) Analysis of a design for ba~ic crror-ch.eckint: ~r to optiml~ 
manufacturability. perfonnance. and economy {for example. by companng \anous posslhle 
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mate~als or design.s).. Infonnation drawn from the product database is used to analyse the 
funcnonal. characte~s.ncs of a part, pro~uct, or system. under design and to simulate its performance 
u~der ~anous ~ndltlO~s .. CAE ~~1tS the executIon of complex circuit loading analyses and 
slmulatton d~nng. the ClrcUlt defimtI~n stage. CAE can be used to determine section properties. 
moments of merna, shear and bendmg moments, weight, volume, surface area, and centre of 
gravity. CAE can precisely detennin.e l.oads, vibration, noise, and service life early in the design 
cycle so that components can be optImIsed to meet those criteria. Perhaps the most powerfulh 
CAE technique is finite element modelling. See also kinematics. . 
CAM (computer-aided manufacturing) The use of computer and digital technology to generate 
manufacturing-oriented data. Data drawn from a CAD/CAM database can assist in or control a 
proportion of all of a manufacturing process, including numerically controlled machines. computer-
assisted parts programming, computer-assisted process planning, robotics, and programmable logic 
controllers. CAM can involve production programming, manufacturing engineering. industrial 
engineering, facilities engineering, and reliability engineering (quality control). CAM techniques 
can be used to produce process plans for fabricating a complete assembly; to program robots; and 
to coordinate plant operation. 
CIM (computer-integrated manufacturing) The concept of a totally automated factory in which 
all production processes are integrated and controlled by an IT system. CIM enables production 
planners and schedules, shop-floor foremen, and accountants to use the same database as product 
designers and engineers. 
COMPACT II A source language used in computer-aided manufacturing to program NC mJchine 
tools. COMPACT II is a registered trademark of Manufacturing Data Systems Inc. 
computer-aided process-planning (CAPP) An application program that is interdctive with 
CAD/CAM and assists in the development of a process/production plan for manufacturing. 
computer-aided testing (CA T) An application program that tests by modelling parts and product 
design and specifications through interaction with CAD/CAM. 
computer numerical control (CNC) A technique in which a machine-tool. control use.s a 
minicomputer to store NC instructions generated earlier by CAD/CAM for controlling the machine. 
configuration A particular combination of a computer, software and hardware modules. ~d 
peripherals at a single installation and interconnected in such a way as to support certain 
application(s). 
database A comprehensive collection of interrelated information stored o~ so~e kind of mass 
data storage device, usually a disk. Generally consists of information orgamsed 1n~0 a nu.mber 01 
fixed-format record types with logical links between associated reco.rds. TYPICally ~nc.lu.des 
operating system instructions, standard parts libraries, completed deSIgns ~nd docum,cntatlon. 
source code, graphic and application programs. as well as current user tasks m progress 
delllil drawing The drawing of a single part design containing all ~he dim~nsions: annotations. 
etc., necessary to give a definition complete enough for manufactunng and Inspectlon 
. h' h ts of NC machines are connected to a direct numerical control (DNC) A system In w IC se ' ~'::"::":'-"':":":::::":":'::'=":"'::=:"""'::"';::"';";":;~~-.~ • . f' be' the DNC computer memor\' and the 
mainframe computer to establIsh a dlfCct mter ace tv. cen . . 
machine tools. The machine tools arc directly controlled by the computer WIthout the usc of tape. 
. CAE f d termining the structural intcgnl \ 01 [inite element analysis (FEA) A method used m or e ...., '. 
. . . d d ' b)' mathemJtlcal SImulation 01 the r·1f1~ 
a mechanIcal part of phYSIcal constructIon un er eSI~ 
and its loading conditions. See finite element modellmg (FEtvD. 
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anile element modeUing (FEM) The creation on the system of a mathematical model representing 
a mechanical part or physical construction under design. The model, used for input to a finite 
element analysis (PEA) program, is built by first subdividing the design model into smaller and 
simpler elements such as rectangles, triangles, bricks, or wedges which are inter-connected. The 
fmite element model is comprised of all its subdivisions or elements, and its attributes (such as 
material and thickness), as well as its boundary conditions and loads (including mechanical 
loadings, temperature effects, and materials fatigue). See finite element analysis (FEA). 
t7gtbed plotter A CAD/CAM peripheral device that draws an image on paper, glass, or film 
mounted on a flat table. The plotting head provides all the motion. 
fkxible manufacturing system (FMS) An arrangement of machines (usually NC machining 
centres with tool changers) interconnected by a transport system. The transporter carries work to 
the machines on pallets or other interface units so that accurate work-machine registration is rapid 
and automatic. A central computer controls machines and transport. It may have a variety of 
parts being processed at anyone time. 
group technology A coding and classification system used in CAD for combining similar. often-
used parts into families. Group technology facilitates the location of an existing pan with 
specified characteristics, and helps to standardise the fabrication of similar pans. Grouping of 
similar parts in a family allows them to be retrieved, processed, and finally fabricated In an 
efficient, economical batch mode. See family of pans. 
hard automation Use of specialised machines and machine lines to manufacture and assemble 
products or components. Nonnally each machine or line is dedicated to one function. such as 
milling. Hard automation is usually of a continuous manufacturing type and is used for high 
volume production in distinction to batch production. 
hardware The mechanical, electrical and electronic devices which compose a programmable 
controller/computer and the application components. 
initial graphics exchange specificatioll (lGES) An interim CAD/CAM database specification 
until the American National Standards Institute develops its own specification. IGES attempts to 
standardise communication of drawing and geometric product information between computer 
systems. 
island or automatwn (Bright 1958) Stand-alone automated machine, (eg roboL~, CAD/CA\1 
systems, NC machines) without the integration required for a cohesive system. 
job shop A manufacturing facility which specialises in one-of-a-kind or limited production (small 
batch processing) of parts and subassemblies or products. 
kinematics A computer-aided-engineering (CAE) proceeds for plotting or animating the motion 
. CAE' I t' programs allov-of parts in a machine or a structure under deSIgn on the system. slmu a Ion .-. 
. .' . I' d for'c detemlmallons the motion of mechanisms to be studIed for Interference acce eratlOn. an l: 
while still in the design stage. 
. rf" t ' of metal removal operJtions on a 
machining centre A machine capable of pe ormlng a vane) 
part, usually under numerical control. 
. . vl11nninJ! (\IRP/l\1RP III .\ 
materwls requirements p/Olllllllg or manu[acturlllg resources· 
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variety of computer applications for ordering materials and managing inventorie th t 
increasingly interactive with on-line manufacturing data and financial data. See bills Of
s mat~ri:' 
mechot~onics "Mechatronics is ~e ~yn~rgetic combination of precision mechanical engineerin~. 
electromc ~ntrol. and systems thmkmg m the design of products and processes. II (Bradle\ et alia 
1991 p XVll). . 
mo~elling. sO.lid. A type of 3D modelling in which the solid characteristics of an object under 
desIgn are bUIlt mto the database so that complex internal structures and external shapes can be 
realistically represented. 
MRP (Materials Requirements Planning) A time-phased. level by level. nctting and batching 
materials planning system. 
MRP II (Manufacturing Resource Planning) A development of MRP which takes into account 
the planned availability of capacity. 
numerical control (NC) A technique of operating machine tools or similar equipment in which 
motion is developed in response to numerically coded commands. These commands may be 
generated by a CAD/CAM system on punched tapes or other communications media. Also. the 
processes involved in generating the data or tapes necessary to guide a machine tool in the 
manufacture of a part. 
simulation A CAD/CAM computer program that simulates the effect of structural. thermal. or 
kinematic conditions on a part under design. Simulation programs can also be used to exercise 
the electrical properties of a circuit. Typically. the system model is exercised and refined through 
a series of simulation steps until a detailed. optimum configuration is reached. The model is 
displayed on a CRT and continually updated to simulate dynamic motion or distortion under load 
or stress conditions. A great variety of materials. design configurations. and alternatives can be 
tried out without committing any physical resources. 
surface modelling Automatic generation of NC tool paths to cut 3D shapes. Both the tool paths 
and the shapes may be constructed using the mechanical dcsign capabilitics of a CAD/CAt\l 
system. 
turnkey system Any system for which the supplier/vendor assumes total rcsponsibilil) for 
building. installing. and testing, and the training of user personnel. Usually imp~ies a ~ommitment 
by the vendor to make the system work, and to provide preventive and remedIal mamtenance. 
wire-frame graphics A CAD technique for displaying a three-dimension~l objec~ o.n the CRT 
screen ali a series of lines outlining iL~ surface. See finite element analYSIS and fmlte clement 
modelling. 
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The project is aimed at establishing the best practice for 
CAD/CAM implementation, and at developing a methodology for 
managers who are implementing in the future. 
We want to collect information in the following areas:-
- the way in which your unit/plant is organised in terms 
of departments, communications, production processes and 
so on 
- the product market and more general economic 
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- the way in which you went about implementing your 
CAD/CAM system 
- the benefits of that implementation you have gained so 
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All information will be treated confidentially, and no 
interviewee or company will be identified in the report of the 
results of the survey. It is not anticipated that an~ ~f the 
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through the Warwick Manufacturing Roundtable, and through 
individual company sessions should you wish. 
Very many thanks for your help 
Graham Winch 
David Twigg 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CAD/CAM PROJECT 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
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• • • • . . . • • • . . . • • . . • • • 11 • • · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . 
• • • ... • • D • • • • • • • • • • • 11 · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . 
• ••••••••• a a •• • • • • • • • • II • • • • • • • • · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• •••••••••• a a • • • aD. • • • • • a • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . 
· ................................................. . 
· . . . . . . 
• ••••••• • a • • 11 11 D • • • • • • • • • • • · . · . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 11 • • • • • • • a a • • . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • u • • • • 11 • • • • a a .11. 11 • • • · . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a • • · ...... . . . . . . 
• • • • • • 11 • II 11 • • • II 11 • a II • II • II • .11. 
• • • • • • 11 • • • • • • • . . . . . 
2) How many employees are there presently on this site? 
•••••••••••• I: •• II •••••••••• II •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
3) Can you please tell us 
manufacturing operations on 
the total turnover of 
this si.te . 
the 
.............. aa •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
4) 
the 
In assessing the overall 
last two years~ would you 
earned has been: 
performance of this plant over 
say that the gross revenue 
well in excess of costs 
sufficient to make a small profit 
enough to break even 
insufficient to cover costs 
so low as to produce large losse~ 
5) What are the major product lines (maximum 3) produced 
at this unit? 
1. • • • • • • • • • · . · .. . . . . . . . · . . . ... . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . 
. . . · . . 
., 
.a;.. • . . • • • • . . . · ... • • a • • • · . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
3 •• • • • • • • • . . . . . . . • • . . · .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
6) For each of these major lines~ is the market 
1 2 ~ '-' 
local 
nationa.l 
E.E.C. 
global? 
.... -
7) 
in 
feltJ 
For 
terms 
«4) 
each of these 
of the number 
customers? 
products 1S yOLl~ rna ltd' 
I r- t~ e 1 ve r- S 1 f 1 e d customer-s~ or- lar-gely dominated bv a 
1 2 
diversifed 
fe ... J customers 
8) For each of these products~ would you 
the level of demand over- the cha.nges in 
aside from 
desc,.-ibe the 
last two vear-s. 
9) 
the 
seasone.l 
1 2 
Over the last 
pr-oduc t market 
1 2 
va. I'" ie. tions as 
t~A,)O 
for 
rising 
largely static 
fed 1 ing 
years has the 
each of these 
incl"'ea.sed 
level of competition 
p,.-oducts 
stayed largely the same 
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corporation. 
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· ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . " . . · .... · . · . . 
· . . . . . . . . . 
If a single establishment firm go to Q 15 
11) 
head 
By what 
office? 
cr-itel"'ia 
• • • • • • • • • • • " " · . " 
1S your unit's pe,.-for-mance 
• • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . · . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
· . . . . · . . · . . . 
· . . . · . . 
. . . 
measured b. 
· . . . · . . . · . . . 
. . . . · . . . . .. · . . 
· . . . 
· ....... . • • • • • • • • • • • • · . . . . . . · . • • • • • 
· . . · . 
• • • • • • • • • · . . . . . . • • • • · . . . • • • • · . 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . · . 
. . · . . . 
12) How does your unit 
market strategy? 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
fit 
· . .. . 
• ••••••••••••• • a · . • • • • • • • • • 
into head office's product 
• • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • a • • • • · . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· ....... . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • · .. . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . 
· . . .. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
13) How 
unit? 
is 
· ..... . 
· .......... . 
head office's strategy communicated to YOLlr 
· . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • · . • • a • • • • • II I: . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . • • • • • • • • • • u • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
14) What input does your unit make to the formulation of 
head office's strategy? 
••••• II •••• a •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • D • D • • • • · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 
· ............................... . · . . . . . . . . . . 
15) What are the main sources of 
initiatives in your unit? 
capital for new 
•• II •••••••••••••• II a •••••••••••••••••••• 
.......................... · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• ••••••••••• a ..... II ••• 
· . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
16) Do any statutory requirements such as product 
liability~ pollution~ or quality controls impinge upon your 
engineering and manufacturing processes? 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· .................... . .. . . . . . . . . . II • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
....................................... · . . . . . . . . . 
• •••••••••• . . . .. • • • II • • . . · . • •• · .... 
• • It • • • a • • • • • • • • • • • • • · . . . . 
. . .. .. .. • It • 
· . 
. . • II .. It .. . . . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
B) MANUFACTURING STRATEGY 
In this section we are trying to find out how the 
production plan of your plant/unit is related to the product 
market your plant/unit faces. 
1) For each of the major products identified above. 1~ 
ea.ch produc t: 
1 2 -,. . .::-
made to forecast and then sold from 
stock or the forward schedule? 
assembled to customer order? 
manufactured to customer order from 3 
standard catalogue? 
designed (at least in part) to 
customer specification and then 
manu f C'I.C tured'? 
2) What is the annual unit volume of each of these 
products? 
1 . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . a 
? 
....... *' ••••••••••••••• 
~ 
"-' ................... . 
3) How does the company plan to win orders in the mar~.et 
place? (order winning criteria) 
From the following list~ pick no more than three 1n 
each column~ and rank them for each of the products 
identified above: 
Cri. teria. 
Price 
Delivery 
Speed 
Reliability 
QUC'l.1 i ty 
reliability 
finish 
Rate of new product 
introduction 
Prod.1. Prod.2. Prod.3. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 1 eve 1 •....• • • ... • • ... 
Product Design 
Technology 
Performance 
Visual design 
Other(specify) 
· . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4) Do you expect any long-term changes in the order 
winning criteria in the near future? 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • D • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5) Does the overall volume of demand for the products of 
your unit usually vary significantly ()25%) 
over the previous month? 
over the previous year? 
not at all. 
6) Would you describe the usual mix of your final products 
as: 
stable, with little change and easy to cope with 
variable, with reasonable variability with WhlCh 
manufacturing and engineering have the 
flexibility to cope 
unstable, with major variability in mlX which 
causes major uncertainties and difficulties for 
engineering and manufacturing. 
7) In terms of the major factors in mix variation~ into 
which category do most of your parts fall: 
runners~ with fairly continuous~ repetitive 
demand 
repeaters~ with regular orders (at least one 
order or batch per month) 
strangers~ with orders on a one-off or very 
irregular basis (less than one order or batch 
per month). 
8) Can you give a rough percentage of the proportion in 
each category? 
rLln n e rs ••••••••.•.••••• 
repea ters •••••••.•••.. • . 
strangers ••..••.••••• • . · 
9) How far in advance can you plan production Wlth 
certainty ()75%)? high 
week 
month 
quarter 
year. 
10) Which of the following descriptions most closely fits 
the role of your manufacturing unit in the overall business 
strategy of you company: 
the aim is to minimise the potential of 
manufacturing to lose money for the company: 
the aim is to achieve parity in terms of 
performance with competitors~ 
- the aim is to integrate manufacturing within the 
overall business strategy; 
the aim is to achieve competitive advantage 
through the development of the manufacturlng 
function? 
11) What is the total annual facility development budget 
for your unit for 
ne~·:t 
this 
last 
yea. r ............... . 
year- •••••.•.•....... 
,..., ye Ct. r ... c •• II • • • • • • • • • :" 
12) Do you have a written statement of the manufacturing 
goals of your unit? 
yes (request copy) 
- no 
13) Do you have a written statement of the engineering 
goals of your unit? 
yes (request copy) 
no. 
14) How would you summarise the strategic goals of your 
unit? 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 
. . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.... 
Do you. 15) 
m3.nufacturing, 
ever e >~ per i en c e 
and the g02\.l s 
conflict bet\!-Jeen 
engineer-inq. of 
the 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . .. 
• • • • • • DC. • . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 
. . . . ... . . . . . . . . 
• • • . . . 
· ..... · .... 
. . . . . 
· ... 
. . · . . 
. . . . . . ... . . • • 
.. . . . • •• D . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . · . 
. . . . . . . . 
C) TECHNOLOGY AND MISSION 
In this section we 
processes employed 
meet market demand. 
want to 
in your 
establish the 
unit and the 
production 
way they are used 
For- each pr-oduct 
process(es) 
1) 
production 
cha.r-t) • 
line, plea.se 
within your-
descr-ibe the main 
unit (outline process 
2) For- each one, wou.ld you. describe it as 
1 ...... L -=!" ._. 
one-off 
small-batch (less than 100 off) 
1 Cl.r-ge-ba tc h 
flow line production? 
'") ._' Please br-iefly describe the evolution of these 
ma.nufacturing processes» 
• • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
to 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••• a a •••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • a a • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a a a a • • • • . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • II • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • II a •••• . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . 
· .......... . . . . a a a a a • • • a a • • • • • m a • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . 
• •••••••••••• II ••• II • • • • II a ••••••••••••••• . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• •••••••••••••••••• II ••••••••••••••••••••• • • 
. . . . 
• ••••••• a a •••••• . . . . • ...... II ••••• II •• 
. . . . . . 
· ..... . . . . a a • • a II • • • 
• a 
a a • ••••• c • • • a • • • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4) What the main criterion by which 
made with regar-d 
day-to-dav 
to the management 
is 
operational decisions are 
of the manufacturing process? 
• • • • • • • a a . . . . . • a . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . · . . . . 
· ...... . • a a a a • a • • a • a a . . . . . . a a . .... . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . 
· . . . . 
• •••••• • • • • • • • • • • • a • a • 
• a 
. . . . •••• • • a 
. . . . . . . . . . ... 
. . · .. . . · . . . . 
5) Please scale (1,2,3) the following rnanufacturinq 
formanre criteria in order of i t -per - - rnpor ance (three maXlmum): 
Scale 
meeting delivery dates; 
maximising labour utilisation; 
maximising machine utilisation; 
minimising work in progress; 
maintaining quality~ 
maintaining flexibility; 
maximising output; 
meeting budgets. 
6) Please indicate for each of the following statements 
how well they describe your company's approach to new 
technology. (1.-3 scale, 1 poor description, 2 sati'E,factory. 
3 = good) 
We have a long tradition and reputation in our 
industry of attempting to be first to tryout 
new methods and equipment. 
We are actively engaged in a campaign to 
recruit the best qualified technical personnel 
available in engineering or production. 
We are strongly committed to technologicel 
forec2',sting. 
We stress our new production or design 
technology in our marketing strategy. 
D YOUR UNIT'S ORGANISATION 
In this section we want 
unit is organised in 
departments and the 
you to tell 
terms of the 
relationships 
us about the way your 
functions of the various 
between them. 
1) Plea.se 
eng ineer ing 
chart) 
describe the structure of the manufacturlnq/ 
orQ_anisatin_n (pr -epare organisation functions' 
2) Please describe any changes 1n 
last three yea.rs. 
this structure o/er the 
· . . . . . . . . . . ...................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
· ....... . • • II • • • • II • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• •••••••••••••••• · . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
......................... .: .................. . . . 
• ••••••••••••••••• ~ II • II ••••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Please describe 
departments (prepare production 
materials flow chart). 
7) . .:, the f lo~.., of a typica 1 job 
information 
throuqh 
flow chart 
these 
and 
"a) 
'-' 
Has thi.s pattern changed in the last three years? 
· ..... . • •• a a •• · . . . . · . . . . . . . . . 
............................ · . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . · ................... . . . . . . . 
· ..... . · . . . a a • ••••• II •• a a ••• a • . . · . . 
. . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • II • • • • • • · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
4) How would the you describe 
and the 
information flow between 
immediately upstream and 
(show chart 1) 
your departmen t!l 
immediately downstream 
one 
from you 
4a) Has this pattern changed in the last three vear=~ 
· ... • • • • II · . . . · . . . . . . . · . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• •••••••••• • • a a • • • • • a · . . · . 
a • 
· . 
• • • • • a • 
• •• a •••••••••••••• • II a •••••••••• II ••• a ••• 
· . . . . . . . . 
· ....... . · .. • • II • • • • • • · . . • • • • • II · . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . · . . . . 
• •••• · . 
. . • • • • • • · . · . . . • • • • · . . · . 
. . & • • • • • • • • • · . 
. . . . . . . · . . . . 
. . 
4b) How flow between 
chart 2) the information functions? (Show 
the 
describe would you 
and engineering manufacturing 
4c) has this pattern changed 
• • • • • • • · . . • • · . . · . . · . · . 
· ..... · ... · .. · . . . · . . . . . . • • · . 
· ..... 
· . 
. . · . . · . . .. • • ... • • • • • 
• ••••• • •••• · . . . . . · . . · . . · ... · .. 
in the last three years. 
· . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
· . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . · . . . 
. . . 
· . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . · . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
• •••••••• • • • · . • • • • • • · . . · . · .. · . . 
· ..... 
. . . . . . 
A) 
Independent 
Information 
Flow 
B) 
Sequential 
Information 
Flow 
C) 
Reciprocal 
Informa tion 
Flow 
D) 
Iterative 
Information 
Flow 
wont Enters Unit 
999 
Worlt Le~ Unit 
Worlt Enters 
~ 
Work Leeva 
t 
Work LelYft 
Worlt Enters 
I ?<l~ I 
Work LelYft 
Chart 2 
Engineering/Manufacturing 
i 
I 
5) How frequently does your department exchanqe 
information with the department immediately upsiream 
downstream from it. 
upstream downstream 
daily 
weekly 
monthly 
and 
less than monthly. 
5a) Has this pattern changed 1n the last three years? 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... · . . ... 
D • a a a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
a • a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ...... 
• •• a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • D •••• . . . . . . 
.................................. . . . . . . . . . . 
. .. 
6) 
the 
betl,&Jeen How is liaison undertaken 
department immediately upstream 
your department 
downstream. 
and 
a.nd 
upstream do~..,nstream 
informally 
liaison person 
working groups 
matrix organisation 
6a) Has this pattern changed in the last three years? 
· ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . ...... . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . 
...... . . . . . 
· ..... . • • . . . . . . . . 
...................... . . . . ....... 
. . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
• • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · ... . . . . . . ... 
. . . . . 
6b) How is liaison undertaken between the engineering and 
manufacturing functions? 
informally 
liaison person 
working groups 
matrix organisation 
bc) HC'.s this pattern changed in the la.st three veC'.r<.::? 
• • •• • • •• • • • • •• • • ••• • • • • •••••••• II ••••••••••• 
• • a a • • • · . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • • ••• • ••••• • •••••••• II a • 
• •••••••••••••••••••• II •••• 
• • • • • II • • • . . . . . . . 
· . . . .. . . ••••• II ••• ICI ••••••••••••• Q •••••••••••• 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• II ••••••• 
. .. 
7) Have you ta.ken any steps to develop design fo~-
ma.nu f a.c ture? 
. . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • II • • • • • • • • • • • a • 
• • • • • • II ••• I: •• II •••••• 
• • • • • II • • • • .. • • • • • a •••••••••••••••• 
•••• 11 ••••• ...... 
. . . Daa ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
8) Which of the methods is c lo<.::·e<.::.t to 
manufacturing and 
your unit (three 
engineering functions 
maximum) (Show figure 
the 
B.re 
3) 
way ln vJhic h 
co--or-d ina ted 
9) How is the performance of your- department evaluated 
senlor management? 
••••••••••••••• l:aD •••••••••••• · . . . . . . . 
••• aaa ••••••••••••• aaaa. II a •• 
•• D •••••••••• a ••••••••• • •• • • • 11 • • • • • 
••••••••••••••• o •• ao •••••••••••• . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
the 
.1n 
bv 
Chart 3 
ENGINEERING/MANUFACTURING 
COORDINATION PROCEDURES 
PHASE: 
PRE· PROJECT 
COMMUNICATION 
PATTERN: 
ONE·WAY 
STILTED 
TWO-WAY 
TWO-WAY 
Source: 
Designers' tacit 
knowledge 
ofmfg 
Design rules 
Functional 
strategy 
coordination 
9 
PROJECT 
Early mfg start 
with early 
design data 
1-
Design reviews 
Joint design 
teams 
P.S. Adler: The ~aaeti&1 Challenles or Intelrating CAD/CAM 
POST·PROJECT 
Manufacturing 
flexibility 
~ 
Engineering 
changes 
4 
Post-project 
appraisals 
Chart 4 
Elements of Manufacturing Systems Integration 
~~ ~,~,,~~ 
'&~ \.i~;:; ,,<:-~ ~,,~~ ..... ,,<>~ 
~,,>'" ~.:; t..,,<:-~ 
~e '. .....,,<:> e<' ~~ ~ ~e 
I(,..:}I \,0<> 1(,<,0 <,,,<>~ ~~t..; ~~ <:-q, 
... v. \.i~ 
1(," _,-~I(, 0<> 'lie v <,0 ~~t..; ~ ~" (J ~<:> \,<:-q, (>~ 0 o<'~ ~o 00<' 4$"q, I(,~<' \.i0 ~e~ t..,,<:-q, ~<,4, ~q, ~"o~ 
~~ e<' '\~ A- \.,~ eq,· ,,~'i ~~ ~ ~q,t..; V'~ 
4,e ~ ~ \,'t> ~ or.; :\. 0 e<' ~ ~<, 
Sales Planning (including ....,<> ~.,q, ~o ~q, ~'b-~ ~ ~'b- ,"~r.; r:§-~ ~<, <:)"q, 
Forecasting) 0 0 0 DOD DOD 0 0 
Inventory Status 0 DOD D DOD 0 0 
Master Production Scheduling/MRP D D D D D DOD 0 
Shop Floor Control 0 0 DOD DOD 
Design Engineering (including CAD) 0 0 0 DOD D 
Manufacturing Engineering (including CAM) D DOD 0 D 
hocess Controls DOD D D 
Quality Reporting 0 D D D 
kcounting 0 D D 
Order Entry 0 D 
Purchasing D 
Please indicate which pairs of computerized subsystems (or 
• hases) you plan to better integrate over the next two years by checking 
appropriate box(es). 
ee: Manufacturing Futures Survey, Boston University, 1985 
E) IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section ~e move on to dl."sc th"  uss e l.mplementation of 
your CAD/CAM system. 
1) Please describe your CAD./CAM sy~tem. ·t h· t 
- • l. S l. S ory and 
the plans for its future development. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· ....... . • • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • 
.... . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • • II a •••••• a a ••••• . . . . . . . . . 
· . . .. . . a a • c • • Q • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a • 
u • • • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . ...... . 
• • D • • • a • • • a a • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a • • • • • • • • • 
..................................... . . 
•••••• D ••••••• n •••••••••••••••••••••••••• • • • • • • • • D • • 
2) What proportion of the total facilities budget given 
earlier do these developments take? 
25% 
50% 
751. 
100% 
3) Systems integration. Please 
computerised systems you plan to 
next two years by filling in the 
(Show figure 4) 
indicate which pairs of 
further integrate over the 
attached integration matrix 
4) Which of the following statements best characterise 
your current CAD/CAM implementation strategy 
an experiment prior to full scale adoption 
an independent investment in CAD followed by 
linking to CAM 
A planned phased approach to CAD/CAM 
a fully integrated implementation elM. 
5) What prompted you to evaluate implementing CAD/CAM. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
• ••• . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • iii ••••• • • • • •••••• • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . ... 
. . . . . . . . . . .......... 
· . . . . . . ............................ . 
· . . . . . . . ................................ . 
. ....... . 
6) Have any of your customers influenced 
CAD/CAM t ~ your choice of sys em:· 
yes 
- no 
If no~ go to Q 10. 
7) Can you name them? 
• • • • • a a • • • u • • • • • • • a a • • • • D a a c • a a • • a a • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . 
8) What has been the influence of these customers? 
Customer requires that you 
have technology, and 
specifies the system 
Customer requires that you 
have technology 
Customer suggests that you 
ha.ve technology 
CAD CAD/CAM 
10) On what criteria was the system justified? 
• • • a a • • • • • • II • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a a • • • • a 
• a • • • • • a an. • • • • • • ................................ . . . . . 
• ..... u ••••••••• a a a • • • aD. a • • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• a • 
a.a •• a_allall DOo ••••• a •••••••• n ••••••••••• •••••••••• 
• •••••••• " ••••• Il •••••••••••••••••••• a a •••••••••••••••••••• 
11) To whom was the justification made? 
• a • • • • • • • • a a .......................... a a C • 
......................................... 
......................................... D • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
12) Over what time period did you implement/do you plan to 
implement the system? 
• •••••••• II • . . . . . . 
...................................... 
13) Which of the following statements best characterises 
your systems evaluation strategy? 
an independent systems consultant was retained 
a single CAD supplier was approached 
multiple CAD suppliers were approached 
- a combination of consultants and supplier~ wer~ 
approached 
14) Which of the following best describes your procurement 
strategy? 
- use of external supplier for total turnkey 
opera.tion 
- joint design and installation - supplier 
dominant 
- joint design and installation - your company 
dominant 
- total control of design and installation by your 
compa.ny 
15) How was the system designed? 
standard system - off the shelf 
system tailored to company environment 
16) What criteria were used to select the supplier(s)? 
•••••••••••• a ••••• " ••••••••••••• u ••••••••••••••••• 
•• aa ••••••••••••• a •••••••••••••••••• n ....................... . 
• c.a •••••••••••••••••• c •••••••• c •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
801l ............ a ... " •••••••••••• a.o ••••••••••••••••••••• ., ••••• 
"a •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
17) Please rank the quality of your unit's relationship 
with the system vendor during implementation for each of the 
following questions on a 1-3 scale (l=poor~ 2= satisfactory 
3=good) • 
the quality of the relationship was very good 
supplier and user goals were compatible 
problem solving styles were easy to integrate. 
18) Can a particular individual be credited with pushino 
the implementation through? 
yes 
no 
19) If yes~ please give his/her position in the 
organisation . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
20) What role have senior management 
played in the decision to innovate and 
implementation? 
(i.e. director level) 
the subsequent 
• • D • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • II • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • II • D • • • • • a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • II II II II II II • II II II II • II II • II II • • • II • II II II • • • • II • II II II II II 
C II II • • • II II • 
• • II • • • 
21) I;Ja. s 
implement 
B.ny spec i f ic 
the system? 
grouping 
eVCl.luate implement 
set up to evaluate 
informal gr-oup 
par-t-time task for-ce 
full-time project team 
specialist pr-oject manager-
a.ppointed? 
22) If so. cCl.n you pi ea.se desc r- i be the br-ief it was given? 
.................. 11" ••••••• • II II • a II II • • II II II • • II • II 
•• a ••••••• II •••• a ••• U •••••••• ., ...... . ..a ••••• a ••••••••• un •• III •• 
II ... II • II • • II • II • II • II • • II II II • • II • a a II a II II II II II • II II II • a . . II • D II • • • II • • a a • • • 
•• a ••• an ..... au ••••••••• II ••• II II •• II a II II • • II II • II D II II • 
II II a a II • II • II a II II " . " " 
• II II a a • • a II II • II II II II II II II ••• II II II •• a ••• 
23) Which depa~tments wer-e involved the 
evaluation 
• • • " a a • a ••••••• u •••••••• ......... 
• a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
D • a a a •••• a a • a • a • a • • • a a • • a a • • • • • • II • • . . . . . . . . . . . 
implementation planning 
a ••••••••••••• " •••••••••••• a " 
of th t ~, e :.ys em:· 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.................. a a ••••••• • • • • • • • • • • • • • a . . . . . . . . . 
. . . 
. . . . 
24) Has the company had any previous experience of the 
implementation of: 
computerised business systems (e.g. purchasing 
payroll) 
CAD 
CAt1 
value engineering techniques 
group technology 
Just-in-Time production 
If so~ please describe them briefly 
•• a a •• •••• •••••••••••• e •• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• 11 •••••••• a .................. o ••••••••••••• o •••••• • • • • • u • • • 
• • • • • u • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ..................... . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • a • • • • • • • a a • II • • • .. • • a a • • • 
J; •••••••••••••••••• a a ••••••••••••• 
26) 
the 
Have there been 
implementation of 
any disputes 
the system? 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
between departments over 
• • a a • • • • • • a a • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • II a • • • • • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . a a II a •••• • • • • • • II • • . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . a ••••••••••••••••••••••• • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a a • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
27) How did you obtain the expertise required for the 
evaluation and implementation of the system? 
evaluation implementation 
use existing staff 
hire a consultant for an 
initial report 
retain a consultant over 
the key stages of 
evaluation and 
implementation 
hire full-time 
specialist staff. 
28) Is there an implementation project manager? 
yes 
no 
29) Is there a manager in charge of CAD/CAM operation~~ 
30) Please 
specified in 
high) 
yes 
no 
rCl.te criteria 
29/30 on the 
for the selection of the 
following on a 1-4 scale 
m·:3.nagers 
(1 low 4 
CAD/CA,..1 
MGR 
PROJECT 
MGR 
Design experience 
Software/systems expertise 
Prior experience of CAD or 
CAD/CAM 
Cross-functional management 
skills 
Were each of these managers recruited 
internally: CAD/CAM man .. · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
project man. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
externally: CAD/CAlvj man. . . . • • • • . . . . . . . 
proj ec t man ...••••................ 
What are the major sources of 
CAD/CAM implementation. 
learning that you. e:·:pect 
during the 
•••••••• a •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• . . . . · . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
· . • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • a a a • •••• D • · . 
. . . . . . . . . . . · . . . 
• •••••••••••••••••• a a •••••••• . . · . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . 
. . . 
-.- ..... ) 
' .. '. __ ,_I If the system is operating~ 
impr-ovemen ts? 
do you have a policy of 
getting 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . · . 
... · . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . 
· ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · ..... · . 
· . . . . . · . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . · . . 
. ..... 
· ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ . . • • · ... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
34) Please describe your training associated with the ~ew 
technology for each of the following employee groups: 
Personnel 
Design Engineer 
Dra.ug h-=:· tmen 
Production engineers 
Pla.nning sta.ff 
Manufacturing managers 
Engineering managers 
Sen i. 0 1'". managet-~. 
Superv i s·ors 
Others (please specify) 
Amount 
<week <month 1-9months >~month~ 
35) What project management and planning tools have you 
used? 
••••• IIIl.a •• aaJla.DflcUlla •• IIIIII •••••• C ••••••••••••••••••••• 
aa.aaa.aaaaaa •• aa ............ c.ac •••••••••• I11 ••••••••••••• e ••• 
•••• " ....... aaall •• aa ••••••••• aa •••• I1.all •••••••••••••••••••••• 
aa ........ ucaaaauaaauaauaaaa ••• nua ........................... . 
••••••••••• aa.lIlI.aaa •••• c: .. uaa.ct.:.a ••• lla ...... cu ••••••••• a •••• 
F) F'EPFOPMANCE 
In this section we 
the implementation 
want to ask 
of CAD/CAM 
you about the 
in your unit. 
outcomes from 
1 ) Doe:::, the system meet 
in terms of 
cost 
the lCl.id down the 
eVCl.l Ud. tion 
deadline 
performd.nce a 
2) If not 
... a.aa .. lla ••• D 
••• aa •••• lla •• aa ••• al:lla. aaallaa.a 
· . 
• a ••••••••• ••• •• 1:1 ••• · . . . . 
••••••••••••••••• lIaa •• .: •• a • II II II • II II II • II II 
. " " 
c· ) 
. , How do you.~ or pld.n to med.=·ure the performClnce of the 
imp 1 emen td. tion project 
•••• a ••••••• D ..... .. 1I1I •• e •••••••••••• II ••• 
.......... aa Duea"caaaa.aaaaac . . . 
the implemented technology 
" " 
.a ••••• a •• Il •• 
•• "aa ••• lJalZt::aaa.allaaaa 
a " " " a " 
II II • II • II .. .. II • II • .. II • II II • II 
4) A~e any of the 
system 
(l=not 
pe~fo~ma,nce? 
used 2 = some 
following used 1n the evaluation of the 
use 3 =impo~tant mp~~L~ ) 
- -_ l. e 
Sca I E;:, 
-Time to install 
-Cost to install 
(%ove~ budget) 
-Uptime 
-cycle time met 
-ROI 
-Design to 
manufactu~e lead time 
-labou~ p~oductivity 
-custome~ satisfaction 
-ope~ating cost 
(ve~su.s bu.dget) 
-Cycle time 
-Plant Utilisation 
5) Who sets performance measures? 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
... aaeaaaa •• e 
6) How 15 measurement done? 
•••• II •••• a II a II II II II II 
7) Who 1S measured? 
II II II II ... II II II II II II II II II II II II 
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II • II II .. II II II II II II II II II II II C 
II • II II 
II II II II II II 
• II II II II II II II II • • II II II 
8) What changes 1n these have there been ln measu~es SlnCE' 
installa.tion 
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II 
II II II II II • 
• II • • II II • 
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II 
• II II II II II II II II II II 
commissioning? 
II II II II 
• II II II II II II II II II II II 
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II 
II II II II II II II . . . 
..... 
9) How have your 
since the st21.rt? 
eNpectations of these projects changed 
· . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . · . · . . . . . · . . . · . . . . · . . . . . . . . . 
· . 
. . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • · . . • • • • • • • • • • · . • • • • • . . . . . · . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • · . . . · . . · . . • • · . . · . • •• I: • · . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . 
• • · . 
• • • • • • • • • • 
10) What 
· . . · . . · . . . · . . • • • a a • • • a a · . . • • • • • • a 
· . . · . . • • • · . • • · . . · . . . . . · . . . 
have 
since 
• • • • a • • • • • • 
been the key events: 
The show stoppers 
The key technical events 
Other problems 
Problems solved 
the sta.rt of the project 
a • • • • • • • • • • I: • • • • • • • • • • • • • a • • • • • • • . . . 
· . . . . 
· . . . . 
· . . . 
•• c ........................................ . . . . . . . 
· . . . . • • • • • .. • • • • • • • a a • • • • • • • • · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . 
• a a • • • • a a • • a a • • • a • • • • • • • • • a • a • • . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . 
• •••• I: •••••••• a a • • •••••••••••••• a ••• · . . 
l.n the last 6 months 
· . . • a .... II • · . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
n a a • • • • • D • a a • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • n · . · . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • a • • · . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . · . 
. . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • a • • a II • a a II • a • a a a a • • • • • a • • • • • • • • • • • a • . . . . 
· . . . . • a ••••••• II a II a a • • • c • • II • • • • • • • · . . 
11) Have there been any chanqes in the organisation of your 
unit as a direct result of the implementation of CADjCAM~ 
· . . . . . • • • • • • • a • 
. . . 
II a • • II a • II • a a • • • II II • 
•••••••••••••••••• a •••••••••••• •••••••••• 
. . . . . . . . . . 
• ••••••••••••••• a •••••• · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . 
• •• II •••••• II II a •• II • II II II ••••••••••••••• • II • • • • •••• • •• • • 
• • II •••• II •••••••••••• II •••••••••••• II •• • ••• 
· . . . . . . . . . 
12) If so!, have you eNperienced 
company~ outside your 
any oppo=ition 
unit to the parts of your 
from other 
changes you 
have made following implement.ation? 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . 
. . . . . 
• • • • • · . . · .. . · . . . . · . . . . · . . . 
· ... • • · . . • • II • • • · . • • · . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· .............. . · ... 
· ................... . 
• •• II a ••••• · ...... . . . . · ................. . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . 
· . 
• •• • • • • · .. • • • • • a • . . . . • • • • • · .. 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
13) 
of 
Have you been 
such pressure? 
obliged to make any changes as a 
. . . . . 
. . . . . . 
re=ult 
. . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . 
. . . 
• • 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
• • • • · . . . . . . . . . • • • • • • • • · .... 
· ...... . 
. . . . . . . . . · . . . 
. . . . . . . . 
• ••• •••• • • · . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . · .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • · ........... . · .................. . 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
14) Have you gained any unforeseen benef i ts~' 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II • • .. • • • • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . ••• II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
· . . . . . . . . . . •••••• II ••••• . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • .. • .. • • • a 'II • • • . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• ............. a a ••• a ••• . . II • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . 
15) you 
imp 1 emen ta. tion 
If were to start aqain 
differently? 
how would you manage thi~ 
• II ......... II •••••••• II a •••••••• 
••••••••• lIlIa ••••••• a •••••••• 
• II a • . . . . 
· .. • • • • • II •• .. .. . . II II ............. . . . . 
. . . II 'II a II . . . 
.. " .... .................. . ... . . . 
17) Looking back, do you think that you made the right 
choice in system specification? 
'II II a ...... .. .... . . . 
........... a •••• . . . . . .. . . . . • II II • • 
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 
a •••• a ..... a •• •••• a ••••••••••• 
· ...... . 
18) Are there B.ny issues .... Jhic h you think ought to be 
a.ddressed B.SSOC ia ted with CAD/CAt'1 implementa.tion which 
hB.ve not covered in thi=. in terv ielrJ? 
II a .......... . .... . . 
• a II a a ••• II • II . . . . .. 
. . . II • II • II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
• • II • • • • II • • • • a .... a II II •••• 
... • II • II II II 
II • II • • • II • • • 
VERY MANY THANKS INDEED FOR YOUR TIME 
we 
